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ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin Church was a Puritan from colonial New England.  Church moved to the 
frontier where he befriended many of his Native American neighbors.  Through those 
friendships, Church was able to pass between the cultural boundaries that separated 
native England and the Puritan settlements.  Church maintained his loyalty to his Anglo-
American community and his Christian faith, but also developed an appreciation for 
many elements of Native American culture.  When King Philip’s War broke out between 
the New Englanders and several groups of Native Americans in the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century, Church fought for the English colonies.  However, Church adopted 
many of the tactics he had learned from his Native American friends and used them 
against his enemies.  Instead of following Native American allies into battle, Church 
recruited his Native American friends to fight for him.  Church built a unit that combined 
men of both races and melded the tactics of both into a new style of fighting.  Church and 
his unit gained fame when they killed the Wampanoag sachem, Metacom, and captured 
his War Chief, Annawon.  Church’s reputation grew, and he was called upon to fight 
again in King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, against the French and their Native 
American allies.  Men like John Gorham and Robert Rogers followed in Church’s 
footsteps, creating more units that practiced an American style of irregular warfare, later 
known as ranging.  When Robert Rogers published his “Rules of Ranging” in 1757, his 
name became synonymous with the American ranger.  Yet Rogers is only a chapter of a 
story that began nearly a century earlier.  Benjamin Church, a name little known outside 
of historians of colonial New England, was the true founder of American ranging.     
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Many people who study the military conflicts of the colonial period, both 
professional historians and casual fans of military history, have heard of Robert Rogers 
and his company of rangers.  Infantry soldiers of the U. S. Army are also familiar with 
Rogers, as his “Standing Orders” appears in the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook, second 
only to the “Ranger Creed.”1  Much fewer people have heard of Benjamin Church, a 
colonial figure much more deserving of acclaim than Rogers.  Who is Benjamin Church, 
and why is he more significant than Rogers in regard to the innovation of American 
rangers?  Rogers is no doubt important, as he is credited with “the first written manual of 
warfare in the New World.”2  However, many of the tactics Rogers so famously 
published were being put to use nearly a century earlier by Benjamin Church and his 
company of guerilla fighters that would one day become known as American rangers.   
 Benjamin Church was a frontiersman who lived in an area of New England that 
was heavily populated by Native Americans.  Church befriended his Native American 
neighbors, accepted parts of their culture, and even adopted some of their lifestyle.  As a 
result of his openness to Native American culture, Church recognized potential in 
adapting parts of Native American warfare into New England militia units.  By blending 
Native American and European military tactics, Church created an effective transcultural 
military unit in colonial New England.  Church and his specialized unit are most famous 
                                                          
1 United States Army, SH 21-76:  The Ranger Handbook (Fort Benning, GA: 1996), i-ii. 
2 John R. Cuneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1959), 55. 
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for the death of the Wampanoag sachem Metacom, called King Philip by early New 
Englanders, in what became known as King Philip’s War.  He also established similar 
units that saw action in King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War.  Church’s special 
brand of warfare did not die with him.  In fact, the demand for soldiers like Church only 
increased throughout the colonial era.  Church’s innovation and success paved the way 
for men like Robert Rogers to become key figures in American military history. 
Historians have not totally neglected Church.  For more than a century, historians 
have mentioned the first ranger in a variety of secondary sources.  Methodologies 
featuring Church range from grand narratives to social histories to cultural histories 
focused on topics as diverse as ideas about gender roles and the influence of written word 
on societies.  Church is featured most prominently in military histories.  However, despite 
the variety of historical commentary featuring Church, he is usually limited to only a few 
pages of subject matter within a much broader topic.  Church has been portrayed as a 
romantic hero, a bloodthirsty villain, a cultural mediator, a tactical innovator, and an 
over-glorified self promoter.  Much of the variation in Church’s character is related to the 
overall scheme of the historical work or to the time it was written. 
Early twentieth century works that feature Benjamin Church rely on a grand 
narrative approach.  These works are focused on English colonists or French colonists, 
with little thought paid to the Native American perspective.  At the turn of the twentieth 
century, Samuel Adams Drake published The Border Wars of New England:  Commonly 
called King William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars.  This volume does not discuss Church’s 
campaign against the Wampanoags, Narragansetts, and Nipmucks during King Philip’s 
War.  Church was an older man and already a hero to the people of New England when 
3 
 
he went to war against French Canadians, Acadians, and their Native American allies 
during the imperial wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.   Initially, 
many New England Puritan elites resisted Church’s embracement of Native American 
culture and its application to New World warfare.  It was only after a string of successes 
in King Philip’s War that the New England governments were more supportive of 
Church.  As Drake’s work focuses on a later period, much of that information is avoided.  
However, Drake does mention that Church’s unit was multi-ethnic.  “A part of the two 
hundred and fifty men enlisted for this service were Seconnet and Cape Cod Indians, 
some of whom had been out with Church before.”3  The passage shows that Church not 
only used Native American soldiers during this war, but that he had in the past as well.   
History has shown that Church’s Native American recruits were essential to his 
style of warfare.  Drake, however, dismisses them as “true Indians” who “sold their 
powder –horns and bullet-pouches to get money to squander for drink.”4  Professional 
historians today do not embrace this type of ideology.  Drake was alive during a time 
when certain Native American groups were still very much considered enemies of the 
United States, and he was likely the product of his times.  Drake also suggests that 
“Church now found himself at liberty to carry out his favorite idea of tracking the 
savages to their villages and striking them there.”5  Drake later supports Church’s 
destruction of enemy villages with the phrase “root out the nests and the vultures would 
fly away.”6  While such dehumanizing terms as savage and vulture would surely be 
                                                          
3 Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New England: Commonly Called King William’s and Queen 
Anne’s Wars (New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1897), 38. 
4 Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New England, 38. 
5 Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New England, 41-42. 
6 Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New England, 67. 
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considered racist by today’s standards, the context of the terms still gives insight into the 
tactics Church used during King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War. 
It is important to note that while Drake is obviously biased towards the Anglo-
American cause of King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, he is not afraid to 
discuss Church’s failures.  After Church’s final military expedition, Drake comments that 
“this expedition ended, like the others that had gone before it, in disappointment and 
disgrace.”7  In this case, Drake more likely perceived the failure, as he probably 
misunderstood a campaign of attrition versus a glorious victory with a high number of 
casualties.  While Church never replicated his success of King Philip’s War, that victory 
is not really indicative of guerilla warfare.  Regardless, Drake does give an account of 
Church’s campaigns into Acadia, mostly in the form of a grand narrative, and primarily 
using Church’s own published memoirs as his source. 
Shortly after Drake’s publication, John Frederic Herbin published The History of 
Grand Pré:  The Home of Longfellow’s “Evangeline.”  Similar to Drake, the part of this 
work concerning Benjamin Church relates to King William’s War and Queen Anne’s 
War.  Unlike Drake, however, this work is biased towards the people of Acadia, who 
were the target of Church’s raids.  Herbin’s portrayal of Church is very much the villain.  
According to Herbin, Church “destroyed the populous villages, plundered the inhabitants, 
and killed their cattle” and that “ruin and desolation followed his route.”8  While 
Church’s campaigns in Acadia were destructive, and there were casualties, the language 
of Herbin’s text makes the raids seemingly more deadly.  However brutal Herbin makes 
                                                          
7 Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New England, 114. 
8 John Frederic Herbin; The History of Grand Pré: The Home of Longfellow’s “Evangeline” (St. John, NB; 
Barnes & Co., Limited, n.d.), 36. 
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him appear, it is still evident that Church was utilizing unconventional tactics.  Herbin 
refers to Church as “a celebrated partisan,” a term synonymous with irregular warfare.9   
Herbin does allow some of the blame to pass from Church to the colonial 
governments by arguing that “he was sent in the spirit of retaliation, because the Indians 
had been attacking the English settlements, instigated, it is said, by the French of 
Canada.”10  In doing so, Herbin also passes some blame to the French and their Native 
American allies, but maintains that the people of Acadia were innocent of any wrong 
doing.  Herbin also tries to remove any hero status from Church by asserting that “he 
must have outgrown the valor that made him a noted Indian fighter: for… he treated the 
innocent people there in a despicable manner.  Public opinion in Massachusetts branded 
him as a coward, though he received the thanks of the government.”11  Herbin maintains 
Acadian innocence while trying to use Church’s own people to discredit him.  
Furthermore, it seems that Herbin has no problem with Church killing Native Americans, 
only Acadians.  Like Drake, that likely indicates that Herbin was a product of his time. 
 A significant work concerning Benjamin Church’s exploits in King Philip’s War 
was published in 1958.  Douglas Edward Leach’s Flintlock and Tomahawk:  New 
England in King Philip’s War, like Drake and Herbin’s works, relies on a grand narrative 
style of history.  Leach’s primary focus is not on Church himself, but Church does 
receive more discussion than in previous works.  After all, as Leach notes, “the name 
most frequently associated with the ending of King Philip’s War is that of Captain 
                                                          
9 Herbin, The History of Grand Pré, 36. 
10 Herbin, The History of Grand Pré, 36. 
11 Herbin, The History of Grand Pré, 37. 
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Benjamin Church.”12  Leach relies heavily on Church’s memoirs as a source for 
Metacom’s death, so some of Church’s tactics are discussed.13  It seems that Leach was 
aware of Church’s new style of fighting, but was unaware of how revolutionary it was, or 
that it was connected to a cultural appreciativeness of Native American culture.  It is 
important to note that Leach discusses early conflicts between Church and the other 
colonial military powers.  Leach mentions that Church recognized an enemy retreat as a 
strategic withdrawal, whereas the other military leaders falsely believed they were 
victorious for having taken ground.14  This ideological contrast was not demonstrated in 
earlier historical works, yet is significant in suggesting that Church was adopting a new 
military mindset while other Puritan commanders were settled on European military 
doctrine.  Leach states that Church was “convinced he was in the company of fools and 
cowards,” referring to the more conventional soldiers of the colonies.15 
It is interesting that Leach recognized Church was different from the other 
commanders, but failed to recognize that the innovative tactics were rooted in cultural 
diffusion.  Perhaps that is because Leach, like Drake and Herbin, was himself not open to 
Native American ideology.  Leach admits that the Native American losers of the war left 
no sources to tell their side of the story.  Leach argues that his book is an attempt to 
present a more rounded picture of King Philip’s War.  It is evident that he tries, but the 
socio-cultural attitudes of the 1950s are still present in his work.  Leach uses society’s 
familiarization with total war, because of World War II having just ended within a decade 
                                                          
12 Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk:  New England in King Philip’s War (New York, 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1958), 228. 
13 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 232-236. 
14 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 54-55. 
15 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 51-52. 
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of publication, to justify some of the English actions against their enemies.16 Leach 
argues that King Philip’s War was inevitable because of the clash of two incompatible 
cultures.  However, Leach unfavorably refers to the Native Americans as “Indians in their 
primitive ignorance” and “bloody fiends.”17  It would be difficult for a historian with that 
mindset to recognize Church’s tactics grew out of an appreciation of Native American 
culture. 
In the early 1960s, Howard H. Peckham published The Colonial Wars, 1689-
1762.  Once again, the focus shifted to the imperial wars that involved British America, 
French Canada, and Acadia.  Similar to Drake and Herbin, Peckham mostly avoids 
Church’s early years as a guerilla fighter, but does mention that he was an “experienced 
veteran who had crushed King Philip’s uprising fifteen years” prior to the event of King 
William’s War.18  Peckham does acknowledge that Church’s fighting style differed from 
more conventional forces, stating that “while Church ranged against the Indians, Phips 
laid out a respectable fort to accommodate more than a dozen cannon.”19  It can be 
argued, however, that Peckham uses a much more favorable voice when describing the 
conventional tactics of Sir William Phips.  It is interesting to note that Peckham’s work 
also discusses Robert Rogers.  Peckham credits Rogers with scouting, taking prisoners, 
and gathering intelligence for British commanders in the French and Indian War, 
claiming “the innovation eventually reformed the British Army.”20  Peckham wrongfully 
attributes the innovative tactics to Rogers.  While Rogers did influence the British 
                                                          
16 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, vi-viii. 
17 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 1, 7. 
18 Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 1689-1762 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 
41. 
19 Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 44. 
20 Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 153. 
8 
 
commanders, his methods were not innovative, as Rogers simply followed in the methods 
of Church.   
In the 1970s, historical works that included Church moved away from the grand 
narrative to discussions about social and cultural factors affecting colonial New England.  
Charles M. Segal and David C. Stineback published Puritans, Indians, and Manifest 
Destiny, which discussed the conflicted relationships between the two groups in the 
colonial period.  A major problem with the book, however, is the lack of discussion of 
Church.  The book is about Puritans and Native Americans but mostly excludes a 
significant character that bridged both cultures.  The book discusses a female sachem, 
Weetamoo, who discussed Metacom’s looming attack with Church, but the work makes 
no mention of his special relationship with his Native American neighbors that put him in 
the position to discuss such things with her.21  The book also mentions that Church and 
his men killed Metacom.22  A similar work, published one year later, was David 
Horowitz’s The First Frontier:  The Indian Wars and America’s Origins, 1607-1776.  
Horowitz, like Segal and Stineback, make little discussion of Church.  Horowitz explains 
that another female sachem, Awashonks, surrendered to Church and offered her warriors 
to fight for him.23  However, the author makes no mention of Church and Awashonks’s 
preexisting relationship, a vital element to Church’s story.  Also like Segal and Stineback, 
Horowitz briefly states Church’s role in the death of Metacom, but nothing of the tactics 
that made him different from the other colonial military leaders.24 
                                                          
21 Charles M. Segal and David C. Stineback, Puritans, Indians, and Manifest Destiny (New York:  G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1977), 190. 
22 Segal and Stineback, Puritans, Indians, and Manifest Destiny, 200. 
23 David Horowitz, The First Frontier:  The Indian Wars and America’s Origins, 1607-1776 (New York:  
Simon and Schuster, 1978), 79. 
24 Horowitz, The First Frontier, 79-81. 
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The 1990s saw a new historical trend in exploring Native American culture and 
the colonial period.  Works that discussed Benjamin Church reflected that trend.  A 
significant work concerning Church was The Skulking Way of War:  Technology and 
Tactics among the New England Indians by Patrick Malone.  Malone’s work was not just 
focused on Native American warfare, but how it differed from warfare practiced by 
colonial militias.  Malone is one of the first historians to identify that Church’s style was 
different from both, but heavily influenced by Native Americans.  Malone argues that “a 
special combined force of Indians and militiamen under the command of Captain 
Benjamin Church was doing great damage to hostile groups… until the English made 
good use of their Indian allies and began to adopt some Indian tactics, the warriors who 
opposed them were far superior in forest combat.”25  Malone also mentions the New 
Englanders’ disrespect for that style of fighting, arguing that “the English would have to 
use tactics which they had long regarded with contempt and indignation.”26  Malone 
refers to the tactics Church utilized as “a tactical and technological revolution” and that a 
“new doctrine of forest warfare was evolving.”27  Finally, Malone states that “Church 
probably did the most to popularize the adaptation of unconventional tactics by English 
forces.”28  More than any previous historian, Malone defines Church as a tactical 
innovator, but he is far from the focus of the work. 
In 1996, Philip Gould published an article that was seemingly focused on Church.  
“Reinventing Benjamin Church:  Virtue, Citizenship and the History of King Philip’s 
                                                          
25 Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War:  Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians 
(Lanham, MD:  Madison books, 1991), 87-88. 
26 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 90. 
27 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 90. 
28 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 91-92. 
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War in Early National America” was actually focused more on the writings of early 
nineteenth century America.  Gould agrees with Malone that Church’s “unorthodox 
military tactics, which derived in large part from the Algonquians themselves, often put 
him at odds with the Puritan magistracy.”29  However, Gould argues that Church’s 
memoirs, published by his son Thomas Church, saw a surge in popularity in the early 
nineteenth century because it appealed to “early national America’s understanding of 
‘virtue’ and ‘republicanism.’”30  Gould claims that historians of the early republic 
released new editions of the texts, but that they did more than “reprint Church; they 
reinvented him” as a character that was more appealing to the republican ideology of the 
time.  Gould’s purpose is to express caution when reading edited primary sources, but his 
article possibly explains why some earlier versions of Church were different from his 
original memoirs and later historical works. 
Colin Calloway’s New Worlds for All:  Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of 
Early America discusses how Anglo-Americans and Native Americans became more like 
one another.  This work is similar to Malone’s but on a much larger scale, encompassing 
cultural topics like religion and clothing.  Therefore, the work is much larger than 
military tactics, but Calloway rightfully includes a brief discussion of Church.  Calloway, 
in agreement with Malone, states that New Englanders abhorred the way Native 
Americans fought, but eventually they “resorted to such tactics themselves to defeat the 
Indian confederation led by Metacomet.  Captain Benjamin Church in particular 
                                                          
29 Philip Gould, “Reinventing Benjamin Church:  Virtue, Citizenship and the History of King Philip’s War 
in Early National America,” Journal of the Early Republic 16, no. 4 (Winter, 1996): 646. 
30 Gould, “Reinventing Benjamin Church,” 648. 
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employed Indian tactics and Indian allies against Indian enemies.”31  Furthermore, 
Calloway suggests that Church’s connection to Native American culture went further 
than tactics.  Calloway explains that “Church had lived among the Indians, and put what 
he learned to good use.”32  Church’s lifestyle directly contrasts with the Puritan norm, as 
Calloway explains that New Englanders who lived with Native Americans or adopted 
their ways were considered degenerates and some colonies even passed laws to prohibit 
“indianization.”33  Another interesting topic in New Worlds for All is Calloway’s 
comments on cultural historian Richard Slotkin’s “‘frontier hero,’ who had knowledge of 
both Indian and white ways.”34  Calloway explains that Slotkin speaks of “fictional 
characters like Hawkeye in James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans,” but 
Calloway claims that “history furnished numerous examples:  Benjamin Church, Robert 
Rogers, Daniel Boone, and others.”35  Calloway places Rogers and Church within the 
same category, yet Church’s claim to “frontier hero” status was earned much earlier than 
Rogers. 
Jill Lepore’s The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American 
Identity is not as much a history of King Philip’s War as it is a discussion of how the 
contemporary writings about the war influenced American society.  Therefore, Benjamin 
Church and his tactics are not a major point of conversation in the book, but Lepore does 
mention him, as his memoirs are one of the significant primary sources of the raid that 
                                                          
31 Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds for All:  Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America 
(Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 102. 
32 Calloway, New Worlds for All, 102. 
33 Calloway, New Worlds for All, 153. 
34 Calloway, New Worlds for All, 196. 
35 Calloway, New Worlds for All, 196. 
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led to Metacom’s death.  Lepore suggests that he created a polished version of himself, 
stating that “Church portrayed himself as a man searching for conscience, an independent 
moral agent, acting on the courage of his convictions, more moral that the Mohegans, but 
also more moral than the English.”36  While it is likely true that Church created a more 
favorable image of himself for his memoirs, it is important to note that, even as Lepore 
suggests, he belonged to a space that was neither English nor Native American.  It is also 
important to note that Church’s memoirs are the major source for his pre-war 
relationships with Native Americans.  Church died long before Cooper’s The Last of the 
Mohicans and America’s romantic fascination with white characters that embodied the 
spirit of Native Americans.  Therefore, despite Church’s self promotion, it is likely that 
much of Church’s memoirs concerning his acceptance of Native American culture is true, 
supported by the fact that Church would not have gained any special status for doing so 
in a time where Native Americans were still perceived as a threat to Anglo-American life. 
Entering into the new millennium, historical works that mention Church are 
primarily military histories, though not always.  Even those military histories, however, 
are more rounded and complex than the grand narratives of the early twentieth century, 
and are more likely to include aspects of cultural, social, and political history.  The result 
is a more rounded and complex discussion of Church as well.  James D. Drake’s King 
Philip’s War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 is an example of such work.  Even 
the title suggests a more objective view of the belligerents rather than portraying the New 
Englanders as good and the Native Americans as villains.  While Drake describes Church 
                                                          
36 Jill Lepore, The Name of War:  King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York:  
Vintage Books, 1998), 17. 
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as “the quintessential self promoter,” the author does portray Church as an early 
champion of Native American rights.37  Drake explains that Church spoke against “the 
sale of 160 rebel Indians” who had “surrendered with the promise of life and liberty.”38  
Drake also mentions that “Church’s force included a large number of non-Christian 
Wampanoags, suggesting that neither faith nor tribe necessarily, determined the treatment 
of Indians.”39  While this continues the discussion of Church’s conflict in ideology with 
the colonial powers, it is beyond the scope of military tactics. 
In An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Acadia, 
by Geoffrey Plank, Church is once again portrayed as a villain.  Like Herbin a century 
before, Plank’s focus on Church is connected to raids in Acadia during King William’s 
War and Queen Anne’s War.  Plank suggests that Church was motivated by economic 
gains because of the creation of scalp bounties.40  Plank also portrays Church as a rogue 
warrior, who acts outside of the colonial system.  According to Plank, “though no 
Acadians had participated in the attack on Deerfield, and some Acadian villagers had 
recently declared their willingness to cooperate with the New Englanders, Benjamin 
Church… decided on his own that he would return to Acadia for a punitive raid.”41  
However, Plank then suggests that Massachusetts governor Joseph Dudley “warned 
Church to avoid Port Royal and refrain from engaging the French military.  This would 
be a punitive raid aimed exclusively at noncombatants.”42  Not only does this seem to 
                                                          
37 James D. Drake, King Philip’s War:  Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 (Amherst:  The University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 151. 
38 James D. Drake, King Philip’s War, 121. 
39 James D. Drake, King Philip’s War, 153. 
40 Geoffrey Plank, An Unsettled Conquest:  The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Acadia 
(Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 33. 
41 Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 36-37. 
42 Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 36-37. 
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contradict Plank’s earlier statement that Church acted outside of colonial authority, it 
seems in this case that Church’s brutal raids are the result of following orders.  Plank’s 
overall theme is the British plan to remove the Acadians, however, and Church provides a 
suitable villain for his thesis. 
Contrary to Plank’s portrayal of Church as a villain, Guy Chet portrays Church as 
an accidental hero undeserving of fame.  In Conquering the American Wilderness: The 
Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast, Chet argues that “The 
Colonies’ military and political leadership never rejected European military conventions.  
Benjamin Church’s accomplishments, as well as his legacy, have been overstated by 
himself and by generations of admirers.  European tactics were not outdated or 
ineffective in the American wilderness.”43  Chet acknowledges that Church “adapted 
characteristics of Indian warfare” and later suggests that “the fact that Winslow ignored 
Church’s advice sheds light on the inadequacies that characterized English military 
operations.”44 Chet himself admits that European tactics were problematic in the New 
World.  However, Chet argues that “the lessons taught by Benjamin Church and his 
ideological successors went unheeded by those in positions of high military command.”45  
Chet is correct in arguing that Anglo-Americans did not abandon European tactics, even 
after the War for Independence.  Church himself did not fully abandon European tactics, 
but combined them with Native American tactics.  What Chet fails to realize is that 
Church’s style of combat, later known as ranging, did not replace conventional tactics but 
                                                          
43 Guy Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness:  The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial 
Northeast (Amherst:  University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 2. 
44 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 38, 51. 
45 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 60. 
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supplemented them.  Even today, irregular forces work with much larger conventional 
forces.  Church is the founder of such operations. 
N.E.S. Griffiths returns the discussion to raids of Acadia in From Migrant to 
Acadian:  A North American Border People, 1604-1755.  Like Herbin and Plank, 
Griffiths portrays a villainous Church who “acted with considerable duplicity.”46  Unlike 
Herbin and Plank, who wrote of the death and destruction Church left in his path, 
Griffiths argues that Church’s raids were ineffective and insignificant.  Griffiths states 
that the villages Church raided, including the dykes that kept the fields free of seawater, 
“were repaired or rebuilt reasonably quickly.”47  From this point of view, Griffiths is 
more in alliance with Chet in arguing that Church’s style of warfare was insignificant in 
terms of winning the war.  However, history has shown that the majority of violence 
during King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War was carried out as raids similar to 
those conducted by Church.  John Mack Faragher also discusses Church’s raids in 
Acadia, but argues against Griffith’s claims that they were insignificant.  In A Great and 
Noble Scheme:  The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from their 
American Homeland, Faragher agrees with Herbin and Plank, stating that “the Acadians 
would long remember Major Benjamin Church’s assault.”48  Faragher even blames 
Church for some of the Acadian combatants resorting to violence, claiming his 
“destruction of the Acadian settlements could not have been better calculated to turn 
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neutrals into implacable enemies.”49  Faragher also agrees that Church was motivated by 
money, stating that when the Massachusetts government “raised the bounty on native 
scalps to an astounding 100 pounds,” it “drew the attention of Benjamin Church.”50 
The same year Griffiths and Faragher published their works, John Grenier 
published The First Way of War:  American War Making on the Frontier.  Grenier does 
not deny Church’s violence, and in fact, it is central to his thesis that American frontier 
warfare was bloody for combatants and noncombatants alike.  Grenier briefly discusses 
Church, but states that he “took it upon himself to learn the Indian way of skulking,” and 
created a special unit consisting of “friendly Indians” and “a handful of hardy settlers.”51  
Grenier gives credit to Native American allies, without which, “Americans… never could 
have become rangers.”52  Grenier also warns against giving too much credit to Church 
and his men for the victory in King Philip’s War, but that “he planted the seed from 
which the American ranger tradition would grow.”53  Genier also discusses Church’s role 
in the wars with France, explaining that the “rangers skirmished with Abenaki warriors 
and waged extirpative war on Abenaki villages and the noncombatants they contained.”54  
Grenier does not condemn or forgive Church for his actions, nor does he consider him a 
hero or villain.  Instead, Grenier recognizes him as a tactical innovator and founder of a 
style of warfare that continues in the American military tradition today. 
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Ann M. Little approaches King Philip’s War from a socio-cultural methodology 
in Abraham in Arms:  War and Gender in Colonial New England.  Little argues that the 
war was a struggle of masculinity between the Puritans and Native Americans, and that 
both sides saw the other as lacking courage and masculinity in regard to their tactics.55  
While Little’s book addresses the societies as a whole, she does identify Church as sort of 
a cultural outlier.  Little mentions that “Church worked especially hard to secure the 
loyalty of Awashonks to the English… but apparently the authorities in Boston thought 
too little of these potentially valuable allies to strike the deal.”56  Little also suggests that 
he may not have been as effective at training Anglo-American rangers as hoped, stating 
that “despite Church’s interest in adopting Indian tactics, his narrative suggests that 
Indian men were much more adept at creating a successful mix of Indian and European 
tactics.”57  Regardless of these setbacks, it is clear that Little sees Church as someone 
who disrupts the cultural guidelines set by the New England establishment. 
John Grenier returns to the historiography with The Far Reaches of Empire:  War 
in Nova Scotia, 1710-1760.  The scope of this work actually discusses events in Acadia 
after Church’s death, such as King George’s War and Father Le Loutre’s War.  However, 
Grenier explains that, with the exception of a few conventional military operations, 
Church’s raids were the only significant military actions that occur in Acadia during King 
William’s War and Queen Anne’s War.58  Grenier also addresses Griffiths and Faragher, 
who both published works on Acadia the same year as Grenier’s The First Way of War.  
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Grenier claims that “Griffiths remains the premier scholar of the Acadians” and the From 
Migrant to Acadian is “the natural starting place for any study that touches Acadian 
history.”59  However, Grenier says that “Faragher overstates his case; his focus on the 
grand derangement ‘as an early example of ethnic cleansing’ carries too much present 
day emotional weight and in turn overshadows much of the accommodation that 
Acadians and Anglo-Americans reached.”60  While Church is mostly omitted from this 
work, this is an important development.  Griffiths portrayed Church as an insignificant 
raider whereas Faragher portrayed Church as a greedy, blood thirsty villain.  If what 
Grenier suggests about Faragher’s work is true, then it is possible that Faragher 
exaggerated Church’s character as well. 
A significant work to address Church was Ranger Dawn:  The American Ranger 
from the Colonial Period to the Mexican War, by Robert W. Black.  Once again, material 
on Church is limited to a few pages, but Black does establish that he had pre-war 
relationships with Native Americans.  “This close contact served him well as he 
understood Indian methods of warfare and established friends among the Indians who 
would later serve as scouts and warriors in his force.”61  Black mentions that Church’s 
rangers were “a mixture of colonists and Indians, thus combining the advantages of both 
groups,” which does not credit one group or the other with the innovation, but explains 
that something new was created.62  Black also mentions that Church and his men were 
carrying out tactics that Rogers made famous many decades later.63 
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In 2010, Daniel R. Mandell published King Philip’s War:  Colonial Expansion, 
Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty.  In this work, Mandell portrays a 
much more complex view of the causes and effects of the war as well as a much more 
rebellious version of Church.  Mandell states that he “spoke Wampanoag and had 
developed close relations with the Natives living in the area.”64  A Wampanoag-speaking 
Church who had close relations with Native Americans certainly builds on the idea of the 
man as a cultural outlier.  Furthermore, Mandell presents several examples of Church 
battling with the other colonial officers.  Mandell states that early in the war, Church had 
“tried to get the colonial forces to move more quickly against Metacom” and that he 
“urged the United Colonies to make more liberal use of Indian scouts and adopt guerilla 
tactics.”65  Mandell suggests that “Church and his sons negotiated with tribes in ways that 
recognized native leadership, autonomy, and culture.”66  While Mandell’s version 
portrays Church as having possibly gone native, it is far from the racist Indian fighter 
historians were portraying years before, and likely closer to the truth considering 
Church’s own words demonstrate he was close friends with his Native American 
neighbors. 
R. Todd Romero’s Making War and Minting Christians: Masculinity, Religion, 
and Colonialism in Early New England compares and contrasts Puritan and Native 
American attitudes about religion and masculinity.  Like Little, Romero addresses the 
societies as a whole.  Interestingly, the book is about English and Native American 
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masculinity, but avoids discussing Church, who possessed qualities of both.  Church is 
briefly mentioned, but as a commander that many Native Americans fought under during 
King William’s War.67  However, Romero’s work is important to understanding Church 
because it provides information that demonstrates he crossed the cultural boundaries of 
the two groups. 
Recently, Brian D. Carroll published “‘Savages’ in the Service of Empire:  Native 
American Soldiers in Gorham’s Rangers, 1744-1762.”  In this essay, Carroll also notes 
that “Robert Rogers is widely credited with instituting the American ranger tradition and, 
thus, with establishing… a uniquely American style of warfare based on Indian 
strategies.”68  Carroll also acknowledges that “some scholars assert that Rogers was 
merely the heir apparent to men such as Benjamin Church.”69  However, Carroll focuses 
on Gorham’s Rangers, who he argues are “the true descendents of Church’s early 
companies as well as the immediate antecedents to and model for Rogers’s Rangers.”70  It 
is clear from these statements that Carroll recognizes Church as the true founder of 
American rangers, and only disputes that Rogers should rightfully come after Gorham. 
It is clear that Benjamin Church has been portrayed many ways in a variety of 
historical works.  The problem is that Church has been limited to only a few pages in 
each of those works.  While volumes have been written about his successors, the founder 
of American ranging has yet to have even one chapter dedicated to him, with the 
exception of republications of his memoirs. The closest thing to a dedicated essay, 
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Gould’s “Reinventing Benjamin Church,” is actually more focused on the historians of 
the nineteenth century.  Some works feature him more heavily, specifically those few 
discussing the fighting of King Philip’s War, but he is never the subject of the work.   
Perhaps that is why Robert Rogers is more nationally known, even if he only followed in 
the footsteps of Benjamin Church. 
This thesis hopes to reexamine Benjamin Church and his contributions to 
irregular warfare in colonial America.  Rather than mentioning him in the context of 
larger work, this work will make Church the subject of historical discussion.  The second 
chapter discusses the Pequot War, which was the first major military conflict in New 
England.  The chapter exposes some of the problems with European tactics in the New 
World and demonstrates the colonies’ dependence on Native American allies.  While 
Native American allies were used throughout the colonial period, Church’s lessons 
helped reduce the dependency.  The third chapter examines Benjamin Church in the years 
just prior to and during King Philip’s War.  This chapter is heavily focused on the 
cultural differences between the Puritans of New England and the Native American 
groups of the region as well as the ways Church moved between cultures.  The fourth 
chapter also discusses Church during King Philip’s War, but from a military 
methodology.  The chapter explains how the creation of a transcultural military unit was 
a turning point in the war.  The fifth chapter discusses Church’s raids against the French 
Acadians and the Abenakis during King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War.  The 
chapter compares Church’s tactics to the conventional operations of the war, which 
demonstrates that he was truly conducting a guerilla war.  The final chapter examines the 
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continued use of ranging after Church’s death and an increased desire for ranger units by 
both the colonial forces and the British Army. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
Chapter II 
THE PEQUOT WAR:  IDENTIFYING COLONIAL DEPENDENCE ON NATIVE 
AMERICAN ALLIES 
 
 When crediting someone with an innovation, in this case Benjamin Church and a 
new style of fighting, it is necessary to show what preceded the innovation.  In the case of 
warfare in colonial New England, the Pequot War is best suited for such an example.  A 
generation before King Philip’s War and a few years before Church was born, the early 
colonists fought a war against the Pequots, who were one of the dominant Native 
American groups in New England at that time.  There were no men like Church to lead 
the fight against the Pequots, yet the English colonists won the war by a large margin.  
The Pequots were almost entirely eradicated, and the New Englanders replaced them as 
one of the dominant powers in the region.  How did the English colonists accomplish 
such a victory?  The New Englanders did not have a man who, like Church, could fight 
like a Native American, but they had the support of Native American allies themselves, 
particularly the Narragansetts and the Mohegans.   
The New Englanders were completely dependent on Native American allies to 
lead them into the wilderness to fight the Pequots.  Yet, once they found the Pequots, 
they killed them indiscriminately, justifying their violence by their faith.  Despite their 
total dependence on Native Americans, the early colonists viewed themselves as a far 
superior culture and race.  These assumptions were what made Church so different from 
his Puritan brothers, and what caused his methods to be looked down upon early in King 
Philip’s War.  As a result of the near genocide of the Pequots, many Native Americans 
realized the dangerous potential of the English colonists for the first time.  Also, despite 
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the assistance of Native American allies, the English filled the power vacuum left by the 
Pequots, which created more friction in the region.  The Narragansetts and the Mohegans 
did not fight for the love of the English, but for the hatred of the Pequots and for their 
own gains.  The empowered New Englanders denied their allies of some of the things for 
which they fought.  This, along with an ever expanding English population, led to Native 
American anger and resentment, which contributed to King Philip’s War. 
 The Pequots were an Algonquian speaking people who lived in the Connecticut 
River Valley.  The Pequots lived in about fifteen villages at the time of European contact.  
In Pequot society, men hunted, fished, and made war while women gathered food from 
the wilderness and farmed.  The Pequots were a warlike people, and were expanding their 
territory eastward and creating a tribute system among many of the Native American 
groups in New England when the English colonists first arrived.  When the English 
arrived, they brought Old World diseases with them.  From 1616 to 1619, a combination 
of European diseases broke out simultaneously, which decimated Native American 
populations in New England.  The Pequots, however, escaped the epidemics, probably 
because they were somewhat further inland.  However, in 1633, a smallpox epidemic 
struck the Pequots.  The Pequots suffered a 77 percent mortality rate, bringing their 
numbers from an estimated thirteen thousand to about three thousand.1  Not only would 
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such damaging numbers significantly reduce the number of fighting men, but it would 
also affect the society as a whole.  Though there were many less mouths to feed, there 
were fewer men to hunt and fish, and fewer women to farm and gather.  Much of the 
political, spiritual, and military leadership of the town would also be abruptly lost.2  For a 
group that was expanding politically, such a blow would have been devastating, causing a 
frantic search to repair the balance of their world.  The Europeans, being a new factor, 
would have seemed a likely cause of the deaths. 
 The Pequots first made contact with Europeans a year before the smallpox 
epidemic, in 1632.  The Pequots occupied the territory between the rapidly expanding 
English and Dutch settlements. They quickly found themselves in close contact with both 
English and Dutch traders, who were competing for economic control of the region.  
Economic ties with Europeans created further problems for the Pequots.  The Pequots 
dominated the fur trade and wampum trade, but their Native American rivals, like the 
Narragansetts, competed for the European trade.  European goods not only contained 
economic value, but spiritual and political value as well.  These European prestige items 
enhanced the power of sachems who could acquire them.  The Pequots were competing 
with the Narragansetts for political power when a smallpox epidemic hit.  While the 
Pequots were devastated, the Narragansetts were largely unaffected.  Many of the Pequot 
tributaries abandoned them for the Narragansetts, or tried to enhance their own stature.  
One who broke away from the Pequot was Uncas, despite being the brother-in-law of the 
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Pequot sachem, Sassacus.  Uncas and his followers called themselves Mohegans.  The 
Pequots tended to favor trade with the Dutch, while the Mohegans favored trade with the 
English.  The Mohegans continued their rivalry with the Narragansetts, but both groups 
fought on the side of the English colonists once the war broke out.3  
 In 1634, once the Pequots had become weak from smallpox and the loss of 
tributaries, the Dutch traders cut economic ties.  The angered Pequots, desperate to 
reassert dominance, attacked the Dutch.  In retaliation, the Dutch arrested and executed 
Tatobam, a Pequot sachem.  The Pequots then sought an alliance with the New 
Englanders.  The English exploited the desperate Pequots, requiring lands, furs, and 
wampum in exchange for their support.4  The Pequots were in a rapid decline.  Only 
decades earlier, they were a dominant power in New England.  They were decimated by 
disease.  They were surpassed by their rivals, the Narragansetts.  They lost many of their 
tributaries.  They became involved with two different groups of Europeans, and had lost 
the respect of both.  It was only a matter of time before more blood was spilt. 
 Contrary to the Pequots, the English who came to New England were a 
subordinate group within their own people.  The New Englanders were Puritans.  They 
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were anti-Catholic, and also faced many problems with the Anglican Church.  Unlike the 
economic expeditions of the English in the South, the New Englanders sought a new land 
to practice a purified form of the Church of England.  The New England Puritans 
believed themselves to be the chosen people of God, much like the Israelites who fled 
Egypt in the Old Testament.  Furthermore, the Puritans believed that the New England 
wilderness would test them like the wilderness the Israelites faced in the book of Exodus 
and the three temptations of Christ in the New Testament.  The New Englanders believed 
that the Promised Land awaited them, but they must build it themselves.  Captain John 
Mason, a Puritan commander in the Pequot War, quoted the Bible, claiming that “in a 
word, the Lord was… pleased to say unto us, The Land of Canaan will I give unto thee, 
tho’ but few and Strangers in it:  And when we went from one Nation to another… He 
suffered no Man to do us Wrong.”5  Their goal was to “establish a city on a hill as a 
beacon for all the world.”6  The Puritans perceived part of their Christian duty was to 
civilize and convert the Native Americans of the New World to Christianity.  The 
Puritans believed they were acting on God’s will.  To them, this meant that anyone or 
anything that opposed them was a tool of Satan.  It also meant that any measures they felt 
necessary to accomplish their goals were justified in the eyes of God.7 
 The Pequots, like other Algonquians, placed much emphasis on war.  In Native 
American culture, there is little division between the spiritual and secular spheres.  
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Warfare was permeated with rituals and ceremonies, meant to raise spiritual power and 
enhance strength, health, and bravery.8  During the war, Roger Williams wrote to 
Governor John Winthrop Jr., explaining that “the Pequts comfort them selves in this that 
a witch amongst them will sinck” the boats the New Englanders would use to transport 
their men.9  The Pequots, like all other Native Americans in New England, were very 
mobile, equipped with moccasins and snowshoes for over land.  They also used canoes 
from which they quickly and expertly navigated the river systems of New England.  They 
moved around with the seasons, but were not nomadic, and they had palisades around 
their villages to help defend them. Prior to European contact, these forts served them 
well, as they usually contained enough supplies to withstand a siege, which Native 
American attackers almost never did.  The walls could be easily defended with arrows, 
bows being the primary weapon of Native Americans, even in the Pequot War.   Though 
the bows were smaller and lighter than English longbows, they were still larger, roughly 
five to six feet long, than the bows associated with horse cultures from a later time and 
located further west.  The bows could fire an arrow between one hundred and fifty to two 
hundred feet, but the warriors preferred to get as close as possible to their targets.  Arrow 
heads were made from variety of sources, including stones, antlers, bones, and copper.  
Trained Native American warriors could fire their bows rapidly and accurately.  The 
primary hand to hand weapon of the Pequots was a war club that had a smooth stone tip.  
Most Native Americans used clubs or axes, but at the time of the Pequot War, most were 
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made of stone and wood rather than iron.  Yet, Native Americans quickly sought iron 
hatchets when they could be acquired.10   
Philip Vincent’s contemporary account describes the Pequots as “armed… with 
bows and arrows, clubs, and javelins.”11  These weapons were seemingly primitive 
compared to the weapons and armor of the English.  While it is true that many New 
Englanders were saved from arrow wounds because of their armor, the arrows still had 
considerable force and penetration on impact.  In fact, the number of accounts where an 
English soldier was harmlessly struck with an arrow on account of his armor or thick 
clothing created a myth that the Pequot bows were not powerful.  Lion Gardiner dispelled 
that myth when he recovered an arrow from the corpse of one of his men.  Gardiner 
found that “the arrow going in at the right side, the head sticking fast, half through a rib 
on the left side, which I took out and cleansed it, and presumed to send to the Bay, 
because they had said that the arrows of the Indians were of no force.”12  Furthermore, 
the Pequots, like other Native Americans, had perfected their use and developed tactics 
that were congruent with the weapons they had available.  It is also important to note that 
those weapons and tactics were going to be used against the English colonists in New 
England.  It is not as if the Pequots were sailing to England to wage war in the streets of 
London.  Whether they were hunting or fighting, the Pequots were familiar with how to 
use their weapons in their own lands. 
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The Native Americans established an overall plan of attack, but much of the 
fighting was done as individuals.  Status was gained through individual prowess on the 
battlefield.  The primary tactics of Native Americans were hit and run raids and 
ambushes in wooded areas.  These methods utilized the element of surprise but also 
allowed Native American warriors to limit their own casualties as well as the number of 
casualties they inflicted on their enemies.13  Native Americans typically went to war to 
avenge a blood feud, teach a lesson to their rivals, or to develop the masculinity of their 
own warriors.  The primary objective of early Native American warfare was not killing, 
but the taking of live captives. Captives served social, cultural, and economic functions.  
Captives could be adopted to replace dead members of the group. Captives could also be 
ritualistically tortured as a way of replacing the lost spiritual power of the group.  
Captives helped warriors gain notoriety as a physical symbol of their prowess in war.  
Captives also had economic potential as they could be traded to other groups as 
commodity items or ransomed back to their original party.14  For these reasons, the 
Pequots never fully expected to wage an all out war with the New Englanders.  When 
they raided the Dutch, it was because they were offended and felt they needed to teach 
the Dutch a lesson while reasserting their masculinity.  Later, when the Pequots killed an 
English colonist prior to the war, the Pequots felt they were justified because the man had 
killed a Pequot.  For the Pequots, there was a matter of blood feud that needed to be 
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resolved.  In their eyes, the killing of the colonist settled the issue, and there was no 
further need of hostilities.  The English, however, viewed the situation differently. 
For the most part, the men that came to New England from England were not 
soldiers, but they were expected to serve in the militia when the need arose.  Unlike other 
imperial endeavors to the New World, the early English colonies were expected to 
provide their own defense with no assistance from the royal government.  The primary 
threat to early seventeenth century New England was attacks by Native Americans, and 
therefore military service by most men was essential to the survival of the colony.    
Every colony with the exception of Pennsylvania had militia laws which required every 
able bodied man between the ages of sixteen and sixty to serve.  There were occupational 
exceptions, such as ministers, magistrates, and physicians.  In truth, the actual units to 
which men were assigned were not militia units but trainbands.  Trainbands were 
community based units where men reported for training, known as muster duty.  The 
trainbands only met for muster about four to six days per year, less than a week overall.  
The institution of English trainbands began during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but most 
men who came to the New World had no combat experience.  Training mostly consisted 
of how to hold, load, and fire a weapon in accordance to a designated manual.  In a time 
of crisis, entire trainbands did not serve, but individual men volunteered or were selected 
from each trainband to form a military unit.  The unit elected its own officers, with the 
exception of the commanding officer of the colony, who was given the rank of colonel 
and appointed by the governor, who served as commander-in-chief.  In the early colonial 
period, a typical unit only served a few days at a time, for a specific duty.  There was no 
official logistics plan.  Each man supplied his own firearm and supplies, which was 
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usually limited to what he could carry.15  In regards to martial culture, the Pequots had 
the advantage.  They were fighters and lived in a culture where men advanced themselves 
through combat.  They were also hunters who knew how to stalk and kill prey with their 
bows.  The Pequots also knew the terrain better than any colonist in New England, as 
they had already conquered much of the area in previous years.  The Pequots were much 
better trained for a war than their English adversaries. 
The English colonists were not as well trained and, despite some misguided 
opinions, were not better equipped than the Pequots.  The New Englanders did have 
firearms, but the early colonists who fought in the Pequot War were armed with 
matchlock muskets.  Matchlocks were really only an effective firearm when used against 
an opposing force that was likewise armed with matchlocks.  The firearms were very 
heavy, weighing up to twenty pounds, and fired a projectile that weighed one twelfth of a 
pound.16  The weight of the firearm required it to be shot from a rest, which also had to 
be carried into battle.  Matchlocks also required a match to fire it, which was really more 
similar to a wick or fuse.  This meant that the English colonists had to carry a long length 
of fuse with them into battle as well as a torch to light the wick.  Wet weather rendered 
the firearms useless.  The weapon took a significant amount of time to reload.  
Matchlocks were also inaccurate past fifty yards, which did not matter because most 
Englishmen had no concept of aiming the firearms.  The matchlocks lacked sights, and 
were intended to be fired en masse at an opposing force.  In Europe, hunting was a sport 
of the nobility rather than a way of life.  Most of the men of early New England had 
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never gone hunting, and therefore the only intended use of a firearm was against other 
soldiers.  In that case, matchlocks seemed effective, because their initial training was 
designed for conflicts with enemies similar to themselves, who would meet them in open 
battle, armed with similar weapons.17   
The projectile fired by the matchlock could travel further and penetrate deeper 
than the Native American bow.  However, the weapon could not be fired accurately, 
giving it an effective range not much better than the Native American bow.  The bow was 
more reliable, as it was not dependent on weather, or as many components, such as the 
round, the match, and the powder along with the actual mechanism that made the weapon 
work.  The bow was lighter than the matchlocks, and therefore contributed to Native 
American mobility.  Furthermore, the Pequots used the bow for its intended purpose, 
which was aiming it, firing it, and killing something.  The English colonists could not use 
the matchlocks for their intended purpose, which comprised of lining up against a similar 
enemy, and exchanging massive volleys of fire in organized battle.  Aspects of the early 
firearms demonstrated the potential that firearms could have over the bow, but in New 
World warfare, the matchlocks were a disadvantage. 
Concerning the differences between Native American and European tactics, 
Captain John Underhill, a New England militia officer, wrote that “the Indians fight farre 
differs from the Christian practice, for they most commonly divide themselves into small 
bodies.”18  Underhill’s passage indicates several things.  First, the English colonists 
indeed fought, or wanted to fight, in large formations.  Second, the Pequot style of 
warfare placed more emphasis on small units, which is more congruent with modern 
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guerilla warfare.  Also, Underhill refers to European warfare as “Christian” warfare, 
which implies that, to the Puritans, European warfare is more righteous and even 
masculine.  So how is it possible that, despite advantages in military culture, terrain, and 
weapons, the Pequots not only lost to the English, but lost to the point of near extinction?  
The answer is that the English had Native American allies who hated the Pequots.  
Without their Native American allies, the English could not have nearly destroyed the 
Pequots as quickly and efficiently as they did.   
The Pequot War began with a dispute between the English colonists and the 
Pequots over the murder of some English traders.  Some Pequots and some of the western 
band of Niantics, tributaries who remained with the Pequots, attacked a boat containing 
Englishmen in the Connecticut River. The Native Americans killed everyone on board, 
about eight people, and lit a powder keg which caused the boat to explode.  Accounts 
vary as to the reason for the attack.  The first murder was a possibly a case of mistaken 
identity.  After the Dutch arrested and executed Tatobam, the Pequots sought retaliation.  
It is possible that the Native Americans thought they were attacking the Dutch instead of 
the English.  Some sources claim the Native Americans thought they were justified 
because the English party had some Native American prisoners.  Either way, the Pequots 
thought their actions were justified and also that their actions restored balance and did not 
require further actions against the English.19   
The commander of the vessel, John Stone, was disliked by the New Englanders.  
Stone was from Virginia and had a bad reputation in New England.  Stone was a heavy 
drinker and made a living as a smuggler.  He had been banned from Boston for having 
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sexual relations with another man’s wife, and in the Plymouth Colony, Stone had tried to 
stab the governor, Thomas Prence.20  Despite New England’s lack of affection for Stone, 
he was still an Englishman.  Whether the New Englanders truly wanted to give Stone 
justice, or he was just an excuse to assert more dominance in the region, the English 
colonists used his death to confront the Pequots. 
The New Englanders’ official position after confronting the Pequots was that the 
Pequots had indeed murdered John Stone.  Jonathan Brewster, one of the New 
Englanders who confronted the Pequots, wrote to Governor John Winthrop, Jr. that he 
was “enformed that [Sassacus] with his Brother, upon consultation with their own men, 
was an actor in the death of Stone, and thes men being [five] of the pricipall actors 
alive.”21  The New Englanders required the Pequots to pay a large indemnity for the loss 
Stone and his crew.  They also demanded the Pequots to submit to English trade 
demands.  Lastly, the New Englanders demanded the Pequots surrender all of the Native 
Americans who had a hand in the attack on Stone’s vessel.  As Brewster mentioned, that 
meant five men, including the sachem Sassacus and his brother.  The Pequots refused the 
issue of trade.  In regard to surrendering the persons responsible, they left the request 
open, but never turned over any of their people to the English.  The Pequots did pay some 
of the indemnity, but left most of the balance unpaid.  Their response angered the 
English, and animosity grew between the two groups. The colonial political powers had 
already made their position clear if the Pequots did not cooperate.  The authorities stated 
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that “if they shall not give you satisfaction… or shall be found guilty of any of the sayd 
Murthers and will not delivver the Actours in them into our hands… we hold ourselves 
free from any… peace… and shall revenge the blood of our Countrimen.”22 Both sides 
realized that a war was inevitable.  The English realized that their mission to create their 
Promised Land would require the submission of the Pequots to their demands.  The 
Pequost realized that they needed allies to oppose the English.23 
The Pequots pursued an alliance with their rivals, the Narragansetts.  The Pequots 
realized that Native Americans needed to stand together against the English if they were 
going to survive.  The Pequots warned the Narragansetts that if the Pequots were 
destroyed by the English, it would only be a matter of time before the English destroyed 
the Narragansetts as well.  Unfortunately for the Pequots, the Narragansetts refused the 
alliance.  It was unfortunate for the Narragansetts as well, as the Pequots’ prophecy 
would come true in King Philip’s War.  It was not that the Narragansetts supported the 
English, but instead that they hated the Pequots.  The Narragansetts had only recently 
become a power in the region, helped by the decline of the Pequots.24  
The Narragansetts also had a close English friend, Roger Williams.  Williams, 
like Church a generation later, was a friend of Native Americans and open to their way of 
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life.  Williams was a proponent of freedom of religion, and contrary to much of Puritan 
society, did not view Native American culture or religion as demonic or uncivilized.  To 
make further note of how extreme his views were perceived by Puritan society, Williams 
was exiled by the Massachusetts Bay Colony under charges of heresy.  In exile, Williams 
lived with the Narragansetts, and despite his problems with his former Puritan neighbors, 
convinced the Narragansetts to fight with the English.  Williams also convinced the 
English to use the Narragansetts because they would better oppose the Pequot’s style of 
fighting.25  This is an interesting point, not only in the study of the Pequot War, but later 
in King Philip’s War and the origins of American guerilla warfare.  Williams and Church 
are ideologically similar.  Williams recruited his Native American friends to fight with 
the New Englanders, without which victory may not have been possible.  Church uses 
similar relationships with Native Americans to help New England’s cause in King 
Philip’s War, but uses those relationships to teach the New Englanders themselves how to 
fight rather than relying on others. Church thus possesses the same mentality as Williams, 
but uses his connections to lessen the colonies’ dependence on Native American allies 
rather than acquiring them. 
A second group of murders occurred when Native Americans attacked a vessel 
carrying John Oldham and his crew in 1636.  Oldham was much like Stone, as he was an 
abrasive individual who was banned from the Plymouth Colony. Interestingly, Oldham 
was also the brother in law of Jonathan Brewster, the man who wrote John Winthrop that 
Sassacus and his brother were responsible for the murder of John Stone.  Another trader, 
John Gallop, was sailing near Block Island when he noticed several Native Americans 
                                                          
25 Horowitz, The First Frontier, 43; and Drinnon, Facing West, 41. 
39 
 
aboard the deck of Oldham’s ship.  Gallop and his crew began firing muskets at the 
Native Americans on deck.  Then Gallop twice rammed Oldham’s smaller craft with his 
own vessel, knocking several of the Native Americans into the sea, where they 
presumably drowned.  Gallop and his crew boarded the vessel, where they found two 
more Native Americans.  The crew captured the two Natives and bound them.  However, 
Gallop claimed that he was afraid they would escape their bonds, and for his safety and 
the safety of his crew, had them thrown into the sea, still bound.  Inside the ship, they 
found Oldham’s body.  Oldham’s head was caved in with an axe or club, and his legs 
were cut off.  Interestingly, the Native Americans who occupied Block Island, and likely 
the ones on Oldham’s boat, were not Pequots.  They were from the eastern band of 
Niantics, who had abandoned the Pequots for the Narragansetts.  However, the 
Narragansetts had reached out to form an alliance with the English, thanks to the work of 
Roger Williams, and the English were still angry about the Pequots response to the terms 
delivered after the death of John Stone.  Massachusetts appointed John Endicott as 
commander of a ninety man force responsible for avenging Oldham. Sources differ on 
who to blame for the attack: the Pequots, the Narragansetts, or the Niantics of Block 
Island.  Regardless of the blame, Endicott’s orders were clear.  Endicott was to land on 
Block Island, kill the men, and capture the women and children.  Afterword, Endicott was 
to travel back to the mainland, and demand the Pequots honor the terms the English had 
given them after Stone’s death.  If the Pequots did not comply, Endicott was to attack 
them.26 
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Endicott and his forces arrived at Block Island late in the day on August 22, 1636.  
Block Island is located off the coast of New England.  The island is not large, with an 
area of less than ten square miles.  When Endicott’s forces attempted to land their 
vessels, they were met with a volley of arrows.  The seas were rough, which made the 
boats toss and turn.  Because of the nature of English training regarding matchlock 
muskets, the English colonist’s could not return fire as they could not stand to position 
their weapons.  Many New Englanders fell or jumped out of the boats and stumbled 
through the rough water to the shore.  Once on the beach, the New Englanders formed 
and fired into the direction of the Niantic defenders.  The Niantics dispersed into the 
brush.  The English suffered a few arrow wounds from the volley, but nothing significant, 
thanks to their armor.  However, due to their late arrival on the island and with darkness 
closing in, the New Englanders decided to set up camp.27 
The New Englanders spent two days on the island.  The first day, Endicott’s men 
came across a small group of Niantics.  The colonists fired at the group, who returned fire 
with their bows and disappeared.  Other than that small exchange, the New Englanders 
could not locate any enemy forces, much less kill the men and capture the women and 
children.  The New Englanders did find Niantic villages.  Over the course of the two 
days, the English colonists burned all of the wigwams, sleeping mats, and corn they could 
find.  They even killed the dogs which were left at the village.  At the end of the second 
day, Endicott ordered a withdrawal.  Endicott claimed in his report that his men may have 
killed about fourteen Niantics in the landing, yet that was a lie at worst and a hopeful 
estimation at best.  The Narragansetts later informed the English that only one Niantic 
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was killed.  The eastern band of Niantics did, however, make peace with the English 
colonists after the raid.28  This may have been due to the destruction of their homes, or 
because of the alliance between the Narragansetts and the New Englanders.  Regardless, 
the attack on Block Island demonstrates the ineffectiveness of European warfare against 
the Native Americans.  Whether the expedition killed fourteen or one, the fact that the 
New Englanders could not find their enemies, on an island with an area less than ten 
square miles, shows a considerable lack of ability on their part. Even if the New 
Englanders did kill fourteen Niantics, it was during the first exchange of fire that the 
Niantics initiated.  Furthermore, Endicott’s orders were to kill the men and capture the 
women and children.  Endicott left Block Island with no captives, and no proof of enemy 
casualties.  In contrast, during King Philip’s War, King William’s War, and Queen 
Anne’s War, Benjamin Church was responsible for the capture of hundreds of prisoners.  
Endicott’s raid on Block Island shows that New England severely lacked the skills to 
conduct offensive operations in the North American wilderness in the early seventeenth 
century.  The destruction of homes and crops, however, was a tactic used by American 
forces against Native Americans for the next two and a half centuries. 
Endicott’s forces moved to the Pequots on the mainland, where they demanded 
retribution for the death of John Stone.  A Pequot messenger told Endicott that his 
sachem, Sassacus, admitted to killing Stone himself, to settle a blood feud.  The Pequots 
were justified in the murder, and furthermore, could not turn over their sachem for the 
death of Stone.  Endicott’s forces were waiting near the village while the Pequot 
messenger relayed correspondence back and forth.  After a long delay, Endicott decided 
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to attack, believing the Pequots were not complying, but stalling to make preparations for 
fight.  Endicott’s forces attacked, but the Pequost had fled.  Endicott and his men burned 
the homes and crops, as they had done on Block Island.  They planned to follow up with 
an attack on the western Niantics, allies to the Pequots, but could not find them either.  
Again they burned the homes and crops and went home.29  Like Block Island, the 
expedition was unsuccessful with the exception of the destruction of property, 
The Pequot War only had two events which could arguably be described as 
battles: a 1637 raid on a Pequot village near the Mystic River, and a battle at Sadqua 
Swamp. That is not to say that the period before those fights was without violence.  After 
Endicott’s raid, the Pequots retaliated with a series of attacks along the frontier.  The 
Pequots besieged Fort Saybrook, an English trading post.  The commander of Fort 
Saybrook, Lion Gardiner, wrote to Governor John Winthrop, Jr. explaining the nature of 
Pequot attacks.  Gardiner wrote:  
I with ten men more with me went abov our neck of land to fire some 
small bushes and marshes whear we though the enemie might have lien in 
ambush… we started [three] Indians and having the possibility to… cutt 
them short we runinge to meet them… when rushed out of the woods 
[two] severall ways of a great company of Indians which we gave fire 
upon… yet they run.. to the very mussels of our pieces and soe the shot 
[three] men downe… and [three] more shott that escaped of which one 
died that same night.30 
 
As the New Englanders fled the ambush, they made their way to a clear, elevated 
area in sight of the fort.  The attacking Pequots then withdrew because, as 
Gardiner wrote, “they durst not follow us any further because it is under 
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command of our great guns.”31  The passage demonstrates several things about 
the war.  The Pequots used ambush tactics often.  Gardiner’s troops were trying to 
clear brush to prevent an ambush, and in doing so, were ambushed.  The Pequots 
actually used their own men to bait the New Englanders into the ambush, showing 
that the English pursuits were ineffective.  The passage also shows how the 
Pequots got in close proximity to their enemies to fire their arrows, killing three 
men and wounding three others, one of which was mortal wound.  That was a 
sixty percent casualty rate for the small English party.  Also, the Pequots retreated 
from the threat of artillery support or reinforcements from the fort.  Those Pequot 
tactics are exemplary of guerilla warfare. 
The Pequots attacked settlements where they burned homes and killed English 
livestock.  They also set up ambushes on the roads to attacks the New Englanders who 
pursued them.  The Pequots killed about thirty New Englanders in the raids.32  In April of 
1637, the Pequots attacked the village of Wethersfield, Connecticut.  They killed nine 
New Englanders, and two girls were taken captive in the raid.33  The siege and raids 
provoked English action.  The colonies declared war against the Pequots.  The war united 
the colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Plymouth as the Confederation of the 
United Colonies of New England.  The alliance, combined with the Narragansetts, 
created a strong advantage in power for the English.  Uncas, the sachem of the 
Mohegans, also aligned his people with the colonists.  Uncas brought the New 
Englanders four Pequot heads and a live Pequot captive as a sign of good friendship.  The 
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Mohegans tortured the captive, with English help, and then ate the captive while the 
English watched.  While seemingly brutal, the death of the captive was part of Native 
American culture in the eastern woodlands.  The act also demonstrates that Uncas and his 
followers identified themselves as Mohegans, not Pequots.34  Uncas’s offering 
demonstrates another fact as well.  In one single act, Uncas produced more evidence of 
military skill against the Pequots than the New Englanders had been able to produce.  
Now, with the support of strong Native American allies, the English were finally able to 
take the offensive. 
The colonies appointed Captain John Mason as the commander of its forces.  
Mason was given ninety men from New England and was accompanied by Narragansetts, 
eastern Niantics, and Mohegans. The Native American allies far outnumbered the English 
militiamen.  Captain John Underhill and a smaller force of seventy men accompanied 
Mason on the expedition.35  The New Englanders were completely dependent on their 
Native American allies.  Mason wrote that, with the help of their allies, the New 
Englander force “should come upon their backs and possibly might surprise them 
unaware.”36  The plan depended on the allies themselves, but also on access through their 
territory.  The first attack was on a Pequot village near the Mystic River.  The village is 
sometimes described as a fort.  However, this was not a fort in the sense that it contained 
soldiers, artillery, and strategic military value.  Instead, it was a village surrounded by a 
palisade made from logs buried in the dirt.  The villagers were living in wigwams inside 
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the palisade.  Some have argued the village was occupied only by women, children, and 
the elderly at the time of the English attack.  While many men may have been gone, it is 
unlikely that there were no fighting men at the fort, due to the resistance the English met.  
En route to the fort, several times the English became confused as to the direction their 
Native American guides were leading them, sometimes even questioning their loyalty.  
“Fearing [the New Englanders] might have been deluded” by their Native American 
guides, Mason “gave the word for some of the Indians to come up,” to which he 
“demanded, Where is the Fort?”37  Uncas resolved the matter, and eventually, the New 
Englanders arrived at the village.38  The problems on the march to the village 
demonstrate two things.  First, the English colonists were lost without their guides.  
Second, the Puritans did not truly trust even their own Native American allies. 
The palisade had two entrances, and the New Englanders decided to attack both at 
once on May 26, 1637.  As the New Englanders entered the fort, they met effective 
resistance from arrow fire.  Two New Englanders were killed, and twenty were wounded, 
five of which needed to be carried.39  The English were pushed back, but regrouped.  
Mason ordered the English to form a perimeter around the fort, followed by a second 
perimeter formed by the Narragansetts and Mohegans.  Mason then ordered the New 
Englanders to set fire to the village, with the assistance of gunpowder.  The resulting fire 
and explosions created chaos around the village.  Many of the Pequots were burned alive.  
The Mohegans had been given yellow bands to wear before the fight to distinguish them 
from the Pequots, but there had not been enough bands for the Narragansetts.  As a result, 
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some of the Narragansetst were killed by the New Englanders.  The Narragansett and 
Mohegan allies forming the second perimeter were expecting to take captives.  Instead, 
the English colonists gunned the fleeing Pequots down as they fled the fort.  Hundreds of 
Pequots were killed, and out of the village, only five survived the fight.40  The New 
Englanders had not been able to find their way to the fort, nor take it once they got there.  
They did, however, perform the one tactic they had gotten good at, which was burning 
the Pequot homes, only this time with the Pequots still inside.  The fire finally forced the 
Pequots to do what the English wanted, that is, face them and fight them.  Only the 
Pequots were not fighting, but fleeing right into English muskets. 
The Narragansetts were shocked at the atrocities committed against the Pequots, 
their traditional enemies.  The Narragansetts abandoned the English, leaving them at the 
fort.  The New Englanders became angry because they feared they could not find their 
way back home.  Underhill wrote negatively of the Narragansetts “leaving us in this 
distressed condition, not knowing which way to march out of the colony.”41  Despite 
being appalled by the English actions, the Mohegans guided the New Englanders from 
the fort.  On the way back, Pequot warriors discovered the fort, and tracked the English 
attackers.  It was the Mohegans who fought off the Pequot attackers.  The Mohegans also 
carried the wounded English and guided them back to their boats.42  The actions 
concerning the Narragansett desertion, the Mohegan guiding and covering the English 
withdrawal, and the comments concerning the atrocities demonstrated several things.  
The English, despite a large victory, were still completely dependent on their Native 
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American allies, as demonstrated by Underhill.  Despite that dependence, the New 
Englanders viewed Native Americans as inferior, sub-human, and even demonic. 
Even some of the English colonists were shocked by the atrocities, but Mason and 
Underhill used biblical references to justify their actions.  Underhill, commenting on his 
fellow Englishmen’s disapproval, wrote  
Should not Christians have more mercy and compassion?  But I would 
referre you to David’s warre, when a people is growne to such a height of 
bloud, and sinne against God and man, and all confederates in the action, 
there hee hath no repects to persons… but puts them to the sword, and the 
most terriblest death that may bee:  sometimes the scripture declareth 
women and children must perish with their parents… We had sufficient 
light from the word of God for our proceedings.43 
 
Underhill’s comments not only justify his actions, but demonstrate the growing 
attitudes that Puritans in New England formed following the Pequot War.  Mason 
agreed that the Pequot fate was God’s will. Mason wrote that “God was above 
them, who laughed his Enemies and the Enemies of his People to scorn, making 
them as a fiery Oven.”44 
The New Englanders, still with the help of their Native American allies, continued 
to relentlessly pursue the Pequots in the following months.  In June, the New England 
and Mohegan forces met a considerable Pequot force in the Sadqua Swamp in 
Connecticut.  At the swamp, however, the Pequot women and children were allowed to 
surrender.  About two hundred women and children were captured but the men were 
killed in the fighting.45  It is interesting to note that the New Englanders were using 
smaller pistol bullets in their muskets to create a spray of shot in the thick brush of the 
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swamp.  This practice was a Native American innovation in the use of firearms.  Initially, 
the colonists considered the practice to be improper use and attributed this to Native 
American ignorance.46  However, it seems by the Pequot War, the colonists had accepted 
its value in the New World.   The Pequot sachem, Sassacus, and about thirty to forty 
Pequot warriors went to the Mohawks in an effort to form an alliance.  Instead, the 
Mohawks beheaded Sassacus and killed the Pequots.  The Mohawks gave the Pequot 
scalps to the English as an offering of peace.  Also in June, a group of Pequot refugees 
surrendered to the Massachusetts Militia commanded by Captain Israel Stoughton.  The 
women and children were sold as slaves, while the men were turned over to John Gallop, 
the same man who had discovered Oldham’s body.  Similar to his actions before the war, 
Gallop sailed off the coast into deep waters and threw the Pequot men overboard.47 
Eventually, a few remaining Pequots sought peace with the English colonists.  
Peace was created with the Treaty of Hartford.  At the time of the treaty, there were only 
about two hundred Pequots left.48  By August of 1637, the Mohegans had adopted many 
of the remaining Pequots into their group. Many of the women and children were sold to 
other Native American groups.  The Pequot men who survived were sold into slavery in 
the West Indies.  The Desire, the ship who carried the Pequots to the Caribbean, returned 
with one of the first shipments of African slaves to New England. The Native American 
allies, though much better off than the Pequost, were still negatively affected by the war.  
The Narragansett sachem, Miantonomo, was promised that he would acquire the Pequot 
hunting lands in return for his alliance.  Instead, English settlers took the land for 
                                                          
46 Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 65. 
47 Drinnon, Facing West, 44; Horowitz, The First Frontier, 50; and Confer, Daily Life during the Indian 
Wars, 21. 
48 Greiner, The First Way of War, 28-29. 
49 
 
themselves.  Miantonomo realized that his old enemies, the Pequots, were right in their 
warning of English power.  Miantonomo attempted to unite New England’s indigenous 
peoples against the New Englanders, but he was killed on orders from Uncas by request 
of New England officials.  Uncas was also forced to give up some lands to the English.  
The English colonists emerged as the dominant power in New England, but the power 
placed new strains on the New Englanders’ relationship with Native Americans.49 
As a result of the somewhat easy victory over the Pequots, the New Englanders 
felt confident in their self imposed ideas of superiority over Native Americans.  The war 
seemed to affirm their ideas that they were God’s chosen people, and could conquer 
anything that stood in their way.  The colonists neglected to realize that their victory had 
come at the hands of their Native American allies. Additionally, the New Englanders’ 
actions, during and after the war, alienated the very allies on which they depended.  
When King Philip’s War erupted a generation later, New England’s confidence was 
shattered.  The New Englanders still lacked the ability to fight an offensive war against 
Native Americans on their own.  That is, until Benjamin Church adopted the ways of his 
Native American allies. 
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Chapter III 
BENJAMIN CHURCH: TWO WORLDS AND THE FOUNDATION FOR A 
TRANSCULTURAL MILITARY COMPANY 
 
 In 1676, soldiers under the command of Benjamin Church successfully tracked 
down and killed the Wampanoag sachem Metacom, known by the English as King Philip.  
A few weeks later, Church and his men captured the Wampanoag war chief, Annawon.  
The two victories, for the most part, ended King Philip’s War, a brutal war in colonial 
New England that pitted the English settlers and their Native American allies against 
other Native American groups, specifically the Wampanoags, the Narragansetts, and the 
Nipmucks.  While the victory itself is important, what is more interesting is the 
innovative tactics Church used to achieve victory, and the place from where he derived 
those tactics.  Why are Church’s tactics more interesting than the victory alone, and what 
is significant about their origins?  Church learned his tactics from his Wampanoag 
friends, members of the same group as Metacom.  While Church is most known for his 
innovative military tactics, it is important to see how Church accepted Native American 
culture in ways other than just military tactics.  Church’s willingness to learn tactics came 
from a deeper appreciation of Native American culture, something very rare for a Puritan 
in colonial New England.   
King Philip’s War was, among many things, the result of irreconcilable cultural 
differences between the Puritans of New England and their Native American neighbors.  
The two cultures were very different with conflicting ideas about land, gender roles, 
agriculture, weapons, dress, and religion.  Benjamin Church transcended these cultural 
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barriers and formed the most successful military unit of the war.  Church embraced many 
of the cultural aspects of Native American society that his fellow Puritans rebuked.  
Church considered himself to be a devout Puritan.  His elevated status after the war 
seems to imply that the rest of New England felt so as well.  However, it was Church’s 
friendly attitude towards Native Americans before the war that provided the opportunity 
for success.  Church was truly a man of two worlds.   
 One area where Church occupied two worlds was in regard to land.  When the 
English colonists arrived in New England, they immediately attempted to recreate the 
type of civilization they had known in Europe, which required the colonists to clear the 
land.  The New Englanders chopped down trees and put up fences.  They built houses and 
churches and roads.  Their actions permanently changed the landscape of New England.1   
Native American views about the land indirectly caused the colonists to believe the land 
was free for the taking.  The Native Americans of New England were semi-nomadic.  
They did not move day to day, but did move throughout the year.  The seasonally mobile 
people occupied hunting camps in the fall.  During the winter, they would move to 
wooded valleys.  Springtime saw another movement to fishing camps.  Summer saw the 
Native Americans of New England occupying large, open fields.  The Native Americans 
lived in houses that were constructed from pole frames and had skin or bark panels.  In 
times of imminent warfare, they constructed palisades around the village, but the villages 
themselves were only semi-permanent, moving with the people as the seasons changed.  
The Native Americans’ mobility allowed for the recovery of the ecosystems they 
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occupied.  The result was that the Native Americans of New England had left a small 
mark on the environment when the English colonists arrived.2  However, the conflict was 
not an environmental issue but a cultural one.  It is the ideological difference about how 
the land was to be used that caused problems between to the two groups. 
The colonists assumed that the land was unused and therefore available for their 
own use.  Francis Higginson exemplifies the Puritan opinion of Native American land 
practice in his letter: “the Indians are not able to make of the one-fourth part of the land, 
neither have they settled any places, as towns to dwell in, nor any ground they challenge 
as their own possession.”3  The New Englanders assumed that the Native Americans had 
failed to create boundaries and tame the land.  The English colonists viewed the land as a 
commodity that could be bought or sold.  From the English viewpoint, once the land was 
owned, the owner had the right to do with it as they pleased and to exclude others from 
the land as well.  Land was considered property, and property was a significant part of 
Anglo-American identity.  The colonists saw it as their duty to civilize the land.  
Civilization was also connected with Christianity, especially in their practiced form of 
Puritanism.  In the Puritan mindset, Christianity inspired manliness and manliness 
inspired civilization.  Thus, the duty of a Christian man was to recreate the English 
landscape in New England.  Also, Puritan rhetoric believed that the Native Americans 
had failed to civilize the land because they themselves were uncivilized.    
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Some Puritan leaders took the connection between civilization and Christianity 
even further.  John Winthrop wrote “the natives in these parts, God’s hand hath so 
pursued them as, for three hundred miles’ space, the greatest part of them are swept away 
by smallpox.”4  The idea that the smallpox epidemic was in God’s control is not 
profound, especially for a Puritan writer.  Winthrop continues “so as God hath hereby 
cleared our title to this place.”5  Here, Winthrop suggests not only that God controlled the 
plague, but that He provided it to kill the Native Americans to clear the land for the 
Puritans.  Further, Winthrop wrote “those who remain in these parts, not being fifty, have 
put themselves under our protection and freely confined themselves and their interest 
within certain limits.”6  Winthrop suggests that God killed many of the Native Americans 
to give their land to the Puritans. 
Another problem associated with land was the English importation of livestock.  
The introduction of livestock had an overwhelmingly negative effect on the Native 
Americans in New England.  Livestock attacked two major forms of Native American 
sustenance.  The grazing of animals required land used for hunting or farming.  The 
livestock also scared away game animals such as deer.  Livestock, especially pigs, had a 
habit of finding Native American food stores and depleting them.  Livestock may have 
also carried diseases that were potentially detrimental to Native American populations.  
Some Native Americans, Metacom included, tried to accept English methods of raising 
livestock, but faced problems because they were not treated as equals with the whites in 
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terms of property rights and regulations concerning livestock.  English livestock practices 
created even more tensions regarding land use, but more importantly, showed the Native 
Americans that they were not being treated fairly by their Puritan neighbors.7   
The conflicting ideas about land, civilization, and property manifested themselves 
violently once King Philip’s War broke out.  As stated, the New Englanders identified 
themselves by their property.  The Native Americans who attacked the English 
settlements not only attacked the people but their property as well.  By threatening their 
property, the Native Americans were threatening their English culture and civility.  
Therefore, while King Philip’s War was very much a physical war marked by bloodshed, 
it was also a cultural war.8  Killing a New Englander eliminated one person.  Burning a 
village removed the English culture from the landscape. 
It is interesting to note that many of the powerful New England elites were 
involved with speculation and land acquisition.  Among those investors was Benjamin 
Church.  In this case, Church was a member of the Puritan world, as he desired to own 
and occupy his own land for the purpose of European settlement.  Church acquired land 
in Rhode Island at Sakonnet, which the New Englanders later referred to as Little 
Compton.  A proprietary committee purchased the land from the sachem of the Sakonnet 
Wampanoags.  Church built a home there and developed the land in ways common to 
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English ideology.  After the war, Church continued to develop the area and contribute to 
the Anglicization of the landscape.9 
 In terms of expansion into Native American territory, Church was no different 
than his Puritan associates. Church was, after all, a New England born Puritan.  What 
makes Church different in terms of land, and later in regards to forming a transcultural 
military unit, is the relationship he formed with the Wampanoags on the frontier.  
Church’s own words indicate that he was “the First Englishman that built upon that neck, 
which was full of Indians.”10  The fact that Church was the first white man to occupy the 
area is in itself not so profound.  However, Church also writes that he exercised “the 
uttermost caution… to keep myself free from offending my Indian neighbors all round 
about me.”11  This entry is significant.  Between the two entries, Church explains that his 
new home site requires a lot of work to develop because the land is natural and 
untouched.  This includes the clearing of land and construction of the home, outbuildings, 
and fences.  Church also indicates that livestock would be acquired once the home site 
construction was finished.  Here exists evidence of both English and Native American 
cultural attitudes concerning land.  The New Englander feels the need to civilize the 
landscape for his family.  At the same time, the evidence shows that the area was 
populated with Native Americans, yet seemingly untouched to the English writer.  
Church is special because of his efforts to develop his own lands in ways to ensure he 
does not offend the Wampanoags with whom he shares the land.  This indicates that 
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Church was aware of the problems associated with land and English expansion and that 
he wished to prevent those problems with his neighbors. 
Church established positive relationships with the Wampanoags near his home.  
Church formed especially close ties with the Sakonnet sachem, Awashonks.  When war 
was eminent between the New Englanders and the Wampanoags, Metacom recruited as 
many Native American followers as he could, including Awashonks.  Awashonks held a 
ceremonial dance, to which Church was invited.  At the dance, Awashonks informed 
Church of Metacom’s offer, and that the some of the Sakonnet Wampanoags desired to 
join him.  Church attempted to persuade Awashonks to side with the New Englanders 
rather than Metacom.  Metacom’s envoy was also present at the dance and wished to do 
harm to Church, but Awashonks would not allow it.  Awashonks asked Church to speak 
to the Plymouth government on behalf of the Sakonnets.  Awashonks also provided 
Church with an escort to see him home safely. 12   
In his own account of the event, Church makes it clear that there was a lot of trust 
between himself and Awashonks.  In Church’s account, Awashonks informed Church 
that Metacom threatened the Sakonnets to join him, or his own Wampanoag troops would 
attack the New Englanders under the guise of the Sakonnets, which would bring English 
retaliation.  Awashonks also claimed that Metacom said the New Englanders were 
building an army and preparing for war against the Native Americans.  Church informed 
Awashonks that he had no knowledge of English war preparations and that he would not 
“have brought up his goods to settle in that place if he apprehended an entering into war 
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with so near a neighbor.” 13  As a sign of good faith, Church kept his goods at his home.  
Church’s Native American friends and neighbors urged him to secure his property 
elsewhere, but he refused.  Once the war broke out and Church became involved as a 
military officer, the same Native American friends moved and secured his goods for 
him.14 
Despite Church’s efforts to recruit Awashonks and the Sakonnets or encourage 
their neutrality, they allied themselves to Metacom.  The Sakonnets fought against the 
New Englanders during the early part of the war and participated in the burning of 
Puritan settlements.  At the same time, Church argued for the colonial governments to 
allow him to create a military unit that utilized the same tactics that Metacom was using 
against the New Englanders.  Church was denied time and again, but eventually, after a 
string of English defeats, he was allowed to create such a force.  One of his first actions 
was reaching out to Awashonks.  This time, Awashonks expressed a desire to actively 
support Church, and ultimately the New Englanders.  Many of Awashonks’s fighters 
expressed loyalty to Church and willingness to fight under his command.  Church readily 
forgave and accepted Awashonks’s offer but had to convince the New England officials, 
who mistrusted all Native Americans, much less those who had fought against them.  
Church personally vouched for Awashonks, citing their close friendship and the 
willingness of the Sakonnets to prove their loyalty through military action.  Most Native 
Americans who fought against the New Englanders faced severe punishment if captured.  
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Thanks to Church, Awashonks avoided the English repercussions despite allegiance to 
Metacom for the early part of the war.15   
Even during the early part of the war, when the Sakonnets were an enemy of the 
New Englanders, Church sought military action intended to protect Awashonks from both 
Metacom and the English forces.  In his memoirs, Church claims to have argued for the 
pursuit of Metacom’s forces in a way to push them opposite of Awashonks’s land “with 
the greater earnestness because of his promise made to Awashonks.”16  As stated, 
Awashonks occupied the same territory as Church’s own lands, so therefore he may have 
actually intended to protect his own property.  However, given that Church recorded this 
in his diary after the war when he was not only a victor but a regional hero, in a period 
where Native Americans were still very much a threat to Anglo-Americans, and the 
American romanticization of Native Americans had not yet occurred, it seems unlikely 
that he would claim to be acting for Awashonks’s benefit rather than his own. 
Awashonks’s friendship with Church is more indicative of Church’s acceptance 
of Native Americans than any Anglicization on the part of the Sakonnets.  Awashonks 
and the Sakonnets were just as resistant to English expansion and culture as Metacom and 
his war chiefs.  Yet, Awashonks was not only a cordial neighbor of Church, but a friend.  
The only explanation is that Church impressed Awashonks and the Sakonnets by not 
embodying the typical English attitudes toward Native Americans.  They maintained the 
friendship while they were officially at war, and the cultures they fought to protect were 
inarguably at war.  During the war, the two found a way to reconcile, despite the 
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repercussions they could have faced from their own ethnic group.  Yet that friendship 
began when Church bought and began developing the land where the Sakonnets lived.  
Church and Awashonks occupied the same land.  Church and Awashonks used the land 
in ways relative to their own culture, but they built a relationship from their proximity.  
Church’s friendship with Awashonks demonstrates that he bridged the world of Puritan 
New England and the Wampanoag world.  It is even more interesting when considering 
that Awashonks was a woman. 
Church’s relationship with Awashonks is important because it crossed not only 
racial barriers but gender barriers as well.  Neither the Native Americans nor the English 
practiced true gender equality.  Both groups had specified gender roles that were 
expected to be filled by members of a certain sex.  Any person who tried to cross into the 
other culturally designated gender role would have drawn attention.  However, in the case 
of Awashonks, Native American women could fill powerful roles such as that of a 
sachem.  A sachem could inherit their position, but could only hold it by gaining the 
respect of their people.  Church understood that Awashonks’ power was conceded by her 
people because of her leadership ability.  As sachem, Awashonks possessed political 
power of her people.  Awashonks was the diplomatic representative for the Sakonnets.17  
In Reverend William Hubbard’s account of King Philip’s war, he describes Awashonks 
as “a Squaw Sachem of Sakonet, one of Philips Allies.”18  Church’s own diary confirms 
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Metacom’s diplomatic envoy to Awashonks.  The fact that she is diplomatically 
approached by Metacom and Church demonstrate that she is a significant political player 
in the region.  Hubbard also recorded that Awashonks “sent three Messengers to the 
Governour of Plimouth to sue for Life and Liberty, promising Submission to their 
Government on that Condition.” 19  Here, Awashonks used her political power in attempt 
to achieve peace between her people and the government of the Plymouth Colony.  The 
attempted diplomacy is technically an example of international, and definitely 
intercultural, politics.20  
It is difficult to know what the ethnocentric government of the Plymouth Colony 
thought of Awashonks’s diplomatic approach because she surrendered her forces at 
Church’s request before the messengers returned.  Unfortunately, Church had his own 
superiors who embodied more typical Puritan views.  Whether because she was a Native 
American or because she was a woman, Church’s commanding officer, Major William 
Bradford ignored the diplomatic terms agreed to by Church and Awashonks.  Church 
argued to have the Sakonnets placed under his control, but Bradford insisted the Native 
Americans be marched to a new location.  Church was visibly angry, as his own diary 
indicates that “he walked off from the rest” and explained to Awashonks that it “twas 
best to obey orders, and that if he could not accompany them to Sandwich, it should not 
be above a week before he would meet them there.”21  Though it was clearly diplomacy 
between Church and Awashonks that led to the Sakonnets switching sides, Puritan elites 
of the era chose to give credit to Bradford.  Cotton Mather referred to Bradford as “the 
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Oedipus by whom that Sphinx was conquered.”22  Mather’s statement reveals several 
things about the Puritan view of Awashonks.  First, Mather removes Awashonks’s 
political agency by referring to her as conquered.  Whereas Church explicitly describes a 
diplomatic discussion between himself and the Sakonnet sachem, Mather’s version 
implies that Awashonks was defeated in battle by the New Englanders.  Second, by 
referring to her as a sphinx, Mather removes Awashonks’s humanity.  Mather’s view is 
concurrent with Puritan ideology that Native Americans were beasts or only partly 
human.  William Bradford’s father, also named William Bradford and governor of the 
Plymouth Colony years before King Philip’s War, referred to the New World as a land of 
“wild beasts and wild men.”23  In which category would Bradford have placed 
Awashonks? 
As sachem, Awashonks embodied a role as spiritual leader for the Sakonnets as 
well.  Sachems were associated with spiritual power and ceremonies that were important 
for a time such as King Philip’s War.24  Church’s dairy indicates that once Metacom’s 
messengers arrived to recruit the Sakonnet, Awashonks “called her subjects together to 
make a great dance, which is the custom of that nation when they advise about 
momentous affairs.”25  Church also recorded that when he arrived, “Awashonks herself in 
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a foaming sweat was leading the dance.”26  This record indicates that:  Awashonks was a 
spiritual as well as political leader, or that the two were intertwined; the dance was a 
cultural and spiritual method for determining which diplomatic route to take; and 
Benjamin Church understood the cultural significance of the dance and Awashonks’s role 
in it.  Church’s relationship with Awashonks was important because it demonstrates that 
Church believed that a woman, at least a Native American woman, is capable of being an 
effective political and spiritual leader. 
Whereas a Native American woman like Awashonks could become the most 
prominent member of her society, Puritan women possessed much smaller leadership 
roles.  Puritan society was dominated by male authority, with the exception of the 
household.  Women did not dominate the household, but they did exercise some 
authority.  Women maintained the home and took care of small children while men 
worked in fields.  Women’s association with the home and children led to their 
designated responsibility of preparing the next generation for Christian adulthood.  
Richard Mather stated that women suffer in childbirth and should also suffer to ensure the 
“salvation of the childs soule.”27  Women’s role of providing spiritual guidance for 
children fits a Christian agenda.  Their role of cooking meals and tending the sick created 
a spiritual, if not religious, authority within the household, even if the husband was 
technically the head of house defined by patriarchal authority.28 
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Both Puritan and Native American societies adhered to specific gender roles.  A 
specific gender role where Benjamin Church occupied two worlds was connected to 
agriculture.  By his own account, Church was involved in agriculture, as upon acquiring 
his new land, he set out “diligently settling his new farm.”29  Agriculture was necessary 
for sustenance in the New World, and both the English and Native Americans 
participated in agriculture.  For the English, males dominated agricultural production.  By 
placing agriculture in a male specific role, the practice of farming becomes something 
more than the ability to put food on the table.  The ability to produce food signifies 
dominance and independence.  Male dominance was asserted over the earth because he 
was able to bend nature to his will.  Independence was established because the man was 
able to provide for himself and his family.  Therefore, the New Englanders also perceived 
the opposite to be true.  If a man cannot grow enough crops, he was a failure and 
becomes subordinate both to the earth and the other farmers, whom he depends on for 
sustenance.  The ability to develop and successfully farm the land also signifies civility.  
Land that has been surveyed, cleared, and farmed is considered civilized land.  Therefore, 
by English standards, those doing the surveying, clearing, and farming are civilized 
people.30 
The Native Americans of New England were also agricultural people, but, as 
stated, moved with the seasons.  English colonists misunderstood Native American 
agriculture.  Furthermore, for the Native Americans, females dominated agriculture.  The 
English colonists perceived the Native American female agricultural practices to be the 
products of male aggression towards their women.  The New Englanders viewed the 
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Native American men as lazy, uncivilized, and cruel because of the reversed gender role.  
Cotton Mather described the men as “Barbarous” and “slothful” because they made their 
“poor Squaws, or Wives, to plant.”31  New Englanders were not just upset about Native 
American agriculture because they felt the men were cruel or lazy.  New Englanders were 
upset because the reversal of their accepted gender roles conflicted with what they 
believed to be the natural order.  Males dominated Puritan society, and in this Puritan 
male dominated society, men farmed.  In the Puritan mindset, if Native American men 
refused to farm, they were not real men.32 
Native Americans were also accustomed to their own gender roles about 
agriculture.  As stated, in Native American society, women did the agricultural labor.  
From their viewpoint, the English were not men because they placed so much emphasis 
on farming, which the Native Americans considered to be feminine.  For the Native 
Americans, male responsibilities included hunting and warfare.  Englishmen shared the 
Native American association with warfare and manliness, even if their ideas of military 
conduct differed greatly.  Hunting, on the other hand, was a facet of Native American 
culture that drew animosity from the Puritans.  For the English, a man’s value emanated 
from hard work and provision.  Puritans perceived hunting as a lackadaisical pastime, 
mostly because of its nature in the European society from which they came.  In Europe, 
hunting was a pastime for the nobility.  Most of the colonists who came to New England 
in the seventeenth century were from levels of society that were not afforded the 
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opportunity to hunt.  The English colonists not only viewed Native American men as 
lazy, but were offended that Native Americans were participating in an activity deemed 
socially superior to them. While hunting was available to them in the New World, their 
cultural attitudes towards it caused refrain.  Those who did attempt to hunt game lacked 
the skill to be successful.  The lack of skill resulted in unsuccessful hunts which were 
regarded as a waste of time.  The Puritans regarded activity that wasted time to be almost 
sinful, which further condemned the activity.33  Cotton Mather recorded that Native 
American men’s “Chief Employment, when they’ll condescend unto any, is hunting.”34  
Mather’s statement provides insight into both cultures.  First, the passage gives evidence 
that Native American men hunt.  Not only do they hunt, they hunt enough or place so 
much emphasis on hunting that a New Englander considers it to be their job.  Also, 
Mather’s tone implies that the Puritans do not truly consider hunting to be work.  Puritan 
ideas of Native American laziness are also present in the passage because Mather refers 
to hunting as the only work Native American men are willing to undertake.  Higginson 
recorded a similar comment, which states “the men for the most part live idly.  They do 
nothing but hunt and fish.  Their wives set their corn and do all their other work.”35  It is 
clear that both men, religious leaders of their communities, found fault with Native 
American hunting, agriculture, and gender roles. 
Church possessed masculinity in both worlds.  He was a New England Puritan 
who fulfilled his cultural role of manliness through farming.  However, Church was also 
a hunter.  Despite Puritan ideas about hunting, Church hunted and was seemingly 
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successful at it.  Church does not specifically mention himself hunting in his account of 
King Philip’s War, but he does leave evidence that he has some hunting experience.  As 
commander of scouting party, Church and some of his soldiers, both English and Native 
American, “killed a deer, flayed, roasted, and ate the most of him before the army came 
up with them.”36  The scouting party that Church commanded moved some distance 
ahead of the main body to provide reconnaissance and search for ambushes.  The fact that 
Church’s party arrived at its destination and killed the deer fast enough to prepare it and 
eat it before the main body arrived demonstrates proficiency in hunting.   
Later in the war, Church recorded that he saw an enemy combatant, who turned 
out to be Metacom.  Church quickly “clapped his gun up, and had doubtless dispatched 
him but that one of his own Indians called hastily to him, not to fire, for he believed it 
one of his own men.”37  While this act in itself does not seem related to hunting, a deeper 
understanding in the evolution of colonial military tactics provides insight.  Hunting and 
firearms were connected in the New World.  Firearms were European weapons, but it was 
the Native Americans who made them effective and used them in the manner in which 
Church used them at this instance.  Most of the Englishmen who came to New England in 
the early colonial period did not have any combat experience.  Any training they may 
have had came from European militia drills which placed an emphasis on rank and file 
movement and the proper ways to hold and carry a firearm.  Actual firearms training in 
terms of marksmanship was nonexistent.  The European method of warfare involved 
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formations of men firing volleys at their enemies.  Volleys of musket fire were simply 
new versions of European archery volleys.38 
Native Americans did not approve of the European volleys and instead believed 
that warfare utilized individual skills.  Individual skill placed an emphasis on 
marksmanship.  Native American marksmanship originated in hunting.   Though they had 
less experience with firearms than their European counterparts, Native Americans were 
excellent marksmen.  Similar to Europeans, the firearm replaced the bow for Native 
Americans.  However, whereas European archery was based on large groups firing as 
many arrows towards an enemy as possible, Native American archery was a part of 
hunting even more so than combat.  Native Americans were accustomed to stalking game 
in the woods and having to quickly raise their weapon and fire.  After European contact, 
Native Americans continued to develop these skills with guns instead of bows.  
Romanticized views of early colonists as riflemen and hunters are a myth, with some 
exceptions, like Church.39  Methodical stalking of game and quickly shouldering the 
weapon to fire is identical to Church’s statement concerning his pursuit of Metacom.  
Church also demonstrates marksmanship at the Great Swamp Fight, where he claims to 
have “fired upon them, killed fourteen dead on the spot and wounded a greater number 
than he killed, many of which died afterwards with their wounds.”40  Even if Church 
embellished his claims of how many he killed in the battle, the excerpt is still indicative 
of a Native American style of fighting.  If Church had been fighting in a European style 
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formation, he could not have known how many he had killed nor would anyone have 
been interested in his individual marksmanship. 
It is also interesting to note that Church’s description indicates he used a flintlock 
musket.  The primary weapon of English soldiers in 1675 was the matchlock musket.  
From the European view, matchlocks were suitable firearms for combat even though they 
were heavy and required a lit fuse to fire the weapon.  When fighting in organized 
formations, this did not appear to be too much of a disadvantage.  Native Americans, on 
the other hand, needed a weapon that enabled them to crawl or run, and in any 
environment.  A running deer would not allow a hunter an opportunity to light his fuse, 
and the smell of the burning fuse might alert game.  Therefore, Native Americans 
preferred to use flintlock firearms which contained a self igniting action.  Flintlocks were 
also more accurate than matchlocks, something that would have been negated by 
European style formation fighting.  A flintlock would have been the only firearm at the 
time of King Philip’s War that would have allowed Church to quickly raise his rifle and 
potentially fire at an enemy.   The flintlocks were better suited for Native American 
hunting, and ultimately, combat in the New World.  Another Native American innovation 
of European technology was the perceived misuse of ammunition.  Native Americans 
sometimes used smaller, pistol rounds in their long guns.  The English perceived this as 
ignorance, when actually the Native Americans were creating weapons capable of firing a 
spray of shot, which was effective in hunting game and later in warfare. 41   
Through marksmanship, appropriation and innovation, the Native Americans 
quickly became better at the use of firearms than their European counterparts.  The 
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success of Native American marksmen and men like Church caused the colonies to 
rethink their position on firearms.  After King Philip’s War, the colonies placed an 
emphasis on marksmanship as part of their defense.  Also, the colonists recognized a 
need to replace matchlocks with flintlocks.  In fact, the Plymouth Colony banned 
matchlocks after King Philip’s War.42 
Native Americans excelled at the use of firearms, which in turn caused English 
anger and distrust.  The English viewed a well armed Native American population as a 
threat and created legislation to prevent the Native Americans from acquiring firearms.  
Firearms legislation required the Native Americans to acquire their firearms through the 
black market or from other European powers.  William Bradford wrote that the laws were 
ineffective due to “the baseness of sundry unworthy persons, both English, Dutch, and 
French” who “led with the like of covetousness” sold illegal firearms to the Native 
Americans “for their own gain.”43  New Englanders who were caught selling firearms to 
or repairing firearms for Native Americans were punished by the law and socially 
admonished by other members of Puritan society.  Offenders were publicly whipped and 
branded.  They were viewed not just as law breakers but as agents of evil.  However, the 
variety of different Native American groups in the region, and the presence of other 
possible European threats, forced the Puritan New Englanders to entrust firearms to some 
Native American groups.  This led to the arming of the Wampanoag.  Later, when 
tensions were rising between Metacom and the New Englanders, the colonial 
governments attempted to confiscate the Wampanoag firearms.   Metacom refused, and 
possibly perceived the attempt at gun control as further aggression by the New 
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Englanders.44  Benjamin Church not only lived among armed Native Americans, but 
allowed them to fight under him during the war. 
Another strong English criticism was the Native Americans’ dress and 
appearance.  The New Englanders regarded Native American dress as uncivilized.  
Native American dress was a combination of symbolism, spirituality, and practicality.  
Native American dress, though not always understood by Europeans, symbolized a 
person’s political power and social status within a group.  The dress could also symbolize 
allegiance to a certain clan.  Dress and appearance contained powerful symbols for the 
English as well.  The New Englanders felt that their dress was a symbol of civilization.  
In their eyes, European clothing was one of the things that distinguished them from their 
Native American neighbors.  When Native Americans converted to Christianity, the New 
Englanders expected them to adopt European dress.  This included hairstyles as well.  
The Puritans viewed long hair as effeminate and expected the converted Native American 
males to cut their hair.  Native American converts did adopt some form of European 
dress, but usually maintained elements of their traditional culture as well.45 
In Native American culture, almost all aspects of life contained the property of 
being secular as well as spiritual.  This applied to dress and appearance as well.  Clothing 
could demonstrate social status and political power, but also spiritual power.  War time 
rituals could be both religious and militaristic.  Native Americans dressed for battle with 
the intention to look fearsome as well as summon spiritual energy.  Battle dress may have 
included tattoos, paint, feather, bones, and jewelry.  Puritans viewed the practice of 
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piercing and tattooing the skin as an assault on God’s own image.  Furthermore, because 
Puritans viewed the world through a Christian lens, they perceived everything in a very 
dualistic nature.  For the New Englanders, everything concerning the spiritual world was 
good or evil, holy or demonic.  The Puritans already drew lines between themselves and 
their Native American neighbors in terms of Christianity.  They surely recognized a 
spiritual element of the Native American dress and assumed it to be demonic.46 
Native American dress was also practical.  Many pieces of Native American attire 
were better suited for the New World or warfare in general.  Snow shoes and moccasins 
allowed their wearers to travel lightly and quickly in the appropriate terrain.  Native 
Americans also used camouflage to hide themselves in the swamps and forests.  Many of 
the English officers viewed the use of camouflage as cowardly and uncivilized.  Church, 
like other frontiersmen, adopted some articles of Native American dress.  Frontiersman 
often wore a combination of Native American and European style clothing.  Church and 
his soldiers wore moccasins to move quickly and quietly through the woods.  They also 
replaced the European sword with the Native American tomahawk as their close combat 
weapon of choice.47   
When Church captured Metacom’s war chief, Annawon, he “crept close behind 
the old man, with his hatchet in his hand.”48  Instead of marching into the Annawon’s 
camp with English military might, Church and a few of his Native American soldiers 
captured Annawon without a fight.  More significant in terms of dress and Church’s 
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acceptance of Native American culture is Annawon’s actions upon capture.  Annawon 
surrendered his men and his weapons.  Then the two parties shared their supper while 
Annawon told Church of his younger days as a warrior.49  Annawon then 
“pulled out Philip’s belt, curiously wrought with wompom, being nine inches broad, 
wrought with black and white wompom in various figures and flowers, and pictures of 
many birds and beasts.” 50  Annawon draped the belts around Church’s shoulders.  
Annawon then placed Metacom’s headdress, with “two flags on the back part which hung 
down his back” on Church’s head and another piece “with a star upon the end of it.”51  
Annawon told Church “these were Philip’s royalties which he was wont to adorn himself 
with when he sat in state” and that he was happy to “present them to Captain Church, 
who had won them.”52  This event is significant for several reasons.  First, it shows 
mutual respect for both men, even though their respective loyalties had deemed them 
enemies.  Second, it shows the power and symbolism associated with Native American 
dress.  The clothes were Metacom’s political and ceremonial attire.  The clothes signified 
that Metacom was the sachem of that group of Wampanoag.  Annawon perceives Church 
to have accumulated Metacom’s power and feels the articles rightfully belong to Church.  
Finally, it shows that Benjamin Church deviated from the dominant Puritan views 
concerning Native American dress.  Church, though himself the victor of the 
engagement, allowed Annawon to dress him in Native American clothing.  Church could 
have refused the gesture.  Instead, the fact that he chose to include it in his account of the 
war indicates that he was honored. 
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 Both Puritan New Englanders and Native Americans led lives filled with religious 
meaning.  For the Native Americans, the natural world was filled with spirituality.  
Puritans viewed the world through a very specific Christian context.  The New England 
Christians viewed animistic religions as satanic worship.  For the Native Americans, 
spirituality permeated almost every aspect of their lives.  Therefore, the Puritans 
attempted to force Native Americans who converted to Christianity to abandon all aspects 
of their former culture, not just religious practices.  Some Puritans even regarded Native 
American languages as demonic and required that the Native Americans learn English so 
that God would listen to their prayers.  Many Native American converts maintained 
elements of their traditional cultures.  Some of the converts caught maintaining 
traditional elements were publicly punished.  Native Americans who did attempt to 
become culturally white were still not fully accepted by Puritan society.  Regardless of 
their cultural transition, Anglicized Native Americans were still Native Americans with a 
background in their traditional culture and socially shunned my most Puritans.  
Unfortunately, assimilated Native Americans were often shunned by their own people as 
well.53 
 The New England governments placed a great deal of emphasis on preventing 
whites from embracing Native American culture.  The New Englanders regarded anyone 
who adopted Native American cultures as a reprobate.  From a Puritan viewpoint, anyone 
who embraced Native American culture had not only forsaken their spiritual worth, but 
also accepted a devolved way of life.  Some colonies, like Massachusetts, even passed 
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legislation outlawing its citizens from embracing Native American culture.  Adopting 
Native American cultural elements was admonished and English people who lived among 
the Native Americans were suspected as traitors.  The Puritans were obsessed with 
maintaining racial purity as well as cultural purity, which caused English resistance to 
miscegenation in New England.  Native Americans, however, conducted rituals which 
sometimes included adopting captives into their societies.  Joshua Tift was captured by 
Native Americans during King Philip’s War.  Tift eventually married a Native American 
woman and lived as a member of her society.  Later, when Tift was recovered by the 
New Englanders, he was accused of treason.  An account of the event refers to Tift as a 
“Renegadoe English Man.”54  Tift was accused of building a fort for the Narragansetts.  
The Puritan accusers assumed Tift must have built the fort because it was well built and 
therefore impossibly a product of Native American skill.  It was also concluded that Tift 
chose life over death and in doing so chose his sachem over God.  Tift was hanged, 
drawn and quartered, and his head placed on a spike for his alleged crimes.55  Tift’s 
public execution serves not only as his punishment but as a warning to other New 
Englanders to not associate with Native Americans. 
 Benjamin Church violated some, if not most, of these cultural barriers.  Church 
embraced elements of Native American culture such as hunting.  Church also 
appropriated certain articles of Native American clothing.  Church wore moccasins 
because of their practicality.  Church donned Metacom’s ceremonial clothing.  Church 
did not technically live among the Native Americans, but his frontier home in Sakonnet 
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was in close proximity to Native Americans with whom he formed close relationships.  
During the war, Church eventually gained command of a force that was comprised of 
both New Englanders and Native Americans.  During those campaigns, Church was 
immersed in Native American culture, sharing food, language, and shelter.  Some 
historians mention that Church may have been sexually involved with Awashonks.56  If 
that is true, Church definitely crossed some boundaries, including miscegenation and 
violating his Christian marriage vows.  There is, however, little evidence to support 
Church’s sexual relationship with Awashonks and the theory is possibly the result of 
nineteenth century romanticism.  Still, Church’s own memoirs state that he had some sort 
of a close relationship with Awashonks, even if nonsexual.  
 Benjamin Church was also known to treat Native Americans fairly, even those 
who fought against him.  After Church received his commission, some of the Native 
Americans serving under him brought him a captive.  Church’s Native American troops 
explained that the captive was known as Little Eyes, and that he was “the rogue that 
would have killed [Church] at Awashonk’s dance.”57  The Native American captors 
expected Church to execute the captive, but instead Church informed them that he should 
receive the proper quarter due an enemy.  Furthermore, Church orders Little Eyes to be 
left “on an island until [Church] returned; and, lest the English should light on them and 
kill them, [Church] would leave [Little Eye’s] cousin, Lightfoot, to be his guard.  Little 
Eyes expressed himself very thankful to [Church].”58  This passage indicateds several 
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things.  First, Church respected Native Americans, including his enemies.  Second, 
Church recognizes what typical English soldiers would do if they found Little Eyes.  
Last, Church’s own forces contain Native Americans and that he trusted them to follow 
his orders, even to the point of placing one of the captive’s own kin in charge of him.  
The entire incident, from the Native Americans explaining Little Eye’s identity to Church 
to Lightfoot’s responsibility as captor indicates that Church had a close relationship with 
his Native American brothers in arms. 
 Benjamin Church and the other New England officials had many disagreement s 
on the treatment of Native Americans.  Church was friendly to Native Americans and did 
not understand why the rest of the New Englanders treated them so badly.  Many of the 
Native American captives were sold into slavery by the New England governments, 
including Metacom’s wife and son.  Puritan victory and the ensuing practice of selling 
Native American captives into slavery cemented the idea for New Englanders that they 
were the superior race in the region.  Native Americans who were not sold into slavery 
were forced to adopt English culture and were relegated to subservient positions in the 
colonies.59   
Church allowed many captives the opportunity to fight for him rather than be sold 
into slavery.  When Church captured Annawon, Church ordered his troops to spare the 
lives of all of Annawon’s troops.  Church also told Annawon that “it was not in his power 
to promise him his life, but he must carry him to his masters at Plymouth, and he would 
entreat them for his life.”60  Later, Church sought to capture Metacom’s last war captain, 
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Tuspaquin. Tuspaquin was considered to be a war captain with a great amount of spiritual 
power and could not be harmed by bullets.61  Most Puritans would have considered 
Tuspaquin to be a satanic enemy because of his perceived combination of animistic 
spirituality and military prowess. Church, on the other hand, explained that “he would not 
have him killed, for there was a war broke out in the eastern part of the country, and he 
would have him saved to go with them to fight the eastern Indians.”62  Here, in two 
examples, Church attempted to preserve the lives of his enemies, including high ranking 
members of Metacom’s army.  Church later wrote that “he found to his grief that the 
heads of Annawon, Tuspaquin, [had been] cut off, which were the last of Philip’s 
friends.”63  The two had been executed by order of the General Court of Plymouth.  
Church expressed grief at the two men being killed, while reiterating that they were 
Metacom’s loyal subjects.64  It is important to remember that Church’s diary was written 
well after the war, when white New Englanders were the dominant force in the region.  
Puritan self perception of cultural supremacy was at a high, and yet Church still grieved 
for the loss of the two men.  It is most likely that Church’s attitude about the incident was 
genuine. 
Benjamin Church also contradicted English treatment of Native American 
casualties in other ways.  Native Americans practiced a form of ritualistic torture on 
captives that was undeniably brutal.  European firsthand accounts of Native American 
torture are described in vivid detail that no doubt provokes an emotional response.  In 
William Bradford’s words, the Native Americans were “savage people, who are cruel, 
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barbarous and most treacherous, being most furious in their rage and merciless where 
they overcome; not being content only to kill and take away life, but delight to torment 
men in the most bloody manner” which included “flaying some alive with the shells of 
fishes, cutting off the members and joints of others by piecemeal and broiling on the 
coals, eat the collops of their flesh in their sight whilst they live, with other cruelties 
horrible to be related.”65  Brutal as it may be, however, Native American torture was 
ritualistic and therefore had some cultural significance, usually related to the mourning of 
kin who had died.   Despite English attempts to berate the Native Americans for their 
practices, the New Englanders also supported such practices against their enemies, except 
with no cultural value.  Church gives an account of such torture where a Native American 
captive was brought before Church’s commanding officer.  Church claims that “some 
were for torturing of him to bring him to a more ample confession.”66  In this case, there 
is no spiritual reason for torturing the captive but instead the torture is intended to 
produce intelligence.  Church wrote that he “interceded and prevailed for his escaping 
torture.”67  Instead, the general ordered the captive to be executed with a tomahawk blow 
to the head.  Church “taking no delight in the sport, framed an errand at some distance”68 
from the execution.  Unfortunately, the execution was botched and the prisoner escaped 
towards where Church had gone to avoid the sight.  The result was a struggle, where 
Church was forced to recapture the fugitive.  The executioner caught up to them and 
killed the man while in Church’s arms.  While Church played a significant role in the 
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man’s death, it is evident that Church opposed the practice of torturing prisoners, despite 
some English support of the action.69 
Another conflicting cultural practice was the desecration of dead bodies.  English 
accounts describe the mutilation of their dead at the hands of Native Americans similar to 
the torture accounts.  The desecration accounts are intended to provoke an emotional 
response.  However, the Puritans also participated in the desecration of corpses.  For 
Native Americans, the act was intended to create fear in the enemy but it was associated 
with a strong spiritual connection.  The mutilation was intended to affect the soul of the 
dead in the afterlife.  Such acts would inspire fear in Native American enemies because 
they understood the cultural significance of the act.  From a Puritan standpoint, the act 
was horrific, not because it affected their soul but because it affected their civility.  The 
English interpreted the act as barbarous and uncivilized.  The English also participated in 
the mutilation of corpses, but as a symbol of victory and celebration.70   Hypocritically, 
from an English view point, the desecration of bodies was a demonstration of civility.  As 
in the case of Joshua Tift, English corpse mutilation was a symbol of law and order, the 
exact opposite of barbarous savagery.  In an account of Tift’s execution, Nathaniel 
Saltonstall states that Tift was “brought to our Army, and tryed by a Counsel of War” 
where he was “condemned to be hanged and Quartered, which was accordingly done.”71  
The passage indicates that Tift was executed followed by having his body torn apart.  The 
letter states the punishment plainly because its audience understood this to be an 
acceptable way of dealing with prisoners accused of treason.   
                                                          
69 Lepore, The Name of War, 17. 
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Church also participates in the desecration of corpses, and in that sense is no 
different from other Puritans.  In his account, once Metacom was dead and his men had 
secured the area, Church “gave them the news of Philip’s death upon which the whole 
army gave three loud huzzahs.”72  This indicates the celebratory nature of the event.  
Then the troops dragged the body through the mud.  Church ordered Metacom’s body to 
be drawn and quartered, typical of the punishment for treason.  Church also commands 
the body parts to be hanged from a tree.  Church claims the mutilation of Metacom’s 
corpse is because he “caused many an Englishman’s body to lie unburied and rot above 
ground.”73  Church gave Metacom’s hand, which was recognizable due to scarring from a 
previous wound, to the Native American who had shot and killed him.  Church brought 
Metacom’s head back to the Puritan authorities in New England.  However, Church does 
not allow the English to mutilate Metacom’s body but instead asks a Native American to 
perform the task.  The Native American charged with the mutilation “made a small 
speech, directing it to Philip, and said, he had been a very great man.”74  While the end 
result is not different from Tift’s punishment, it is interesting to note that Church had 
Metacom’s body dismembered by a Native American.  Though Tift was an Englishman, 
Church gives a more detailed and somewhat more honorable account of Metacom’s 
corpse than Tift’s executioners allowed him. 
Church was a man who occupied two worlds in colonial New England.  Church 
was an Anglo-American.  He was a Puritan.  He was a farmer.  He fought against Native 
Americans to defend his English colony.  Church adopted and accepted many aspects of 
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74 Benjamin Church, Diary of King Philip’s War, 156. 
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Native American culture that made him exceptional to his New England peers.  Church is 
most famous for his innovation of military tactics that led to the death of Metacom and 
the capture of Annawon during King Philip’s War in colonial New England.  Church’s 
military innovations are the origins of the American ranger.  It is just as important to see 
Church’s acceptance of Native American culture in ways unrelated to warfare.  After all, 
it was Church’s relationships with Native Americans that led to his advanced tactics, not 
the other way around.  
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Chapter IV 
BENJAMIN CHURCH:  THE FORMATION OF A TRANSCULTURAL MILITARY 
COMPANY DURING KING PHILIP’S WAR 
 
In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the English colonists of New 
England were at war with several Native American groups of the region, specifically the 
Wampanoags, the Narragansetts, and the Nipmucks.  Initially, the colonists were losing 
the war, but a series of turning points put them on the path to victory.  Though it is likely 
that the English colonists would have won the war regardless, it was a company under the 
command of Benjamin Church that effectively defeated the Wampanoags by killing their 
Sachem, Metacom, who was known by the English as King Philip.  Church’s company 
also captured Metacom’s war chief, Annawon.   
What enabled Church’s men to track down and kill or capture such highly valued 
targets?  Benjamin Church recognized the need for colonial soldiers to understand and 
adopt Native American methods of warfare.  This required an understanding of Native 
American culture.  His unique company was comprised of Anglo-Americans and Native 
Americans.  Church used Native Americans to train his men, and the unit integrated 
Native American tactics with European weapons and rank structure. Church’s innovative 
transition to a new style of warfare is considered a turning point in King Philip’s War.  
Church’s innovative methods were only possible because of his receptive views of Native 
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American culture.  More importantly, Church’s group was the first of what today is 
recognized as an American ranger company.  Church’s transcultural methods of warfare 
continue to influence the course of American warfare today. 
 King Philip’s War was not the first conflict in New England.  The results of the 
the Pequot War influenced the tactics used by Metacom’s forces as well as those used by 
the English colonists.  The effectiveness and ineffectiveness of those tactics forced 
Church to recognize the need for a transcultural army.  As Anglo-American populations 
expanded into Native American lands, the settlers tried a method of European warfare to 
protect them.  The settlers constructed blockhouses in the frontier.  In the case of an 
attack, the settlers could go to the blockhouses to fight off their attackers.   However, the 
Anglo-Americans were completely dependent on Native American allies to take the 
offensive. New Englanders themselves could not effectively fight a Native American 
force in wilderness terrain. New Englanders won the Pequot War with the help of Native 
American allies.  Their victory over the Pequots made the New Englanders a very real 
threat to the other Native American groups in the region. Old alliances and perceptions of 
power began to change.1  English tactics could be effective, but only in open fields or 
populated areas.  Native American tactics still dominated the wilderness and paths 
linking villages. 
Alliances between the New Englanders and Native Americans as well as alliances 
between Native American groups continued to change prior to King Philip’s War.  The 
cause for King Philip’s War is heavily debated.  Arguments range from economic 
                                                          
1John Grenier, The First Way of War:  American War Making on the Frontier (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 26-29; and Robert W. Black, Ranger Dawn:  The American Ranger from the 
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disputes over English encroachment into Native American lands to political conflict over 
the rights of Native Americans.  There are cultural arguments stemming from the 
conversion and confinement of Native Americans to Praying Towns to Metacom’s 
perception that he was losing power on account of the colonists.2  Whereas the causes of 
the war are debatable, Metacom himself clearly perceived the Puritans and Praying 
Indians as a threat to his power.   Several attempts were made to proselytize to Metacom 
by both New Englanders and Praying Indians.  One Praying Indian named William 
Abahton, who would later fight for the English in King Philip’s War, approached 
Metacom about converting to Christianity.  Metacom responded:  
You praying Indians do reject your sachems, and refuse to pay them 
tribute, in so much that if any of my people turn to pray unto God, I do 
reckon that I have lost him.  He will no longer own me for his sachem, nor 
pay me any tribute.  And hence it will come to pass, that if I should pray to 
God, and all my people with me, I must become as a common man among 
them, and so lose all my power and authority over them.3 
 
Clearly Metacom’s own words indicate that the New Englanders and their practices 
regarding the conversion and confinement of Native Americans to Praying Towns 
conflicted with his role as sachem.   
Other sources from the period show how New England perceived the cause of the 
war and where they placed the blame.  Nathaniel Saltonstall sent a letter to London in 
                                                          
2 Daniel R. Mandell, King Philip’s War:  Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian 
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1675 which gives an explanation for the cause of the war.  According to Saltonstall, an 
educated, Christian Native American called Sassoman went to proselytize to Metacom.  
In Saltonstall’s words: 
But King Philip (Heathenlike) instead of receiving the Gospel, would 
immediately have killed this Sosomon, but by the Perswasion of some 
about him did not do it, but sent him by the Hands of three of his Men to 
Prison; who as he was going to Prison, Exhorted and Taught them in the 
Christian Religion; they not liking his Discourse, immediately Murthered 
him after a most Barbarous Manner.4 
 
Eventually the three Native Americans accused of killing Sassoman were captured, tried, 
and executed.  According to Saltonstall, the trial “so Exasperated King Philip, that from 
that Day after, he studied to be Revenged on the English, judging that the English 
Authority have nothing to do to Hang any of his Indians for killing another.”5  Whether 
or not therein lies the truth about the cause of the war, it is evident is that there was a gap 
between the interests of Metacom and the English colonists.  What it important is that, 
according to the Puritans, the blame lies with non-Christian, “heathenlike” Native 
Americans.  The letter indicates a Puritan feeling of cultural superiority over their Native 
American enemies.  The only sign of respect towards Native Americans in the letter is in 
regard to Sassoman, who essentially abandoned his culture through English education.  
This ideology made men like Church, who embraced aspects of Native American culture, 
outliers within the New England mindset. 
When Metacom felt that diplomacy was no longer an option, he built alliances 
with other Native American groups such as the Narragansetts and the Nipmucks to make 
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war against the New Englanders.  According to Puritan letters, Metacom’s recruitment of 
allies and acquisition of arms was slow, deliberate, and methodical: 
[Philip] privately sent Messengers to most of the Indian Sagamores and 
Sachems round about him, telling them that the English had a Design to 
cut off all of the Indians round about them, and that if they did not Joyn 
together, they would lose their Lives and Lands; whereupon several 
Sachems became his Confederates.  And having now five Years Time, had 
Opportunity enough to furnish themselves with Ammunition and Arms, 
which they did plentifully at Canada, amongst the French; and its judged 
that some English have also Sold them some Arms through ignorance of 
their Design6 
 
The letter indicates that Metacom spent several years accruing European weaponry for 
his allies for his war against the New Englanders.  The letter may also possibly indicate 
some frontier tension and alliance building between European powers as well.  What is 
evident is that Metacom’s army was well equipped, and the New Englanders had no 
technological advantage in weaponry.  Tactics played a major role in the upcoming fight.  
That is not to say that muskets were the only weapons to be used, nor the most reliable.  
New Englanders still utilized pikes and swords, whereas Native Americans employed 
bows and arrows, spears, and war clubs.  Battlefield conditions determined the 
effectiveness of these weapons.  At close range or in wet weather, a musket could be 
more of a liability than an advantage.7 
The New Englanders recruited Native American allies as well.  Perhaps no one 
was more influential to the recruitment of New England’s Native American allies than 
Benjamin Church. Church’s background influenced his ability to recruit Native American 
allies.  He was a born in the Plymouth Colony in 1639.  The son of a carpenter, he trained 
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as a carpenter himself.  Church’s father was a veteran of the Pequot War. New 
Englanders knew Church for being physically strong and aggressive.  He married into an 
influential Massachusetts family and acquired some Native American land in Sakonnet, 
on the frontier.  Church’s frontier home was surrounded by Wampanoag neighbors.  
Church established friendships with his Wampanoag neighbors and learned their 
language.  Church also learned Wampanoag methods of hunting and warfare.  Church 
was often a liaison between the Native world and the world of Puritan New England.8  
Even before King Philip’s War, Church established ties with his Native American 
neighbors and at the same time distanced himself from Puritan New England.  It seems 
that Church saw Native Americans as neighbors and that to be successful in the New 
World, one could not remain one hundred percent European.   
When it became evident to the Puritans that Metacom was building alliances to 
make war on the colony, the New Englanders commissioned Church to recruit Native 
American allies.  Church’s recruitment efforts led him Awashonks, a female sachem of 
the Sakonnet Wampanoags who lived near his home. Female sachems were not 
uncommon, as the wife of Metacom’s late brother also carried the title.  Awashonks 
invited Church to a dance where they discussed the rumors of war.  Church and 
Awashonks were friends, and some have even suggested that the frontiersman and the 
Awashonks engaged in an extra-marital affair.  Awashonks warned Church that Metacom 
had sent men to recruit her allegiance and that he had blackmailed her into support, 
claiming he would attack the New Englanders from her borders to provoke Puritan 
retaliation against her.  Furthermore, Awashonks’s people supported Metacom. Church 
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warned Awashonks that she would do better to stand with New England.  Despite her 
friendship with Church, Awashonks’s people served Metacom’s interests early in the 
war.9   
King Philip’s War started slowly.  New Englanders were familiar with rumors of 
an impending attack.  In the summer of 1675, a few small, isolated incidents of Native 
American raids led the colonists to believe the rumored war was underway.  In response, 
a young New Englander fired on and killed a Native American that was running from a 
house.  The act triggered a response from Metacom, who had his warriors attack and kill 
isolated New Englanders when the opportunity rose.  The first town struck was a frontier 
village called Swansea.  Swansea stood between Metacom’s lands and the Plymouth 
Colony and Massachusetts.10 
The blockhouse tactics that served the colonists well in previous years became 
ineffective in King Philip’s War.  The colonists fled to the blockhouses at the first sign of 
an attack.  Rather than attack the blockhouse, the Native American attackers burned the 
settler’s homes, crops, and storehouses.  Not only were the Native American attacks 
devastating, New Englanders sat in the blockhouses and let the attacks go uncontested. 
They defended themselves against an enemy that would not attack.  The Native American 
enemies placed ambushes on roads leading into and out of settlements.  There they 
attacked any who journeyed through the wilderness.  With European defensive tactics 
ineffective, it became necessary for the settlers to take the war to their Native American 
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enemies.  The colonists faced the problem of not knowing how to find their enemies or 
how to fight them in the wilderness.11  As William Harris protested in 1676, the Native 
Americans made war and “mischiefs in a secret sly, skulking way, no man knew well 
how to find them.”12 
 Church volunteered as an officer to lead the militia against the Wampanoags and 
the Narragansetts.  Church recognized the need for his men to be able to fight like their 
Native American enemies.  Church appealed to his Native American friends to join his 
cause and instruct his men.  Church recruited fellow frontiersman and hunters to fill his 
ranks.  Though Church was a rough frontiersman, his faith led many of his actions.  
Church’s orders began with prayer and biblical scripture and the requirement that his 
officers also consult the Bible.  Many of Church’s Native American allies were Praying 
Indians.  His faith possibly persuaded his command, as Church ordered to take as many 
captives as possible. Church also gave Native American captives a choice to join his unit 
or face death or slavery at the hands of the colonies.  This recruiting of captives led some 
Native Americans to be very loyal to Church.  Some of Church’s Native American 
soldiers were so loyal to him that they would willingly fight against their own kin.  It is 
important to note that not all Wampanoags, Naragansetts, and Nipmucks fought for 
Metacom, nor did all Praying Indians side with the colonies.  In fact, about one-third of 
Church’s men were Wampanoag.  Ranks from both sides contained both Christian and 
non-Christian Native Americans.13 
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 Church’s company was small and often acted independently of the orders of the 
larger, traditional European forces in New England.  The company moved using the 
terrain for cover and faster mobility.  Unlike the other New England forces, Church and 
his men rarely occupied forts.  Church was of the opinion that defensive warfare from 
fortified walls was useless, as the Native Americans often avoided them.  He did not 
overlook all European tactics, but often adapted his tactics around them.  Church studied 
the way large New England military units moved from location to location.  Small groups 
of Metacom’s warriors stalked or eluded numerically superior New England forces from 
concealed positions.  Church’s unit counter-stalked these groups, often forcing them into 
an ambush where they were killed or captured.  The small size of Church’s unit allowed 
it to move quickly and stealthily through the forest.  Its small size, however, was not 
much of a disadvantage as the enemy often believed Church’s men to be part of the larger 
New England force they were stalking, leading them to surrender.14 
 Church’s company became well known among the colonial commanders for its 
ability to maneuver through wooded terrain undetected.  Once, the governor of the colony 
ordered his officers to march their units to a rendezvous point.  Church’s company was 
used as a forward scout element.  By marching some distance ahead of the larger body, 
Church could detect and repel ambushes or return intelligence of enemy activity to the 
rear.  According to Church’s account, 
Major Bradford desired Mr. Church, with a commanded party, consisting 
of English and some Friend Indians, to march in the front at some distance 
from the main body.  Their orders were to keep so far before as not to be 
insight of the army.  And so they did, for by the way, they killed a deer, 
flayed, roasted, and eat the most of him, before the army came up with 
them.15 
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Church’s account does raise some questions.  How were the men able to kill, cook, and 
eat an entire deer while providing a forward security element for the main army?  How 
effectively were they doing their jobs?  It is possible that Church may have exaggerated 
his account somewhat.  Still, the source implies simply by the task provided to Church’s 
unit that they were excellent at moving through the forest quickly and undetected.  
Furthermore, it shows that Church’s unit consisted of both whites and Native Americans. 
 Church let the terrain dictate how his men moved through the wilderness.  His 
soldiers maintained small groups and separation between men to limit the effects of 
ambushes.  Heavily wooded areas required tighter groups in order to maintain visual 
contact and communication as quietly as possible.  An open meadow allowed men to 
spread out while maintaining contact.  These tactics limited the effects of an ambush 
because small groups of Native Americans could not concentrate fire into a thick group 
of bodies.  Church invented other tactics regarding ambushes as well.  When attacked, 
Church’s men sought cover and returned fire. Church made it clear “not to discharge all 
their guns at once, lest the enemy should take the advantage of such an opportunity to run 
upon them with their hatchets.”16  Furthermore, those who were reloading were more 
likely to expose themselves.  Church ordered those who had not fired to maintain cover 
and concealment.  The exposed soldier reloading his musket often provoked his enemy’s 
tomahawk, only for the hidden soldier to counter attack the approaching Native American 
with his still-loaded musket.17  These tactics strayed from the European style of rank and 
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file warfare.  The tactics were not fully Native American either.  Church studied his 
enemy and learned their methods and adapted it to his own methods or warfare. 
 Another element of Indian warfare in which Church’s unit excelled was rescue 
missions.  An important element of Native American warfare was the capture of enemies.  
Captives could be killed, absorbed into their captors, sold into slavery, or held for 
ransom.18  English settlers were often powerless to rescue captives, as a rescue operation 
required knowledge of tracking the Native American captors followed by a successful 
military operation to secure the prisoners. Mary Rowlandson, a Puritan New Englander 
who was captured by Metacom’s forces, serves as an example.  While a captive, 
Rowlandson was moved twenty times by her captors, often while they conducted other 
raids on white villages.  Rowlandson was eventually ransomed back to the Massachusetts 
Colony after several months of captivity.19  While captive, Rowlandson noted that her 
Native American captors had little faith in the English to rescue her: 
I cannot but remember how the Indians derided the slowness, and dullness 
of the English Army, in its setting out.  For after the desolations at 
Lancaster and Medfield, as I went along with them, they asked me when I 
thought the English Army would come after them?  I told them I could not 
tell:  It may be they will come in May, said they.  Thus did they scoffe at 
us, as if the English would be a quarter of a year getting ready.20 
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Rowlandson’s account explains that the Native Americans had little respect for the 
Puritan soldiers, especially their inability to mobilize quickly.  Additionally, it is 
interesting that Rowlandson was captured in February, moved around twenty times over 
the course of several months, and ransomed all before the time speculated by her captors 
that the New England soldiers would mobilize.  Perhaps that is more indicative of a fear 
or realization on the part of New Englanders that a rescue operation was futile.  They 
were, in fact, giving Rowlandson’s captors time to return her for ransom. 
 Church’s unit, on the other hand, was known for mobilizing quickly.  Cotton 
Mather recorded an even in which the company defeated an enemy force and rescued 
English captives.  
Auxiliaries both of English and Indians, under the Command of Major 
Church… were dispatched away upon this Design… who Landed by 
Night in the Casco Bay… and by Night March up to the Pechypscot-fort… 
but found that the Wretches were gone farther afield.  They then marched 
away for Amonoscoggin Fort, which was about Forty Miles up the 
River… they met Four or Five Salvages, going into their Fort, with two 
English Prisoners.  They sav’d the Prisoners, but could not catch the 
Salvages; however… they got up to the Fort undiscovered, where… they 
found no more than one and Twenty of the Enemy, whereof they Took and 
Slew Twenty.  They found some Considerable Store of Plunder, and 
Rescued Five English Captives, and laid the Fort in Ashes.21 
 
This excerpt reveals several things about Church’s unit and New England warfare against 
Native Americans.  First, it shows that Church’s unit was ethnically mixed, consisting of 
New Englanders and Native Americans.  Also, Church’s unit mobilized quickly and 
could cover large distances in a relatively short period of time.  Church’s unit also moved 
at night if the situation dictated.  Also, their enemy was mobile.  The first fort was 
abandoned.  Church and his men were able to track their enemy down to a second fort.  
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More importantly, the rescue of seven prisoners and twenty one enemy killed must have 
been significant for Mather to record the event with such fervor.  Mobilizing and 
covering ground in darkness, tracking the enemy across miles of wilderness, and 
attacking them on their own ground is the exact opposite of how Rowlandson’s captors 
viewed the colonial militias.  Perhaps that is because Church’s unit was unlike anything 
anyone had seen, a blend of European and Native American warfare. 
 Though successful, Church’s unit and tactics were not very popular with the 
colonial officials at the beginning of the war.  Church often disputed orders from higher 
colonial military authorities.  Church particularly disliked military operations involving 
forts.  In one battle, the New England forces were in direct combat with Metacom, who 
fled.  In European fashion, the commander declared it a victory and ordered the men to 
build a fort on the grounds.  Church argued against the plan and instead requested the 
commander allow his men the freedom to pursue Metacom. Church was denied, but his 
memoirs indicate that he felt the fort was a complete waste of time.  Church and his 
superiors disagreed again at a major battle of the war known as the Great Swamp Fight.  
The battle was part of a campaign against the Narragansetts.  The battle took place in 
December where the Narragansetts had built a large fort in a formidable location in a 
large swamp.  However, the winter cold had frozen the swamp, making it more accessible 
for the New Englanders.  The New Englanders surrounded the fort.  Several New 
Englanders died trying to take the fort.  Church and thirty men mobilized and crossed the 
ice and fought their way into the fort, allowing more New Englanders to follow.  In a 
conventional English method of warfare, the commander, General Josiah Winslow, 
ordered the fort burned.  Church opposed the order. Church argued that the fort could 
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provide safety for the New Englanders for the night and that the wigwams within the fort 
contained food and supplies.  Church’s challenge to the order was ignored and the fort 
was burned.  Many of the Narragansett elderly and small children were hiding in the 
wigwams and burned to death.  Many more died from fleeing into the cold swamp with 
no supplies.22 
 The Great Swamp Fight was a New England victory, but a pyrrhic victory at 
most.  Historians disagree on the number of Narragansetts killed, but agree that most 
were noncombatants.  The actions provoked an increase in raids in the following months 
led by the Naragansett war chief, Canochet.  Also, because of the decision to burn the fort 
and provisions rather than use them, the militia was forced to endure cold and starvation.  
The New Englanders were forced to eat their horses to survive.  The lack of suitable 
shelter and provisions in the New England winter forced the New Englanders to retreat 
back to the safety of the colony.23 
 The colonies continued to suffer defeat at the hands of Native American raids in 
the months after the Great Swamp Fight.  With the thawing of winter, the tide began to 
turn in favor of New England.  Several key events led to a turning point in the war.  
Probably the single most important factor was that the New Englanders gained a new 
ally.  The governor of New York, Sir Edmund Andros, successfully recruited the 
Mohawks to assist the New Englanders in the war.  The new alliance created a war on 
two fronts for the Wampanoags as the Mohawks began raiding their villages.  Another 
event was the death of Canochet.  New England’s Native American allies tracked down 
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and killed the Narragansett war chief.  The third event was the colonial approval of 
Benjamin Church’s tactics and an increase in his authority.  The news of Church’s 
authority spread.  He was summoned by his friend, Awashonks.  Awashonks’s warriors 
were dressed and painted for battle.  She swore allegiance to Church and the Plymouth 
Colony, and asked Church to lead her men into battle against Metacom.  In return, 
Church guaranteed the safety of her and her people.24 
Perhaps the culmination of Church’s tactics occurred when men under his 
command hunted down and killed Metacom himself.  Church was an innovator of 
military tactics, but for most of the war was restrained by orders from the colonial 
governments.  The colonial powers loosened their reigns and granted him special 
authority.  Church was authorized to move freely within the colonies in the hopes of 
killing or capturing Metacom.  Church was also granted the right to offer amnesty to 
deserters of the lower echelons of Metacom’s ranks. 25   
Church’s unit began pursuit upon reports from local town militias of Metacom’s 
activity in the area.  Church’s memoirs recount an incident that happened while in pursuit 
of Metacom.  Church and his men approached a tree that was a makeshift bridge across a 
stream. 
The Captain [Church] spied an Indian sitting on the stump of it on the 
other side of the river, and he clapped his gun up, and had doubtlessly 
dispatched him, but that one of his own Indians called hastily to him, not 
to fire, for he believed it was one of their own men.  Upon which the 
Indian upon the stump, looked about, and Captain Church’s Indian 
perceived his mistake, for he knew him to be Philip; clapped up his gun 
and fired, but it was too late; for Philip immediately threw himself off the 
stump, leaped down a bank on the other side of the river and made his 
escape.26 
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At a glance, it may seem that Church was bragging in his memoirs about having 
Metacom in his sights, or even possibly blaming an Indian for Metacom’s escape.  
However, this excerpt provides several clues to the nature of Church and his unit.  First, 
Church’s unit caught up to Metacom.  This is indicative of Church’s soldiers’ ability to 
pursue their enemies.  Second, Native Americans were integrated into Church’s unit.  
Third, the Native Americans in Church’s unit must have appeared similarly dressed to 
Metacom and his soldiers, due to the confusion. Finally, Church respected the opinions of 
his Native American soldiers, as he did not fire when the Native American soldier 
stopped him.  Church makes no mention of chastising or punishing the man who caused 
the escape. 
 The incident at the river was not a total loss.  Church’s men captured several 
prisoners, mostly women and children.  Among the prisoners were Metacom’s wife and 
his nine-year-old son.  Metacom and his Wampanoags fled in one direction while his 
Narragansett allies chose a different route.  Several Native Americans from Church’s unit 
pursued the Narragansetts, killing some and taking others prisoner.  Church continued to 
pursue Metacom and the Wampanoags.  Church’s unit soon reunited with those who 
pursued the Narragansetts and continued to capture prisoners while in pursuit of 
Metacom.  Despite Metacom’s best efforts to move quickly, Church and his men 
continued to gain ground.  They forced Metacom into a swamp.  Church divided his 
forces to set a trap for Metacom, but he once again eluded capture.  However, Church’s 
trap captured more prisoners.  Those prisoners were mostly women and children and 
could not keep up with their warriors.  Since the incident at the log bridge, Church and 
his men had captured one hundred and seventy three prisoners.  The amount of prisoners 
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forced Church to abandon pursuit for the moment, but the losses weighed heavily on 
Metacom.27 
Metacom became more a fugitive than an opposing military leader.  Metacom’s 
soldiers sensed the impending defeat.  One of the Native Americans who served under 
Metacom deserted his cause and sought out Church.  The deserter claimed that his 
brother had suggested that the sachem make peace with the New Englanders.  Metacom 
had the dissenter killed.  The deserter disclosed Metacom’s location to Church and freely 
gave information about his numbers.  Church’s men prepared to move, once again 
utilizing the dark of night to maneuver into position.28  Church gave orders to one of his 
officers, Captain Roger Goulding to 
Creep with his company, on their bellies, until they came as near as they 
could; and that as soon as the enemy discovered them, they would cry out, 
and that was the word for his to fire and fall on.  [He] directed him, [that] 
when the enemy should start and take into the swamp, [that] they should 
pursue with speed, every man shouting and making what noise [he] could; 
for he would give orders to his ambuscade to fire on any that should come 
silently.29 
 
The orders provide more insight into Church’s tactics.  The soldiers were getting into 
position under cover of darkness.  They prepared to bushwhack the Wampanoags in their 
camp.  Soldiers were told to fire when the enemy cried out upon discovery.  Those who 
fled were pushed into an ambush.  War cries of those pursuing alerted those lying in wait 
to ambush of their fraternity.  Those are not the tactics of European gentlemen.  These are 
the “skulking ways” of war William Harris attributed to the Narragansetts and 
Wampanoags in 1676.  The tactics had come full circle.  
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 There was a slight error on the part of Captain Goulding that could have been 
disastrous for Church’s attack.  One of the enemy Wampanoags had risen early to urinate.  
The warrior gazed into to the wood line, which Goulding mistook as being discovered.  
Goulding fired, followed by the rest of his men.  Unfortunately for New Englanders, the 
rest of the Wampanoags were still asleep, lying down.  The bullets passed harmlessly 
over most of them.  The startled Wampanoags began fleeing into the forest.  Fortunately 
for the New Englanders, Church and his men had just barely got into place at the ambush 
sight.  At the ambush sight, two men saw an enemy warrior approaching.  The first man 
to fire was a New Englander, but his weapon malfunctioned.  The second man was one of 
Church’s Native American troops. He fired his musket and it functioned flawlessly.  The 
shot struck the enemy soldier in the chest followed by a second shot.  The Wampanoag 
warrior fell face first into the mud.  A few others were killed in the ambush, but most 
escaped.  The two brothers in arms checked the body of the slain warrior, and recognized 
him as Metacom, the infamous King Philip.30  The events surrounding the death of 
Metacom surely portrayed the creation of a transcultural army.  First, a military unit, led 
by a New Englander but consisting of Anglo-American and Native American troops, 
silently and effectively attacked a Wampanoag position.  The tactics employed were 
definitely more representative of Native American fighting styles.  Second, Metacom was 
killed in a Native American style ambush by two men, one English, the other Native 
American, standing side by side, using European weapons. 
In a letter to London, Richard Hutchinson described what happened next.  “This 
seasonable Prey was soon divided, they cut off his Head and Hands, and conveyed them 
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to Rhode Island, and quartered his Body, and hung it upon four Trees.”31  Church ordered 
Metacom’s body hung from the trees as revenge for all of the New Englanders killed and 
left to rot unburied.  The Native American who shot Metacom was named John 
Alderman.  One of Metacom’s hands was famously scarred from a faulty pistol. Church 
gave Alderman the recognizable hand, which Alderman preserved in a jar of rum as 
confirmation of the kill.  Alderman carried the jar for the rest of his life and earned 
money by showing it to people. News reached the colonial villages of Metacom’s death.   
The New Englanders rejoiced and in Puritan fashion gathered for a sermon. Just as the 
sermon was finishing, Church arrived with Metacom’s head.  Metacom’s head was 
placed on a tall pole for everyone to see.32   
Though Metacom’s death was a great victory for the Puritans, the Wampanoags 
still posed a threat to the English colonies.  The Wampanoag war chief, Annawon, still 
had a force under his leadership capable of making war on the New Englanders.  
Intelligence from captured Wampanoags led Church and his men to Annawon’s location, 
deep within a swamp.  Church was only able to take a few men with him, only one of 
which was a New Englander.  The small group made their way to Annawon’s camp in the 
darkness where they found the war chief and his men resting and waiting for their women 
to prepare food.  From Church’s vantage point, he could also see that Annawon’s men 
had placed their weapons together under a cover to keep them dry.  The weapons were 
next to Annawon and his son. Church sent an elderly Native American captive and his 
daughter into the campsite to create a distraction while Church and his men slipped into 
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the camp.  Church, armed with a tomahawk, simultaneously confiscated the enemy 
weapons and captured Annawon.  Church’s soldiers, who were all Native Americans with 
the exception of one, captured the rest of Annawon’s warriors.33 
Church respected Annawon, who was a war chief when Metacom’s father was 
still sachem.  Church had pursued the war chief many times and was unable to capture 
him until now.  It seems Church had now earned Annawon’s respect in return.  Annawon 
ordered the women in his camp to prepare a meal for Church and his men.  Church told 
Annawon that he must take the captives to the New Englanders, but that they would be 
given quarter and their lives spared.  Church explained that he could not extend this 
promise to Annawon himself once turning him over to colonial officials, but that he 
would do everything in his power to insure he keep his life.  Peace was made between the 
two and fighters from both sides fell asleep after the meal.  Church and Annawon both 
stayed awake watching each other.  Church and Annawon had spoken Wampanoag, with 
the help of translators, throughout the night and now sat in silence.  Annawon got up and 
retrieved something and returned to Church.  Annawon spoke English to Church for the 
first time:  “Great Captain, you have killed Philip, and conquered his country; for I 
believe that I and my company are the last that war against the English, so suppose the 
war is ended by your means; and therefore these things belong to you.”34  Annawon 
presented Church with Metacom’s wampum belts, powder horns, and blanket.  Annawon 
dressed Church with the items and told him “these were Philip’s royalties, which he was 
wont to adorn himself with, when he sat in state; that he was happy that he had an 
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opportunity to present them to Captain Church, who had won them.”35  Annawon then 
told Church stories about wars he had fought in over the years.36  Church’s capture of 
Annawon is significant for several reasons.  Obviously, it ends the war between the 
Puritans and Metacom’s forces.  More significant, however, are the details of the capture.  
Church is an English officer commanding a predominately Native American force in this 
event.  The tactics used are not traditionally European.  Church does not win the battle 
with European muskets, cannons, or even swords.  When Annawon is captured, Church is 
sneaking under cover of darkness, carrying a tomahawk.  The two men show great 
respect for one another, especially when Annawon dresses Church in his sachem’s 
ceremonial garb.  One can only question what the colonial officials and Puritan 
magistrates would think if they saw Church dressed like a “savage” and dining with the 
enemy.   
While the nonviolent capture of Annawon and the exchange of respect between 
him and Church may seem like a happy ending, it unfortunately was not for the Native 
Americans of New England.  Annawon was beheaded by order of the colonial officials.  
Metacom’s wampum belts and other possessions were taken from Church and sent to the 
king as a gift.  New laws were passed in some colonies that ordered captured enemies 
killed or sold into slavery in the West Indies.  Praying Indians who sided with the 
colonies’ enemies were doubly tried for their treason to the colony and to God.  Many of 
those promised quarter were shot.  The balance of power shifted and the New Englanders 
became the most powerful group in the region.37 
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Benjamin Church and his company did not single handedly win King Philip’s 
War.  In fact, Church and his unit did not contribute to the majority of the war effort 
against the Wampanoags, Narragansetts, and Nipmucks.  In reality, New England’s 
victory was more likely because of Native American allies than superior strategy.  
However, Benjamin Church is significant to the history of King Philip’s War and 
American military history.  Church did not view Native Americans as culturally inferior 
and saw them as neighbors and friends.  Church embraced Native American tactics and 
recognized their effectiveness in the New World.  Church believed that Native Americans 
could effectively train English militiamen to make war as they did.  By creating a military 
unit that incorporated European and Native American soldiers, that utilized European and 
Native American leadership, and combined European and Native American tactics and 
weaponry, Church was able to support the larger New England army through 
asymmetrical warfare.  Ultimately, Church was able to track down and kill or capture the 
leaders of the enemy force through the adaptation of that enemy’s tactics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
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BENJAMIN CHURCH’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO KING WILLIAM’S WAR AND 
QUEEN ANNE’S WAR:  THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE  
AMERICAN GUERILLA FIGHTER 
 
Between the years of 1636 and 1638, New England’s war with the Pequots 
exposed the inadequacies of European warfare in North America.  Although they were 
victorious in the end, the New Englanders struggled to conduct offensive operations, and 
were heavily dependent upon Native American allies.  In 1675, in what became known as 
King Philip’s War, the colonists seemed to experience the same failures that plagued 
them in the Pequot War.  A major turning point occurred when the colonial political 
powers, after much resistance, granted more power to Benjamin Church.  Church was a 
frontiersman, a fighter, and, unlike most Puritans, a close friend of Native Americans.  
Church raised a force comprised of both New Englanders and Native Americans to 
conduct small offensive operations in support of the larger New England forces.  
Church’s company utilized a combination of European and Native American methods of 
warfare, including tactics, clothing, weapons, and rank structure.  Church and his men 
tracked down and killed Metacom, and on a separate occasion captured the Wampanoag 
war chief, Annawon.  Church’s acceptance of Native American culture and warfare 
caused some reluctance on the part of other colonial officers and political powers.  
Church’s successes altered their opinions of him and his new style of warfare, and he 
emerged as the hero of King Philip’s War. 
 Around the turn of the century, a pair of imperial wars began in the New World.  
The two wars, known as King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, were technically 
American theaters of European wars involving England and France.  However, the way 
in which these wars were fought were more like the early wars against Native Americans 
105 
 
than anything seen on European battlefields.   In fact, the wars saw two sides of combat.  
Though still dominated by militia, there was a somewhat organized, conventional side of 
the wars, which was mostly ineffective.  There was also an unconventional, violent, 
guerilla side of the conflicts that was fought from people’s homes on the frontier.  This 
side of war saw both sides employing Native Americans and Europeans to brutally attack 
civilian populations, killing and capturing hundreds of people, many of whom were 
noncombatants.  How do imperial wars with regular and irregular warfare relate to the 
hero of King Philip’s War?  The colonial powers requested an aging Church to continue 
the tactics that made him famous against the French Canadians, Acadians, and Abenakis.  
While Church’s methods alone could never remove the French from the continent, they 
did disrupt and harass the enemy and affect their will to fight.  It was in King William’s 
War and Queen Anne’s War where early Americans first began to use, in conjunction, 
regular and irregular forces.  The use of irregular forces is directly connected to Benjamin 
Church. 
 The first of the two wars was called King William’s War after the new English 
king, William III, also called William of Orange.  King William’s War, which was a 
North American conflict, coincided with the European war known as the War of the 
League of Augsburg, or sometimes called the Nine Years War.  King William’s War 
officially lasted from 1688 to 1697.  It has been suggested that the colonists renamed this 
conflict, as well as Queen Anne’s War and King George’s War, to remove any blame for 
hostilities from themselves while placing it on the monarchy.  While these conflicts do 
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coincide with European wars, it is evident that tensions already existed between the 
English and French colonists as well as their Native American neighbors.1   
Disputes over trade, land, culture, and alliances caused many problems between 
the peoples of North America.  Trade arguments often involved fishing rights and the fur 
trade, especially with regards to Hudson Bay.  Land disputes occurred between the 
French and English borders as well as with Native Americans.  Cultural arguments can be 
attributed not only to the differences between Europeans and Native Americans but also 
to Protestants and Catholics.  Alliances created problems because both the French and 
English were victims of attacks by Native Americans:  the Iroquois were allies of the 
English and the Abenakis were allies of the French.  A fragile peace existed between the 
belligerents based on small treaties of neutrality.  When hostilities finally broke out in 
Europe and North America, it is clear that the peoples of New England and New France 
went to war with each other for their own reasons.2 
King William’s War was much more than simply a matter of numbers.  In terms 
of numbers, the English colonists far outnumbered the French.  It is estimated that the 
English colonists numbered around 205,000 whereas the French numbered between 
twelve and thirteen thousand.3  English colonial militia laws required every physically 
able male between the ages of sixteen and sixty to serve.  There were, however, 
exceptions to the rule.  The clergy, lawmakers, doctors, and teachers were not required to 
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serve.  The Pennsylvania colony had no militia laws at all because of Quaker pacifism.  
Those who did serve received less than a week of actual training per year, and were 
required to supply themselves.  There were no professional soldiers in the English 
colonies and few officers trained in how to lead.  Officers were picked by their men and 
the governor served as the commander-in-chief.  Additionally, of the 205,000 English 
colonists, about half lived in New England and New York near New France.  Those were 
further spread out among themselves.  There were also more families in the English 
colonies, meaning that a significant number were women and children.  Another problem 
was that the English colonies were not always united, and it was difficult for them to 
organize their defenses.4 
The French had several advantages to make up for what they lacked in numbers.  
New France was also dependent upon citizen soldiers, but they served under a seigniorial 
system where a tenant provided military service to a landowner, who in turn provided 
service to the king.  New France was comprised of more individual male immigrants than 
entire families, so the sheer numbers had a larger male to female ratio.  New France also 
contained around thirty-two companies of Regulars, including the La Marine Regiment, 
which could number anywhere from 500 to 1,200 troops.5  In total, the French had more 
trained and experienced men in service.  Also, the French were more concentrated than 
the English.  This created a more organized force with which to attack or defend.  Though 
both sides had Native American allies, the French had more and better coordinated 
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attacks with them.  As a result, the forces were much more evenly matched than a first 
glance at sheer numbers indicates.6 
The conventional efforts of King William’s War must be discussed up front 
because the desired outcomes and ineffectiveness in action contribute to the use of 
unconventional efforts.  The conventional efforts of King William’s War involved the 
English attacking specific places that they felt would force the French from North 
America - Montreal, Quebec, and Port Royal.  Hostilities had already broken out in 
frontier settlements because of the use of Native American allies when the English 
colonists decided for a conventional attack on the French.  In May 1690, Sir William 
Phips led an attack on Port Royal in Acadia.  Port Royal was considered to be a staging 
area for Native American attacks on New Englanders as well as French privateering raids 
on English ships.  Phips was a native New Englander who had gained wealth when he 
recovered a sunken treasure in the Caribbean.  Phips also received a knighthood when he 
paid a portion of the treasure to England.  Phips arrived at Port Royal to find the fort 
manned by ninety men, of whom forty had serviceable muskets.7  The French 
surrendered without much of a fight.  The English victory was intended to eliminate Port 
Royal as a staging area, but the English experienced more problems.  The New 
Englanders raided and looted the town in search of plunder.  They did not find enough 
valuable items to pay for the expedition, much less make it profitable for the men who 
made the journey.  Conventional warfare was expensive, especially for independent 
colonies.  Another setback occurred when the French captured an English settlement near 
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Casco Bay soon after, which was a bigger loss than gaining Port Royal.  The English 
could not maintain an occupation of Port Royal, so they abandoned it to the enemy.8 
Despite the setbacks of Port Royal, it convinced the English colonists that they 
could perform a similar attack on Quebec.  Eventually, the colonies decided to attempt a 
two-pronged attack.  The plan called for Phips to conduct an attack similar to the one he 
had made on Port Royal, this time sailing from Boston up the St. Lawrence to Quebec.  
Once at Quebec, the English ground forces were to be commanded by John Walley.  The 
plan also called for a simultaneous over-land attack on Montreal from New York, 
consisting of English colonists and Native American allies led by Connecticut Governor 
Fitz-John Winthrop. The English hoped that the two-pronged attack would divide the 
French and that the two cities would have a large amount of plunder.  Ultimately, the 
attack shows an English desire to win the war in one swift stroke.  The plan combined 
effort of several colonies, each providing some men and officers.  Phips sailed with 
thirty-two ships and thirteen hundred men to Quebec.  There he demanded the surrender 
from the governor of New France, Louis de Baude de Frontenac.  Frontenac refused to 
surrender, some fighting occurred, and Phips sailed back to Boston.  Meanwhile, 
Winthrop’s forces argued among themselves and lacked supplies.  He was also 
undermanned as fewer Native American allies had joined the expedition as anticipated.  
Around Lake Champlain, the expedition halted.  Winthrop sent a small detachment 
ahead, which met some small skirmishes but never reached Montreal.  The majority of 
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Winthrop’s forces returned home.  Smallpox outbreaks further exacerbated both prongs 
of the attack.9   
The failed attack created a lot of debt and blame within the English colonies.  
There was some talk of reviving the two-pronged attack in 1693 with the help of an 
English fleet sailing up the coast from the West Indies.  Instead, the fleet attacked St. 
Pierre in Newfoundland.  French expeditions against the English took Fort William 
Henry in Pemaquid, Maine and Port York in Hudson Bay.10  With the exception of the 
small, insignificant capture of Port Royal, English efforts at conventional warfare in King 
William’s War were a disaster.  While these attempts to destroy the French in one blow 
constitute the majority of the main effort, the majority of the casualties came from the 
irregular warfare on the frontier.  In many ways, this type of fighting better suited the 
English colonists.  They had learned lessons in the Pequot War and King Philip’s War.  
These guerilla attacks were less expensive and required less coordination and planning 
because they used smaller forces.11  For many people living in New England and New 
York, and even Acadia and New France, King William’s War was not a new war but a 
war that had been raging for nearly a hundred years.  It was a war of survival against the 
attackers that come in the night to kill or carry away their loved ones.  One of those 
people was Benjamin Church. 
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Before the attack on Port Royal, raids had already occurred on both sides.  Native 
Americans from the Iroquois Confederacy conducted raids near Montreal, where they 
killed or captured over one hundred Canadians and destroyed fifty-six farms.12  The 
Iroquois Confederacy had formed an alliance with the English in New York known as the 
Covenant Chain.  The English frontier faced similar raids by the Abenaki, who were 
allied to the French.  However, raids conducted by Native Americans may or may not 
have been instigated by white allies.  The problems that led to the Pequot War and King 
Philip’s War were still present in the area.  Regardless, sometimes retaliation was carried 
out against one group for the actions of another, which possibly had no connections.  On 
February 9, 1690, Frontenac led a raid on Schenectady, New York.  The gates to the town 
were open and the guards were either not posted or fell asleep.  Two hundred French and 
Native Americans entered the town, killed sixty English colonists, captured some 
prisoners, and burned the town.13  The French and Native Americans then attacked two 
more settlements, at Newichewarnock and Salmon Falls.  The raid itself had no 
significant value for the French or the English, but is set the standard for how much of the 
war was to be fought.  The French called it “la petite guerre.”14   
This guerrilla campaign included many small raids that almost always consisted 
of killing some settlers, taking prisoners, killing the livestock, and burning the houses, 
barns, and food stores.  Even if the enemy sustained few casualties, the destruction of 
food and shelter was a drain on the enemy, physically and mentally.  When fighting 
Native Americans, as Church did, this type of fighting effectively at pushed the enemy 
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farther away.  What made Church so effective in King Philip’s War was not that he killed 
large numbers of Native Americans, but that he was able to track them to their homes 
without being ambushed en route.  In King William’s War, and later Queen Anne’s War, 
many times his Native American enemies learned of his coming and abandoned their 
forts.  When Church arrived, he destroyed their food and homes.  This effective tactic 
pushed the enemy farther and farther away.  The farther the enemy was removed from 
their homes, the less they threatened frontier settlers.  It was not about taking land, or 
even so much killing, as it was harassing the enemy to the point they abandoned the 
frontier borderlands.15 
Taking captives was another important element to the guerrilla war, especially for 
the Native American allies.  Captives played an important role in Native American 
warfare before the Europeans arrived.  Taking prisoners had social, cultural, and 
economic purposes in Native American combat.  Prisoners could be adopted into the tribe 
to physically replace their own dead.  Likewise, captives could be ritualistically tortured 
to allow their death to replace the spiritual loss of their own dead.  Captives were also a 
symbol of a male’s prowess in battle.  Captives could also be sold or ransomed.16  The 
Reverend Stephen Williams recorded Daniel Belding’s account of captivity during King 
William’s War.  Belding was captured, along with two of his children and two other 
whites.  While taking the prisoners back to New France, his Native American captors 
captured two more prisoners, these both Native Americans.  Belding asked the older of 
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the two Native American prisoners what would happen to them, who replied “that they 
would not kill the English prisoners, but give some of them to the French, and keep some 
themselves; but he expected to be burned himself.”17  This account shows three purposes 
for the captives.  The Native American says the English will not be killed but some given 
to the French, and some kept.  This demonstrates that the captives given to the French 
will likely serve as a form of commodity, meaning the Native Americans will get 
something in return.  The English to be kept are possibly going to be adopted, or 
ransomed back to the English.  The man who will burn in the fires will return the lost 
spiritual power to the clan.  Benjamin Church demonstrated in King Philip’s War his 
ability to both take prisoners and rescue them from enemy hands.  Church’s raids 
involved taking prisoners and rescuing captives even more so in King William’s War and 
Queen Anne’s War. 
Benjamin Church first became involved in King William’s War in response to 
Abenaki raids on the frontier.  Though it had been nearly ten years since the war with 
Metacom, Church felt he was the most qualified to take the offensive.  Church’s primary 
targets during the war was the Abenakis and the Micmacs, though when these enemies 
were scarce, Church attacked the French settlers.  Church’s motives were, after all, based 
in revenge and retaliation for the attacks on the frontier, and the English believed all of 
the French attacks were connected.  Unlike the Pequot War and King Philip’s War, King 
William’s War saw the first allowance for scalp bounties, offered by both the English and 
French governments.  Scalp bounties paid rewards for Native American scalps, regardless 
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if they belonged to women or children. Historians argue as to the value the scalp bounties 
had on Church’s motivation to fight again.  Regardless, Church led four expeditions into 
Maine and Acadia during King William’s War, in 1689, 1690, 1692, and 1696.18 
Benjamin Church, who had been a captain in King Philip’s War, was promoted to 
the rank of major prior to his first expedition.  Church was about fifty years old, and had 
gained some weight.  Still, men were eager to fight for a man with such a reputation.  
Church had two hundred and fifty men, some of whom were Native Americans from 
Cape Cod and Saconnet.19 Some of these men had fought with Church before, especially 
the Saconnet, who were Church’s friends and neighbors who taught him much of their 
ways.  Church arrived in Casco Bay in late September, 1689.  Church received 
intelligence that a large Native American enemy force was coming to attack an English 
settlement of Falmouth.  Church always preferred to act at night, if possible, and this time 
was no different.  Under cover of darkness, Church landed his force behind the enemy to 
cut off their exit, another strategy he employed in King Philip’s War. Church then 
divided his forces and sent some to attack the enemy.  Then things went wrong.  Church’s 
attacking force had to cross a shallow cove at low tide.  During the fight, it was realized 
that some of the musket balls they had been issued were too large, causing precious time 
in having to pound the ball into a cylinder shaped slug to fit the bore of their firearms.  
Church tried to cross the cove to reunite his force, but the rising water did not allow them 
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to cross.  Church ordered some men to provide suppressive fire from his side of the cove, 
while he and some men went wide around the cove and flanked the enemy.  The enemy 
retreated into the forest, and the village was saved.  Technically, Church was the victor, 
but at the cost of twenty-one of his men.20  However, now Church had the opportunity to 
pursue the Native Americans into the wilderness, which was more his style of fighting.  
Church and his men found two forts, at Kennebec and Androscoggin, but they were 
abandoned.21 
During the fight, Church displayed some of the tactics he had developed in King 
Philip’s War.  Church ordered the men to “scatter” and “run very thin” so that his men 
“might not be all shot down together.”22  Church always ordered his men to spread out 
according to the terrain to limit the effects of an ambush.  Church also “left six Indians 
for an ambuscade on the other side of the river, that if an enemy come over, they should 
fire at them, which would give him notice.”23  Church always wanted the element of 
surprise.  Church’s men had dumped out their crates of musket balls onto the field when 
they realized some were the wrong size.  Now the men were out in the open, sorting and 
cleaning up the loose ammunition.  By placing the ambush, Church accomplished several 
things.  First, he provided security for his men while they sorted out the logistical issue.  
Second, he maintained the element of surprise, as the ambushing party would hit any 
approaching enemy unsuspected.  Last, Church insured that the enemy did not surprise 
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him.  The fact that Church used six men for the ambush demonstrates another fact of this 
style of warfare.  When the ambush fired, Church would be alerted to respond.  However, 
it was also possible that six men, just by the element of surprise, could repel an enemy 
force with one volley, due to the hit and run nature of guerilla warfare.  It was not about 
winning battles and taking ground.  This style of warfare was about striking quickly and 
moving on.  
The second expedition occurred during the attempted two-pronged attack on 
Quebec and Montreal.  Church reasoned that the French would be occupied with the 
attacks, and he could move to attack their Native American allies directly in their 
villages.  Church also hoped to kill or capture the Abenaki war chief, Moxus.  The 
company landed in Casco Bay in September and began a movement towards an enemy 
village.  Upon arriving at the palisade, some men tried to flee, but the rangers fired and 
killed some of them.  Inside the fort, Church found some English captives.  He ordered 
the execution of some of the Native Americans inside the fort to serve as an example.  
Church took the rest captive, but left two elderly women at the fort to give a message to 
the rest of their clan when they reunited.  Church’s message was for the Abenaki to return 
all captives to the English within fourteen days, and he would return his prisoners.  The 
major also received intelligence that more Native Americans were at the Saco River, 
planning a raid.  He then burned their corn and village.  Church recruited Anthony 
Brackett, a local man who knew the terrain, and marched to the Saco River.  There, the 
company killed a few of the enemy and rescued another English captive, who disclosed 
the location of more enemy.  Church followed up on the intelligence and, though he 
found no enemy, he found and confiscated their stockpile of beaver furs.  On the way 
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home, some of his men were attacked while encamped.  Church arrived with more men 
and drove the attackers off.  The rangers attempted a pursuit but did not find any 
significant force.24   
Church’s methods in this expedition may seem brutal, but no more than any other 
raid.  In fact, Church was known for showing compassion to surrendering Native 
Americans in King Philip’s War.  At the fort, Church’s men questioned a Native 
American.  Church says that “the soldiers were being very rude, would hardly spare the 
Indian’s life, while in examination; intending when he had done, that he should be 
executed.”25  However, the rescued English captives vouched for the man’s kindness, and 
Church allowed him to live.  Church did not capture Moxus, but his expedition did 
achieve some success.  In October, several sachems came to the English colonial 
government with the desire to make peace.  The Native American diplomats brought ten 
English captives with them as a sign of good faith.  The Abenakis and the New 
Englanders made a temporary peace, with the intention of creating a formal, permanent 
treaty in the spring, along with the return of the rest of the captives.  Unfortunately for the 
New Englanders, word soon spread of the failed conventional two-pronged attack, and 
the Abenakis never returned in the spring to renew the treaty.26 
Church’s third operation was in support of a conventional mission.  Sir William 
Phips was appointed as the governor of Massachusetts, but was facing political trouble 
because of witchcraft scandals plaguing New England at that time.  Orders came from 
England demanding the New Englanders to reassert their claim in Maine by rebuilding 
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the settlement and fort at Pemaquid.  The colonists did not approve because of its 
distance from the rest of them would make it difficult to protect, but Phips, obeying 
orders and seeing an opportunity to escape the witchcraft scandal decided to personally 
lead the expedition.  Phips made Church the second-in-command of the expedition and 
commander of the Maine militia.  En route to Pemaquid, the expedition stopped at 
Falmouth in Casco Bay, the settlement where Church had fought earlier with the wrong 
caliber musket balls.  Since Church’s victory there, it had been attacked by the French 
and their Native American allies.  There, they buried the dead and salvaged some 
cannons and sailed for Pemaquid.27   
It was a two part plan, with conventional and unconventional sides.  Phips rebuilt 
the fort while Church conducted raids in the surrounding area to rid the vicinity of enemy 
and to draw attention away from the men building the fort, thus preventing an attack.  
The fort, which Phips named Fort William Henry, was well built and was armed with 
eighteen pound guns, which were the largest available at that time.28  Cotton Mather 
described the fort as “the finest thing that has been seen in these parts of America” and 
claimed that it took two thousand cartloads of stone and that sixty men could defend it 
against twelve hundred.29 Mather also mentions the guerilla campaign, recording that 
Church raided Penobscot and killed “five Indians; and afterwords, to Taconet, where the 
Indians discovering his approach, set their own fort on fire themselves, and flying from it, 
left only their corn to be destroy’d by him.”30  It is interesting that Mather says the Native 
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Americans set the fort on fire themselves, but does not specify whether or not it was 
intentional.  Either way, it is evident that Church’s attacks were successful in allowing 
the fort to be built unhindered.  It is also evident that Church made sure to destroy the 
corn along with the fort so the enemy could not return to it. 
Unfortunately for the English, the Fort William Henry did not last.  Cotton 
Mather explains that “the expense of maintaining it, when we were so much 
impoverished otherwise, made it continually complained of, as one of the Countryes 
grievances.”31  The English did not provide the fort with enough men or supplies, and in 
1696 it fell to the French by way of a short siege.  When news of the fort’s fall reached 
back to Boston, the colonial government sent Benjamin Church on his fourth and final 
expedition of King William’s War.  However, the colonial government also released 
some Native American captives who had knowledge of Church’s forthcoming expedition.  
Those freed captives went ahead to warn others while Church prepared his operation.32 
Church decided to use whale boats to move to transport his men in his fourth 
expedition.  Many of his men were Native Americans, some of whom excelled at piloting 
whale boats.33  Church’s decision to use whale boats was the result of his third 
expedition.  Church had placed an ambush where the enemy was landing their canoes.  
Church’s men successfully captured two Native Americans, who were so surprised “that 
they could not give any notice to the others” but when more enemy discovered the 
abandoned canoe, they fled on their canoes, leaving Church’s forces unable to pursue.34  
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Church swore to “never go out again without a sufficient number of whale boats, the 
want of which was the ruin of that action.”35  Church and his men, under cover of 
darkness, landed at Pemaquid, but found it deserted.  Church then sailed to Acadia, and 
landed at Beaubassin on the Isthmus of Chignecto.  The tide prevented Church from 
landing immediately, and gave the Acadians time to evacuate.  When Church landed, a 
local man named Germain Bourgeois, the son of the founder of the settlement, brought 
Church a paper declaring the town’s neutrality.  Church then inquired as to the location of 
the Micmac, who were allies to the French.  Bourgeois refused to tell Church, claiming 
fear of Micmac retaliation.  Church then accused the town of supporting Micmac raids 
against the English settlers.  Church ordered the destruction of the houses, barns, and 
crops.  Church also ordered the livestock to be killed and mutilated with tomahawks. 36  
The settlers looked with horror at the livestock, to which Church responded “it was 
nothing to what our poor English, in our frontier towns, were forced to look upon.  For 
men, women, and children were hacked so, and left half dead, with their scalps taken 
off.”37 Church then warned the villagers that if the frontier is attacked again, he would 
return with “hundreds of savages, and let them loose amongst them, who would kill, 
scalp, and carry away every French in all those parts.”38 
After Beaubassin, Church’s forces continued to the mouth of the St. John River 
where the French were building a fort.  Church’s group killed one Frenchman and 
captured another, who disclosed to Church the location of the cannons intended for the 
fort.  Church captured the cannons and held a council with his men on whether to attack 
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the French at Fort Nashwaak, commanded by Joseph Robineau de Villebon.  The men 
decided that attacking the fort would be too difficult due to the water level.  Church 
decided to end the expedition and return home.39  It may have actually been that such an 
act would have been more conventional in terms of combat and therefore not Church’s 
style.  Church hated forts, regardless of whether he was defending or besieging the 
structure.  Church’s hatred of forts caused some problems with his commanders early in 
King Philip’s War. 
En route back to Boston, Church crossed paths with Lieutenant Colonel John 
Hathorne, the son of another veteran of King Philip’s War and prominent member of 
Massachusetts society.  Hathorne was on his way to attack Fort Nashwaak.  Hathorne 
ordered Church and his men to join their expedition, to which Church angrily complied.  
The combined force arrived and started siege operations, but after only a few days, the 
English attackers were driven from the area by the French and their Native American 
allies.  The defeat marked the end of New England’s offensive operations in King 
William’s War.  In 1697, the war officially ended status quo ante bellum under the Treaty 
of Ryswick.40  
In 1702, war broke out again, known as Queen Anne’s War.  Queen Anne was the 
English monarch after the death of William III.  Queen Anne’s War was the American 
theater of the War of Spanish Succession.  The Hapsburg King of Spain, Carlos II, died 
without an heir and left his throne to Philip, the grandson of Louis XIV.  Several 
European rulers disputed this claim, as it essentially meant that the Louis XIV would rule 
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France, Spain, and the colonies of both kingdoms.41  In North America, Queen Anne’s 
War was really more of a continuation of King William’s War.  The war in the northern 
part of North America contained conventional warfare marked by attempts at taking 
major cities, and unconventional warfare marked by bloody raids on the frontier.  There 
were some differences from King William’s War.  Because of the Spanish issues, the 
southern theater of North America became more prominent.  Also, during the war, 
England and Scotland united to form Great Britain, which created a greater sense of 
empire and connectedness to the colonies.  As a result, the war effort in New England 
received more royal assistance than it previously had since the colonies’ foundation.  
Additionally, the Iroquois Confederacy made a separate peace with New France between 
the wars, meaning they would be neutral and the colonies could not rely on them.  As a 
result, much of New York also sought to remain neutral, leaving New England to carry 
the majority of the northern war effort.42 
The conventional efforts at making war were similar to attempts in the previous 
war.  The English made a few attempts to recapture Port Royal, but those attempts failed.  
Samuel Vetch, a Scotsman who fought in the European theater of King William’s War, 
started trying to revive the two-pronged attack on Montreal and Quebec.  Vetch strongly 
argued to the royal authorities that the best course of action was to remove the French 
completely from the continent, and the two-pronged attack was the best way to 
accomplish that task.   The Queen agreed and offered to send ships and troops to New 
England.  In America, Francis Nicholson, the Deputy Governor of New York, 
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volunteered to lead the overland attack on Montreal.  However, the promised British 
assistance was canceled twice as it was determined they were more needed in the 
European theater.  Nicholson traveled to England accompanied by four Native American 
sachems in an attempt to gain royal support.  A small amount of support was given, but 
the English colonists were not prepared for an attack when Nicholson arrived back in the 
Americas, as they were expecting yet another delay.  Instead, not wanting to waste the 
British support, Nicholson took the force and attacked Port Royal.  The attack was 
successful, and Port Royal was renamed Annapolis, after the queen.  Finally, in 1711, the 
two-pronged attack was revived yet again, with definite British support.  Sixty-four ships 
carrying six thousand seamen and five thousand soldiers left England, commanded by Sir 
Hovenden Walker.43  The ground troops were commanded by Brigadier General John 
Hull.  These forces would attack Quebec by sea while Nicholson attacked Montreal by 
land.  It was the largest force ever assembled in the colonies at the time. However, that 
led to a problem.  The British expected quarter in Boston, but the town could not 
accommodate their numbers. As a result, the attack began hastily and unprepared.  
Walker was unable to find pilots who knew the waters.  Walker’s ships entered a fog, and 
some ships ran aground, losing 850 men.44  Walker abandoned the assault and sailed for 
England.  Nicholson received word of Walker’s retreat, and also turned and went home.45  
That was the end of conventional warfare in Queen Anne’s War.  The two-pronged attack 
had failed, even with some British assistance.  Port Royal, or Annapolis, was taken and 
held, however, until the end of the war. 
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The guerilla warfare also continued in much the same fashion as the previous war.  
The war started with a series of French-supported Abenaki raids on New England in 
1703.  In February 1704, the French and Abenakis raided the settlement of Deerfield, 
Massachusetts, killing or capturing more than half the town.  At the time, it was the most 
destructive raid in New England’s history.46  The Deerfield settlement was only a few 
years old, but it was built on the ruins of a settlement that was evacuated during King 
Philip’s War.  In King William’s War, after the French and Native American attack on 
Schenectady, New York, the Deerfield community erected a palisade around the town.  
Later in King William’s War, in September 1694, there was an attack on Deerfield, but 
the town defended itself, having none killed and two wounded.47  By Queen Anne’s War, 
the palisade had rotted, but the settlers repaired it.  Settlers living outside the 
fortifications moved inside.48  It was as if they had learned their lessons from the previous 
wars. 
Perhaps it was the preparations and experiences of past conflicts that make the 
effectiveness of the raid so puzzling.  Heavy snows had fallen, and by February 29, the 
snow was almost as high as the walls.  There had been no attacks in the area since the 
beginning of the war, and the settlers had grown complacent.  Just before dawn, a mixed 
force of French and Native Americans entered the town and killed or captured over one 
hundred settlers.  Accounts vary as to how the attack came so surprisingly.  John 
Williams, the town’s minister, who was captured in the raid, along with several of his 
family, blamed the surprise attack on the town watch.  Williams, believing the town 
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watch had fallen asleep, wrote after his release that “the enemy came in like a flood upon 
us, our watch being unfaithful:  an evil, whose effects in a surprisal of our fort, should 
bespeak all watch unto avoid, as they would not bring the charge of blood upon 
themselves.”49  Samuel Partridge, an officer in the Massachusetts militia claimed that 
“the watch shot of a gun and cried “arm,” which very few heard.”50  It is possible that 
Partridge is correct because even though the French and Native American raiders acted 
mostly at will, they met strong resistance in one corner of the town.  For one home to 
mount such a defense, it seems likely that they had heard a shot or warning and had time 
to quickly prepare. 
The home that fought back was occupied by seven men, four to five women, and 
a number of children.51  Men defending the home included Benoni Stebbins, a sergeant in 
the militia, David Hoyt, Jr., and Joseph Catlin.  Interestingly, another man in the home 
was Benjamin Church, a twenty-four-year old member of the militia.  Given the age of 
this Church in relation to King Philip’s War, it is possible he was named after the aged 
guerilla fighter.  The men, women, and children occupying the house fought off the 
French and Native American attackers for almost three hours.  The house walls were 
filled with raw bricks intended to insulate the home.  In this case, the walls protected the 
people inside from bullets.  The attackers kept trying to enter the house, only to be driven 
back or killed, including an Abenaki war chief and a French officer.  Some attackers tried 
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to set fire to the house but were killed.  Others tried to negotiate with the defenders, but 
the English settlers would not give up the home.  Eventually, the attackers left with their 
captives, setting fire to much of the village.  Stebbins was killed in the home’s defense, 
but the attackers never entered the home.52 
Despite the heroic efforts of the defensive stand at Stebbins’s house, it was 
nothing new.  For nearly a hundred years, the English colonists had relied on fortified 
homes and blockhouses as a means of defense.  These tactics were effective because the 
Native Americans did not typically besiege the villagers, but hit them swiftly, caused a 
lot of damage, and left.  The colonists, with the exception of Church in King Philip’s 
War, were not efficient at pursuing their attackers into the woods.  Usually efforts to 
pursue Native American attackers ended in ambush, with the colonists fleeing back to 
their towns.  In King Philip’s War, Church excelled at pursuing the enemy and avoiding 
ambush, while using ambush tactics himself.  After the attack on Deerfield, some English 
militiamen attempted to pursue their attackers, but met with the fate of so many others.  
Some of the attackers ambushed the pursuing New Englanders to protect the rest of their 
force making off with the captives.  According to William Whiting, a Connecticut militia 
officer, about thirty men pursued the attackers, and “though they killed five, yet venturing 
too far lost nine.”53  Partridge says the ambush “caused our men to give back, though too 
late, being a mile from the fort.”54  The ambush was typical of what had been occurring 
since the Pequot War.  The distance of a mile made any support from the town 
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impossible, be it artillery or reinforcements.  At the time of the Deerfield raid, Benjamin 
Church still had the best reputation for dealing with such circumstances.  Samuel 
Penhallow, a militiaman in Queen Anne’s War, wrote that “under all those cruel 
sufferings from a cruel Enemy little or no impression could ever be made by us upon 
them, by reason of their retiring into unaccessible Swamps, and Mountains” to which 
Penhallow claims “it was determined that, Major Church, who was so eminently 
Serviceable in the former War,” that they would need his services again.55 
At the time of the raid, Church was sixty-five years old and fat for a man of the 
period.  Still, upon receiving news of Deerfield, Church did not wait to be contacted.  
Church began raising troops immediately.  Church mounted his horse and rode seventy 
miles to Boston to offer his services to the governor, Joseph Dudley.  Church urged 
Dudley to allow him to take the offensive, starting with pursuing the Deerfield attackers.  
Instead, Dudley ordered Church to attack the French and Native Americans in Acadia.  
The two men also discussed an attack on Port Royal.56   
Church’s final expedition began on April 1, 1704.  Given that the Deerfield raid 
happened on February 29, Church’s expedition took less than a month to prepare.  
Church had a reputation for mobilizing quickly during King Philip’s War.  A month may 
seem long, but considering that Church had no command when word reached him of the 
raid speaks volumes.  Church also raised his own troops, numbering five hundred and 
fifty men, including Anglo-Americans and Native Americans.57  Church decided to use 
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whale boats, similar to what he had done in King William’s War.  Church also had two 
British navy ships and one colonial vessel, and his men were issued some of the first 
Queen Anne’s Muskets, which were a new and improved version of the flintlock 
musket.58  Church also requested “four or five hundred pairs of good Indian shoes be 
made ready, fit for the service for the English and the Indians.”59  Church had long since 
adopted Native American moccasins and snowshoes for his expeditions.  It is interesting 
to note that he charged the colonies with supplying moccasins for his Native American 
troops.  Church must have considered his Native American soldiers as equals, or at least 
recognized the necessity of them being as well equipped as his Anglo-American soldiers. 
For the first time, Church decided against attacking Native American forts.  
Church felt that because it was early spring, there would be little to no food stored for his 
men to destroy, and it would therefore be a wasted effort against his Native American 
enemies.  Instead, Church decided to attack the French posts.  Church used the whale 
boats to maneuver and the larger boats as his supply train and support.  Church captured a 
few French and Native Americans, whom he interrogated under threat of torture as to the 
numbers and locations of more enemy.  Church attacked settlements in Penobscot Bay, 
where his forces killed or captured everyone they encountered, including the capture of 
the daughter of Baron de St. Castin, a French officer responsible for the attacks on 
Falmouth and Pemaquid in King William’s War.60 
Church patrolled the coasts during the day and sent out night patrols on land.  
Church patrolled Mount Desert Island and Machias Bay, but people were scarce.  Church 
                                                          
58 Samuel Drake, Border Wars of New England, 194. 
59 Thomas Church, History of the Great Indian War, 246. 
60 Samuel Drake, Border Wars of New England, 195-197; and Peckham, Colonial Wars, 64. 
129 
 
received intelligence that there was a significant enemy force at Passamaquaddy Bay, but 
he only found a French family, who told him that there were enemy Native Americans in 
the nearby woods.  Church divided his forces and sent out expeditions to find the enemy.  
Church found a French settlement, which he raided.  One of Church’s standing orders 
was for his men to never stand or move in a tight group.  This was one way Church 
limited the effects of an ambush.  After the raid, Church noticed a group of his men 
standing in a cluster.  Church angrily ordered them to disperse, but the men complained 
that some of the captives would not exit their home.  Church ordered the men to break 
into the house and tomahawk them, “never asking whether they were French or Indians; 
they being all enemies alike” in his eyes.61  Upon reuniting with his forces, Church sent 
the larger ships to blockade Port Royal, while he took his forces to Grand Pré in the Bay 
of Fundy.62   
The Grand Pré settlement was built on such low ground near the coast that a 
system of dykes was necessary to the survival of the town.  When Church’s forces 
arrived, the tide would not allow him to land.  When the tide rose the next morning, the 
French began attacking Church’s boats.  Church countered and most of the French fled 
the town.  Church’s forces spent the rest of the day destroying the houses and barns and 
killing the livestock.  Church also destroyed the dykes, which flooded their crop fields.  
At night, Church set an ambush for the returning settlers.  The ambush worked, and 
Church captured over one hundred prisoners, including about thirty women.63  Church 
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sent two of the prisoners to Jacques-Francois de Monbeton de Brouillan, the governor of 
Acadia, to warn him of further raids if there were another attack like Deerfield.64 
Church conducted similar raids at Pisiquid and Cobequid before sailing to 
Beaubassin at the Isthmus of Chignecto, where he made the threat to return in King 
William’s War.  A number of French militia were waiting and attacked Church’s forces 
when he arrived.  Church, despite being old and fat, led the charge himself, and his 
fighters pushed the attack back.  Church then sacked the town for the second time.  
Meanwhile, Church’s forces at Port Royal had forced the French militia commander, 
Pierre Leblanc, to offer to surrender.  Leblanc was overruled by Brouillan, who sent a 
force of soldiers and Micmac to attack the English, which kept Church’s forces from 
landing.  When Church and his forces reunited, they considered making another attempt 
on Port Royal, but considering the state of his men and the amount of prisoners they had 
taken, Church returned home, stopping and patrolling a few places he had already visited, 
but found nothing significant.65 
Queen Anne’s War ended in 1713 with the Treaty of Utrecht.  Philip became the 
King of Spain with the condition that he could not ever also rule as the King of France.  
Austria gained some Spanish territory in Europe, primarily Italy.  Great Britain gained 
Gibraltar and Minorca in the Mediterranean; Acadia, renamed Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland, Hudson Bay in North America; and St. Kitts in the Caribbean.  The 
people of Acadia were forced to move or live as British subjects.  Despite the fact that 
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Benjamin Church never replicated his success from King Philip’s War, his style of 
fighting had a lasting impact on those he trained.  The New Englanders realized they 
could perform offensive operations in the wilderness.  During Queen Anne’s War, the 
colonists constructed a two hundred mile chain of forts and stockades from Deerfield, 
Massachusetts to Wells, Maine.66  From these forts, patrols were sent out between the 
villages and into the frontier to scout out Native American enemies. The patrols not only 
denied their enemies freedom of movement for attacks, but it disrupted their hunting, 
fishing, and agricultural patterns.  Some of the men Church trained went on to form their 
own ranger units, like John Gorham, whom Church was ordered to “advise… and is to 
take your command in case of [Church’s] death.”67  Those orders show that the 
authorities valued Church’s methods so much that they did not want them lost in the 
event of his death.  Those trained by Church trained others in Church’s tactics and 
innovated their own methods of guerilla warfare, which saw action King George’s War, 
the French and Indian War, and the American War for Independence.68 
Church’s methods of guerilla warfare would likely never win a war against a 
European army like it did against Metacom.  Church’s methods were effective when used 
to harass the enemy.  Even when Church could not find the enemy, it was because his 
raids kept them moving.  By forcing the enemy to withdraw, it could not attack the 
people on the frontier.  Church’s methods also attacked the enemy’s livelihood through 
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other means.  With the enemy on the move, they could not grow crops, hunt, or fish.  
That combined with the destruction of their food and shelter has the potential to quickly 
wear an enemy down.  Those were the same tactics ordered by General George 
Washington in the Sullivan Expedition against the Iroquois in the American War for 
Independence.  Destruction of food and shelter was not new to the New Englanders.  
They used that method to nearly eradicate the Pequot in the 1630s.  The difference in the 
Pequot War was that the colonists were completely dependent upon Native American 
allies to bring them to the Pequot.  In King Philip’s War, Benjamin Church lessened the 
dependence on Native American allies by adopting and adapting some of their methods 
of combat.  King William’s War saw the use of Church’s tactics against both Native 
Americans and European settlers.  By Queen Anne’s War, there were more practitioners 
of Church’s style of warfare, and they were willing to carry it into the eighteenth century. 
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Chapter VI 
BENJAMIN CHURCH’S LEGACY:  GORHAM, ROGERS, AND THE CONTINUED 
USE OF AMERICAN GUERLLIA FIGHTERS IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 
 
 When Benjamin Church and his rangers tracked down and killed Metacom in 
1676, he proved to New England that a new style of fighting which combined elements of 
European and Native American warfare was more effective in the North American 
wilderness that traditional European tactics alone.  During King William’s War and 
Queen Anne’s War, Church demonstrated how that style of fighting could work in 
conjunction with more conventional European forces.  Two more imperial wars 
threatened the New England frontier in the eighteenth century.  King George’s War, 
known in Europe as the War of Austrian Succession, was fought from 1744 to 1748.  The 
French and Indian War, known in Europe as the Seven Years War, was fought from 1754 
to 1763.  Both wars pitted the French and English, their colonists, and their Native 
American allies against one another.  The wars were also bridged by small colonial wars 
that stemmed from the tension between the French and English settlers.  In what ways did 
Church’s legacy impact the colonial wars of the eighteenth century?  Though Benjamin 
Church was dead by the start of these wars, his tactics were embraced more than ever.  
The colonial political powers who were familiar with his methods encouraged others to 
follow in his footsteps.  More importantly, the British crown itself also endorsed the 
creation of units who could fight as Church did.  This resulted in the creation of several 
independent units of rangers who could replace Native American allies as scouts and 
raiders.  Not surprisingly, men like Church or directly connected to him commanded 
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these new ranger companies. Church’s legacy was the permanent addition of irregular 
forces to act in support of regular forces in the wars of colonial New England. 
 Trouble was already brewing in North America when war was declared between 
France and Great Britain in 1748.  When Queen Anne’s War ended in 1713 with the 
Treaty of Utrecht, the French North American province of Acadia was ceded to the 
British.  The British renamed the province Nova Scotia and changed the name of the 
capital from Port Royal to Annapolis Royal, after the queen.  Despite becoming British 
territory, there was little change to Nova Scotia’s population demographics.  After Queen 
Anne’s War, the British allowed the Acadians to remain in Nova Scotia, with the 
condition they “were to become British subjects, and enjoy their religion so far as the 
laws of Great Britain would admit.”1  In addition to the Acadians, the majority of peoples 
living in Nova Scotia were Micmacs, Maliseets, and mixed-bloods of French and Native 
American descent known as métis.2  The only true British presence in the province was a 
“garrison… kept at Port Royal, and another small one at Canso; but still no government 
was established, nor any suitable encouragement given” for Anglo-Americans “to settle 
there.”3  Great Britain appointed Jean Paul Mascarene as governor of Nova Scotia.  
Mascarene was a French born British military officer, and it was hoped that he could 
soothe the tensions between the Acadians and New England.4 
 The tensions between New England and the Acadians were not unwarranted.  
Many times during King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, the New England 
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frontier was attacked by French and Native American raiders from Acadia.  Likewise, 
Acadia was often a target for British aggression.  Benjamin Church led five expeditions 
into Acadia during the two wars, which included many brutal raids against combatants 
and noncombatants.  After the European treaties were signed, raids by Native Americans, 
especially the Micmacs, continued.5  The Micmacs were staunch allies of the French.  
The Anglo-Americans of New England considered the Micmacs their worst enemies and 
described them as bearing “the greatest resemblance of wild beasts of any savages that 
we are acquainted with.”6  Though the New Englanders knew the Micmacs were 
responsible for at least some of the raids against them, they often blamed the Acadians 
for the attacks.  After Queen Anne’s War, the new acquired British subjects “continued to 
commit hostilities themselves, at least secretly, and to supply and encourage the eastern 
Indians to perpetrate the most horrid acts of cruelty and barbarity on the English on the 
frontiers of New England, whose scalps or persons were carried to market to Louisburg, 
Quebec.”7  Despite the New Englanders’ strong convictions to blame the Acadians, it is 
likely that at least some of the motivation came from French Canada.  Canada was a 
martial society in comparison to the agrarian Acadia, and many Acadians did not 
consider themselves to be countrymen to the Canadian Frenchmen.  Regardless, the 
French government in North America desired to take back Nova Scotia, and the result 
was a bloody frontier similar to that of the previous imperial wars.8 
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 France declared war on Great Britain on March 15, 1744.  News of the declaration 
arrived in the French colony of Île-Royale on May 3, 1744.  From Louisbourg, the capital 
of Île-Royale, French governor Jean Baptiste Louis Le Prévost Duquesnel began planning 
an attack on the British garrisons in Nova Scotia.  The French force was commanded by 
Captain François Dupont Duvivier and his brother Joseph and consisted of fifty troupes 
de la marine, seventy Maliseet warriors, and one hundred Micmac warriors.9  The British 
in North America did not receive word of the declaration until late April.  When the 
French and Native American attackers arrived, the British were caught off guard.  The 
French attacked Canso on May 24, 1744.  The unsuspecting garrison put up little 
resistance before surrendering to the French force.  Canso was looted and burned.  The 
French force then turned its efforts towards Annapolis Royal.10 
 Annapolis Royal was protected by Fort Anne.  The British force there was 
commanded by Governor Mascarene.  In July, a guerilla force led by French priest Jean 
Louis Le Loutre attacked Annapolis Royal.  Le Loutre’s force consisted of some 
Acadians and Micmac and Maliseet warriors.  The soldiers defending Annapolis Royal 
were able to repel the attack, and Le Loutre retreated until the larger French force arrived.  
On September 6, 1744, the French force under Duvivier arrived at Annapolis Royal.  The 
French lacked artillery to fully attack the fort.  Instead, Duvivier besieged the city and 
sent small groups to probe the defenses, which led to skirmishing between the British 
defenders and the French attackers.  Duvivier asked Mascarene to surrender, suggesting 
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that resistance was futile.  If Mascarene surrendered peacefully, they would be treated 
well by French captors.  If they were taken by force, he would turn the captives over to 
his Native American allies.11  The thought of Native American captors surely worried the 
defenders of Annapolis Royal.  The Native American practice of taking captives was well 
known in the region, and was a major threat on the frontier during King William’s War 
and Queen Anne’s War.  As the siege continued, the dissention began to grow behind 
Fort Anne’s walls.  The probing and skirmishing continued, and Duvivier asked 
Mascarene to surrender again on September 15.  Mascarene refused and the siege 
continued, with both sides hoping for reinforcements to arrive and finish the siege.12  
Luckily for Mascarene and Annapolis Royal, reinforcements did arrive in late September 
to break the siege.  Annapolis Royal’s saviors were not the British Navy or Royal 
Marines, but rangers from New England led by John Gorham III. 
 Though John Gorham was not related to Benjamin Church, it can be argued that 
Gorham’s Rangers13 were descended from Benjamin Church’s units.  John Gorham’s 
great-grandfather, John Gorham I, was a military officer from the Plymouth Colony 
during King Philip’s War, the same as Church.  Gorham I was killed in that war fighting 
on the frontier.  Gorham I would have recognized the unique nature of North American 
fighting during his service.  Gorham’s grandfather, John Gorham II served under 
Benjamin Church in King William’s War.  Eventually, Gorham II was appointed as 
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Church’s second in command. Church was ordered to “advise” Gorham so that he could 
“take… command in case of [Church’s] death.”14  Church’s rangers were comprised of 
both Anglo-American and Native American troops.  When Gorham founded his first 
company of rangers in King George’s War, he could only recruit twenty Anglo-
Americans into service.15  The remainder of Gorham’s ranks was filled by Native 
Americans.  Most of Gorham’s Native American troops were Nausets and Wampanoags.  
Gorham’s force also included a small group of Pigwackets.  The Pigwackets were 
members of the Wabanaki Confederacy that also included the Abenakis, the Maliseets, 
the Micmacs, and the Passamaquoddies.  The Wabanakis were traditional French allies, 
and provided much of the frontier threat that Church faced in King William’s War and 
Queen Anne’s War.  The Pigwackets who joined Gorham were from farther south and 
chose to ally with Massachusetts.  Their perceived treachery left their families exposed to 
possible retaliation, and Gorham helped his Pickwacket soldiers relocate their people to 
safer territory.  This paralleled actions taken by Church in King Philip’s War when he 
befriended certain Wampanoag groups who aided him rather than Metacom.16 
 Gorham paralleled Church in another aspect in regards to his Native American 
troops.  After King Philip’s War, many of New England’s Native Americans were 
economically forced into occupations where they performed services to English 
employers.  A significant example was the whaling business.  Unlike Church, Gorham 
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did not come from the frontier, but the coast of Cape Cod.  Gorham began whaling at a 
young age, and developed skills in seamanship, navigation, logistics and leadership.17 
Gorham also developed a relationship with the Native Americans who worked as 
whalers, just as Church formed relationships with his Native American neighbors at his 
frontier home.   More importantly, Gorham and his Native American sailors were experts 
at adapting whaling into a combat technique.  Church himself adopted the use of 
whaleboats in his fourth expedition to Acadia during King William’s War.  Some of 
Church’s Native American soldiers were also experienced whalers.  During Church’s 
third expedition, his party encountered a small enemy force equipped with canoes.  
Church’s soldiers attempted to kill or capture the force, but many escaped in their canoes.  
After the event, Church swore to “never go out again without a sufficient number of 
whale boats, the want of which was the ruin of that action.”18  Church was known for his 
mobility in frontier fighting, but his use of whale boats made him an amphibious threat as 
well.  Gorham’s Rangers excelled at amphibious operations. 
 Gorham arrived at Annapolis Royal on September 26 with a force that included 
about seventy Pigwacket rangers.19  Despite having been besieged for twenty days, many 
of the British garrison at Fort Anne did not welcome the rangers because of underlying 
hatred towards all Native Americans.  Instead, the rangers occupied a building in 
Annapolis Royal to serve as a barracks and base of operations.  From there, the rangers 
used their boats to conduct military movements up and down the waterways.  The rangers 
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brought supplies to the men defending the fort, which lessened the effects of the siege.  
The rangers could not attack the French head on, but they were able to get behind them 
and harass their movements and support elements.  On October 4, the rangers raided a 
Micmac camp.  In true frontier fashion, men, women, and children were killed and their 
corpses mutilated.  Gruesome as it was, the raid was effective.  The Micmacs withdrew 
from Annapolis Royal.  The French followed the Micmacs’ example and withdrew to 
Louisbourg on October 5.  The siege was broken and the city was liberated.  The French 
naval force Duvivier was expecting did arrive, complete with the artillery needed to 
attack the fort.  Finding Duvivier’s force gone, however, the French vessels sailed away.  
Gorham’s force of Anglo-American and Native American irregulars changed the balance 
of power and secured the British hold on Nova Scotia.20 
 After the siege was broken, the British began to plan an offensive campaign 
against the French.  In King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, the English and later 
British forces had experienced some success by combining regular tactics with Church’s 
irregular tactics.  Massachusetts governor William Shirley felt the best plan of action was 
a conventional attack on the French at Louisbourg with support of the British navy.  
Gorham believed that the biggest threat to Nova Scotia were the Acadians and unfriendly 
Native Americans in the colony.  Thus began the conventional planning for an attack on 
Louisbourg while Gorham’s Rangers began a guerilla campaign against the people of 
Acadia.  Mascarene gave Gorham permission to raid his Acadian subjects, and 
contributed supplies to the rangers.  The Massachusetts General Court offered one 
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hundred provincial pounds for Micmac adult male scalps and fifty for the scalps of 
Micmac women and children.   Of course, there was no real way to tell to whom a scalp 
belonged once it was taken, and the bounty created a rise in recruitment.  Later, the 
British government increased the bounty to ten pounds sterling.  The French government 
also encouraged scalping with monetary reward.  The frontier once again became a place 
that was safe for no one.21 
 Gorham’s Rangers contributed to the defense of the frontier.  Both John Gorham 
and his brother Joseph, who had his own ranger company, used their resources to build 
blockhouses.  Blockhouses were not particularly effective at winning wars, but they 
provided some safety for the noncombatants of frontier villages if they had men to defend 
them.  More importantly, the rangers raided Acadian and Micmac villages and disrupted 
enemy movements.  Constant small scale patrolling kept the Acadian guerillas and 
Micmac allies on the defensive, and forced many Native American allies to abandon the 
French cause.  The rangers were also beneficial to the overall British strategy by 
gathering intelligence.  Joseph’s company raided Cobequid, where they interrogated 
villagers who claimed that Le Loutre had forced their allegiance at the threat of death.  
Joseph’s rangers searched the homes and seized the weapons they found.  They took four 
Cobequid deputies and a parish priest captive.  Gorham’s Rangers also used an 
unconventional tactic of dressing as Frenchmen to deceive their enemies, thus capturing 
and interrogating them.  The rangers were famous to the British and notorious to the 
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French.  When the time came to attack Louisbourg, the rangers were considered valuable 
assets.22 
 Louisbourg contained a stone fort that defended entry into the Gulf of Saint 
Lawrence and the river which led to the interior of Canada.  Shirley appointed William 
Pepperell, an American born officer, to lead the expedition.  Pepperell commanded 4,300 
men from Massachusetts, Maine, New York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.23  The 
British naval vessels were commanded by Commodore Peter Warren, who sailed up from 
Antigua in April of 1745.  Shirley appointed Gorham as commander of whaleboat 
operations at Louisbourg, which included amphibious assaults.  Shirley believed that the 
rangers were best suited for attacking any enemy force attempting to enter or leave the 
area based on their highly efficient mobility.  Shubael Gorham, father to John and Joseph, 
commanded the 7th Massachusetts Regiment.24  The combined Anglo-American and 
British force was much better prepared to launch an attack than the initial French attack 
on Annapolis Royal. 
 On April 30, 1745, Gorham conducted an amphibious landing at Gabarus Bay.   
The Anglo-American troops marched overland while the British fleet established a naval 
blockade around Louisbourg and provided artillery support for the land forces.  The 
Americans were also able to capture a French cannon and turn it against the French.  
Despite being bombarded by both sides, the French sustained a resistance for some time.  
On May 23, Gorham conducted another amphibious landing, this time under heavy fire.  
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French naval forces attempted to break the blockade and rescue Louisbourg, but to no 
success.  Only one French ship made it through the blockade, and its provisions were not 
enough to sustain the fort.  The other French ships were captured by the British naval 
forces under Warren, and their provisions were used to sustain the British.  On June 16, 
1745, the French surrendered Louisbourg.  They would not, however, surrender it to the 
American land forces, and Warren had to come ashore to accept the surrender.  
Louisbourg’s treasures were divided between the British navy and the British crown, 
scorning the Americans who had fought to take it.  When the war ended with the Treaty 
of Aix-la-Chapelle on October 18, 1748, Louisbourg was returned to the French in 
exchange for the British colony of Madras in India.25 
 Before the end of the war, in 1747, Gorham went to England to gain royal support 
to recruit more rangers.  Gorham had hoped to get enough money to recruit and train two 
thousand rangers.  However, the Royal Court was so impressed with Gorham’s actions in 
Nova Scotia that they awarded him a commission as a captain in the British army, in 
addition to his rank as a lieutenant colonel in the Massachusetts militia.  His company 
also received royal status as His Majesty’s First Independent Company of American 
Rangers.  Gorham was the first American ranger to receive a commission in the British 
army.  Such commissions were typically reserved for high ranking officials acting as 
governors.26  Gorham’s commission proves that American guerilla fighting had become 
highly respected since the days of Church’s first company.  Church was initially met with 
apprehension.  After his success in King Philip’s War, Church gained support for his 
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style of fighting.  The colonial governments supported his actions in King William’s War 
and Queen Anne’s War.  In King George’s War, the British monarch himself was willing 
to endorse American guerilla fighting. 
 When Gorham returned home, the war was over.  The fighting, however, was not.  
The French priest Jean Louis Le Loutre was still determined to force the British out of 
Acadia. Likewise, the Anglo-Americans had lost all patience with their Acadian 
neighbors and wanted them gone as well.  The result was a long and bloody guerrilla war 
on the frontier. Gorham raised his ranger company and conducted many amphibious raids 
and woodland patrols over the next few years.  When Gorham died from smallpox in 
1751, his brother Joseph assumed his command.  Joseph also received a commission in 
the British army and continued to fight the Acadians and their Native American allies 
until the next imperial war broke out on the continent.  In the French and Indian War, 
Joseph was present at the recapture of Louisbourg and commanded one of the six ranger 
companies present at the capture of Quebec.  Like Church’s tactics in earlier wars, the 
rangers were often used to support larger groups of regulars by patrolling their flanks 
during movements.  Their notorious reputation made them valuable targets to the enemy.  
When rangers were captured, they were brutally tortured.  The brutality of the guerilla 
war only fueled the demand for more ranger companies.27 
 In fact, John Gorham and his brother Joseph were not the only commanders of 
rangers in King George’s War.  Massachusetts born Benoni Danks led an independent 
ranger company that fought alongside Gorham’s Rangers and were also skilled at 
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tracking and capturing Acadian guerillas and their Native American allies.  William 
Clapham and Francis Bartelo also commanded ranger companies and were regarded 
highly by British officers.  John Goeffe led his ranger company on a one hundred and six 
day scouting mission in the dead of winter.  Winter soldiering was primarily a ranger 
skill, especially for an expedition that lasted three months.  Another significant ranger 
commander was David Ladd, an experienced woodsman whose company patrolled the 
New Hampshire frontier.  Among the soldiers who served under Ladd was a fifteen year 
old boy whose family home had been raided and burned at the hands of Abenaki 
warriors.  The boy’s name was Robert Rogers, and he would eventually become the third 
American ranger to receive a commission in the British army, and arguably the most 
famous American ranger of all time.28 
 Robert Rogers was born in 1731 in New England and raised on the frontier.  It 
was 1745, during King George’s War, when Rogers’s family home was attacked by 
Abenakis.  Rogers’s family fled east to the more fortified town of Rumford.  In the spring 
of 1746, eight men from the town were ambushed by an Abenaki war party.  Five of the 
men were killed, stripped naked, scalped, and disemboweled.  The Abenakis cut out their 
hearts and their genitals, and finally removed their limbs.  When the local militia 
commander asked for volunteers, young Robert Rogers raised his hand.  The militia 
conducted several patrols, but were not able to locate any enemy.  By October, the militia 
disbanded to harvest crops for the winter.29  Military campaigns for militia soldiers 
commonly came to a halt in colonial times as winter approached so the soldiers could 
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return home to work the fields, but winter usually halted regular forces as well.  Only 
specialized soldiers like Rogers usually operated through the winter. 
The events of 1745 and 1746 had an impact of the teenaged Rogers.  Rogers 
developed a hatred for Native Americans.  Church was a close friend of his Native 
American neighbors.  Even Gorham relied heavily on Native Americans to fill his ranks, 
and distinguished friendly Native Americans from enemies.  Rogers, on the other hand, 
preferred to fill his ranks with Anglo-Americans.  Despite their different attitudes 
towards Native Americans, Rogers embodied many of the same tactical traits as Church 
and Gorham.  Like Church, Rogers was a frontiersman, a hunter, and a marksman.  In 
fact, for men like Church and Rogers, hunting, marksmanship, and soldiering were 
connected.  In fact, Rogers used hunting to improve the marksmanship of his men.   
They will next be taught to handle their arms with dexterity; and, without 
lasting time upon trifles, to load and fire very quick, standing, kneeling, or 
lying on the ground.  They are to fire at a mark without a rest, and not 
suffered to be too long in taking aim.  Hunting and small premiums will 
soon make them expert marksmen.30 
 
Rogers also depended on hunting skills to feed his men.  This was important because as a 
highly mobile force they could not be bothered with long, slow supply trains.  The ability 
to feed themselves while in the field was critical to their success.  Rogers wrote in 
December of 1755 that his men “had the good fortune… to kill two deer with which 
being refreshed, on the 24th, we returned to Fort William Henry.”31  There is a very 
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noticeable parallel to Church’s account from King Philip’s War where himself and his 
men killed and cooked a deer while waiting on the main effort to join them.32 
Both examples demonstrate that the two rangers saw hunting skill as a significant asset to 
war.  The examples also prove that both parties traveled lightly to increase mobility. 
 Like Church, Rogers also recruited men familiar with his style of fighting to lead 
as officers in his company.  Church appointed John Gorham II as his second in command.  
Rogers also recruited his friend, John Stark.  Stark was, in many ways, more qualified to 
command than Rogers, and probably embodied the “white Indian” more than Church 
himself.  Stark was captured by the Abenakis as young man.  When the Abenakis forced 
Stark to run the gauntlet, he attacked the line of captors waiting to attack him.  The 
Abenakis put him to work hoeing the weeds out of their corn, but the defiant Stark used 
the hoe to cut the corn instead.  When his captors demanded to know why he cut the corn 
instead of the weeds, Stark explained that farming was women’s work, and that he was a 
warrior.  Stark was actually correct in regard to Native American gender roles, and his 
courage impressed his captors.  The Abenakis adopted Stark as one of their own.  Stark 
was eventually ransomed back to New England society.33  Stark proved his worth to 
Rogers in January 1757 when his rangers were attacked by a much larger force of French 
soldiers and their Native American allies.  It seemed that the enemy party had the rangers 
trapped when “Lieutenant Stark repulsed them by a brisk fire from the hill, killing a 
number, and affording us an opportunity to post ourselves to advantage.”34 
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 Another way in which Rogers emulated Church was in dress.  Despite his dislike 
for Native Americans, Rogers recognized that certain Native American innovations were 
best adapted for the American frontier.  During the winter months, Rogers and the men 
wore snowshoes to best maneuver across the snow.  Rogers and his men also adopted the 
use of a “tomahock… and scalping knife.”35  Among other items, Rogers required his 
men to dress in “a strong tanned shirt, short trowsers, leggings, [and] mokawsons.”36  
When preparing for an expedition in Queen Anne’s War, Church requested the colonies 
pay for “four or five hundred pairs of good Indian shoes” for himself and his men.37  It is 
clear that both men believed a hybrid of European and Native American clothing and 
equipment were best adapted for warfare on the frontier.  Later in the war, as the British 
regular army became more involved with Rogers’s ranging expedition, Rogers’s Rangers 
were outfitted with professional uniforms.  However, the uniforms were still suited for 
Rogers’s style of warfare.  The cloth was green, which identified them as rangers to the 
other British soldiers, but also provided some concealment in the eastern woodlands.  The 
uniforms were equipped with leggings and moccasins rather than breeches, stockings, 
and European shoes.  The rangers had originally used seal skin bags to keep their powder 
and ammunition dry, but those were replaced with regulation cartridge boxes.  They were 
also issued bayonets, but still carried the tomahawks and scalping knives.38 
 Another aspect in which Rogers mirrored Church and Gorham was the use of 
watercraft in patrolling.  Native Americans in eastern North America had long used 
natural waterways and river systems as highways.  As stated, Church adopted the practice 
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in King William’s War.  Gorham, an experienced whaler, excelled at amphibious warfare 
and was a highly mobile asset to the British cause in King George’s War.  Rogers used 
boats to move in and out of French territory quickly.  When the French discovered 
abandoned boats in their territory, French officer Louis Antoine de Bougainville assumed 
it “could only be what it was, the advance guard of their army, led by Colonel Bradstreet 
and Major Rogers.”39  Rogers was able to maneuver his boats through French territory 
undetected because he moved “by night.  This idea is made more likely because several 
of the oars were bound with cloth,” which would have muffled the sound of the oars 
touching the water.40 
 Like Church, Rogers also used ambush tactics when scouting enemy territory.  In 
January, 1756, Rogers recorded “at night we renewed our march, and, by daybreak… 
formed an ambush… within gunshot of the path in which the enemy passed from one fort 
to another.”41  When a small French party passed by, the rangers captured them and 
confiscated their supplies.  This event was typical of many ambushes conducted by 
Rogers.  Church often used an “ambuscade” as part of his strategy, as a method of attack, 
to cut off fleeing enemies, or to serve as an early warning system of approaching 
enemy.42 
 Church’s rangers primarily served as raiders whereas Rogers’s Rangers primarily 
served as scouts.  Rogers was, however, given the opportunity to raid the Abenaki in 
1759, the same Native American people who raided his home as a boy.  British Major 
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General Jeffrey Amherst ordered Rogers to attack Abenaki raiders living at Saint 
Francois in the Saint Lawrence Valley.  Rogers’s Rangers crossed the 150 mile distance 
in twenty two days.  Rogers’s force consisted of 142 rangers.  About 1500 yards from the 
Abenaki village, Rogers and his men dropped all of their extra gear and checked their 
weapons for functionality.  Rogers picked one hundred men for the attack, leaving the 
rest to cordon the area in order to prevent escape.  After dark, the rangers moved in, 
armed with muskets, tomahawks, and knives.  At dawn, the rangers saw scalp poles 
adorned with the fresh scalps of Anglo-American men, women, and children.  The 
rangers let loose their fury on their Native American enemies, burning huts and 
tomahawking and scalping Abenaki men, women, and children.  Those who tried to 
escape ran into the awaiting ambush formed by the rest of the rangers.43  The raid was 
victorious, although brutal.   The raid was also very familiar to the history of New 
England.  The night maneuver, attack at dawn, and surrounding cordon were the exact 
tactics used by Church when Metacom was killed.  The burning of the village and the 
murder of women and children were indicative of the brutal raid at Mystic during the 
Pequot War. 
Despite Rogers’s similarities to Church, it would be wrong to assume that Rogers 
became the most famous of the colonial American rangers because of any strategic 
victories or tactical innovations.  Church is more deserving of that claim.  Church’s 
victories over Metacom and Annawon were the most decisive victories conducted by 
ranger companies in the colonial period.  The reason for Rogers’s fame is that he took the 
methods used by Church, and later Gorham, and put them into writing.  In 1757, Rogers 
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formalized those methods into twenty eight rules which compiled became the first written 
manual of warfare in North America.44  By creating a standardized method for training 
rangers, Rogers negated the need for Native American allies and even rugged 
frontiersman.  Anyone, including British regulars could be trained in the ways of ranging. 
In 1753, Rogers and nineteen men surveyed the New Hampshire frontier.  By 
1754, Great Britain and France were at war, and in 1755, Sir William Johnson was in 
desperate need of intelligence regarding the French numbers.  Johnson was a general and 
the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the northern region of the British colonies.  The 
British had relied on Mohawk scouts for reconnaissance, but the Mohawk had abandoned 
the British at the start of the war for diplomatic reasons.  Joseph Blanchard, a colonel in 
the New Hampshire militia suggested that Robert Rogers could conduct a reconnaissance 
mission for Johnson instead.  In September, Rogers led a small ranging party into French 
territory, where he ambushed a French and Native American party, creating enemy 
casualties and taking prisoners and gaining information.  The raid was successful, if 
somewhat insignificant, but drew British attention to Rogers and the rangers.45 
Previously, the British had seen the use of Native American allies as a necessary 
evil in frontier fighting.  Native American allies provided troops for wilderness fighting, 
gathering intelligence, raiding villages, taking prisoners, and countering similar attacks 
by the enemy.  However, the British also viewed Native American troops as unreliable, 
as they often showed up for duty ill equipped, drunk, or not at all. 46  The American 
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leadership had seen the value of rangers since the days of Benjamin Church, but the 
British leadership began to take note as well after the defeat of General Edward 
Braddock.  The French had long supported the type of irregular warfare conducted by 
Native Americans and rangers.  The British realized that North America was not Europe, 
and that rangers were a necessary part of American warfare.47 
Rangers were primarily used to support the British regular army and colonial 
militia by providing information used to plan operations.  The ranger patrols explored 
routes through French territory to determine the best route of attack for conventional 
forces.  The rangers also gathered information about enemy strength and movements.  
When possible, the rangers attacked small, isolated enemy units to question.  The rangers 
destroyed or confiscated enemy supplies when the opportunity presented itself.  Just as 
rangers had done in New England for a century, the rangers defended frontier 
communities by disrupting small raiding parties.48  Though the ranger’s actions did not 
provide a significant threat to enemy numbers, the expeditions had significant strategic 
value for planning.  Furthermore, on a much smaller scale, the conventional forces began 
to emulate the rangers. 
John Campbell, Fourth Earl of Loudoun, and commander in chief of the British 
forces in America used American rangers as scouts when Native American allies were 
unavailable or unwilling to serve British interests.  Loudoun also saw the need to engage 
in winter fighting, but the regulars and even the militia could not field expeditions in the 
snow.  Rogers’s Rangers, however, had much experience with winter expeditions.  
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Despite their value, Loudoun did not like using Americans and preferred the use of 
British officers, over which he felt he had more control.  While Loudoun recognized the 
usefulness of rangers, he disliked their methods of scalping their slain enemies.  To 
remedy his disdain for the American rangers, Loudoun sent junior British officers into the 
field with the rangers in order to learn their skills.  Loudoun believed that he could then 
use his own newly trained officers to build ranger companies within his own British 
forces.49  Loudoun explained that “it is impossible for an Army to Act in this Country, 
without Rangers; and there ought to be a considerable body of them, and the breeding 
them up to that, will be a great advantage to the Country, for they will be able to deal 
with Indians in their own way.”50  When Fort William Henry fell to the French, it left the 
frontier exposed to raids.  Loudoun asked New York, New Jersey, and New England to 
raise ranger companies to help defend the frontier.51  Loudoun clearly recognized the 
need for rangers, but simply wanted them within his own British system. 
British general James Abercrombie also recognized the value of rangers, and tried 
to emulate them with his own British forces.  After a failed scouting party where Rogers 
lost many men and was himself wounded, Abercrombie wrote to Rogers.  “I am sorry… 
for the men you have lost… few persons will believe it, but, upon honour, I should have 
been glad to have been with you, that I might have learned the manner of fighting in this 
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country.”52  At the Battle of Ticonderoga in July, 1758, also called the Battle of Carillon, 
Abercrombie used Rogers’s Rangers in conjunction with his own regulars.  Abercrombie 
used the rangers as marksmen to target the French defenses while the regular forces 
attacked in three long parallel lines.53  The rangers were proficient in the use of firearms 
and were excellent marksmen.  Thomas Brown, a member of Rogers’s Rangers who was 
captured by the French gave an account of his capture after his release.  “I… got to the 
Centre of our Men, and fix’d myself behind a large pine, where I loaded and fir’d every 
Opportunity… The engagement held, as near as I could guess, five and a half Hours, and 
as I learnt after I was taken, we killed more of the enemy then we were in Number.”54  
Brown was captured during a winter scouting expedition by a much larger French and 
Native American force.  However, Brown’s narrative demonstrates how the numerically 
inferior rangers inflicted significant casualties on the enemy through the use of protective 
cover and marksmanship.  British troops tried to adopt American marksmanship by 
adopting target practice rather than simply leveling their arms and firing.  British officers 
created a new command for their troops.  “Tree all!” was the order shouted when 
ambushed which told the regulars to find cover rather than standing in the line of fire.55  
British general George Augustus Howe, Third Viscount Howe also spent time 
learning from the rangers.  The Pennsylvania Gazette reported in 1758 that Howe had 
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“been forming his regular Troops to the Method of Bush-fighting all Season, so that he 
has now, it is said, made them as dexterous at it almost as the Rangers.”56  The British 
regulars adopted more than just tactics.  The British troops modified their uniforms as 
well.  Howe “ordered all the coats of his Regiment to be cut short, to make them as light 
as possible.”57  British soldiers also modified their hats to make them more practical 
under combat conditions.  Many British officers stopped wearing their identifiable 
gorgets and sashes, which served no practical purpose and drew the attention of enemy 
marksmen.  Some British regulars even adopted the ranger, and initially Native 
American, practice of carrying tomahawks.58  Firearms and steel hatchets were European 
inventions, not Native American.  Native Americans, however, adopted their use in their 
own way.  Rangers, specifically beginning with Church, readopted those European items 
through a Native American filter.  While a musket was European, the concept of aiming 
it was American.  The decision to use an iron hatchet, a European tool, as a weapon in the 
same manner as a Native American war club rather than using a sword or bayonet was 
also American.  Rangers often dressed in a combination of European and Native 
American dress because it was more tactically proficient on the battlefield.  When the 
British regulars began trying to emulate the rangers, they were copying the same methods 
as Church nearly a century before. 
 The French military had taken an active role in North America much earlier and 
therefore accepted the use of guerilla fighting and Native American raids long before the 
British army.  The French used the term “la petite guerre” to describe the style of fighting 
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conducted by Church, Gorham, Rogers, French and Acadian guerrillas, and their Native 
American allies.59  Despite their longer exposure to la petite guerre, Rogers and his 
rangers still made a name for themselves among their enemies.  Bougainville remarked 
that “in Canada everyone is a soldier but every soldier is not equally brave.  The English 
detachment consisted of seventy three men, six of them officers, and ten sergeants, 
commanded by Robert Rogers, captain of one of the four companies of forest runners that 
the English call ‘Rangers,’ whose mission is to go scouting in the woods.”60  
Bougainville’s comment provides several pieces of evidence.  First, rangers, especially 
those under Rogers, seemed extraordinarily brave to their enemies.  Second, they were 
highly mobile wilderness fighters and scouts, as Bougainville refers to them as forest 
runners.  Last, the popularity of ranger companies was growing.  Whereas Church’s unit 
was unique in 1675, Rogers’s unit was one of four at the time of Bougainville’s remarks 
nearly a century later. 
Not all of the high ranking British officers were fond of the American rangers.  
Initially unimpressed, Major General James Wolfe referred to the rangers’ appearance as 
“little better than canaille.”61  In preparation for his expedition into Canada, Wolfe raised 
six ranger companies to support his regulars and militia.  However, in May of 1759, 
Wolfe referred to the “six new-raised companies of North American Rangers” as “the 
worst soldiers in the universe.”62  Wolfe’s description of the rangers may be a bit unfair.  
After all, these were newly raised rangers, and likely inexperienced.  Additionally, any 
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unit of Americans, especially those preparing for irregular warfare, would have probably 
seemed unfit for service to a professional British officer.  What is more important is the 
fact that the British army was raising six new ranger units, which shows that the Anglo-
American and British officers had come to see American guerilla fighters as a necessary 
element of warfare in the New World.  However, the war was all but won with a 
conventional battle.  Wolfe became the British hero of the war with a decisive victory 
over the French at Quebec on the Plains of Abraham.  Wolfe died in the battle.  Had he 
lived, he would have seen his victorious British army looking far different from their 
European selves.  Of the victorious force, only sixty percent were actually British.63  The 
rest were Anglo-American and Native American.  The British regulars who were present 
had modified their clothing and tactics as well.   
 The British victory at Quebec marked the beginning of the end for the French in 
North America.  In truth, it marked the beginning of the end for the British as well.  With 
the French gone, the Anglo-Americans soon grew restless with British rule.  The year 
1763 marked Great Britain’s greatest victory over the French, but it also marked the end 
of the colonial period for the Anglo-Americans.  In the hundred years that took place 
between King Philip’s War and the American Revolution, the idea of what it meant to be 
an American soldier transformed dramatically.  Whereas Benjamin Church had to plead 
with colonial powers to create his specialized military unit, men like John Gorham III and 
Robert Rogers were lauded for using the same tactics.  Whereas the colonial powers 
resisted Church’s methods because they were too Native American, colonial and British 
powers supported Gorham’s and Rogers’s methods and even adopted some of the ways 
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of the American ranger themselves in order to lessen their dependency on Native 
American allies.  Had Church not established himself as a friend to his Native American 
neighbors and been so receptive of Native American culture, it is unlikely that he would 
have ever been responsible for Metacom’s death.  Instead, his success led directly to the 
expansion of ranger expeditions in King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, and 
eventually King George’s War and the French and Indian War after Church’s death. 
Those campaigns established a precedent of violence and guerilla warfare that lasted on 
the American frontier for centuries.   
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